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1684
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Topic
#1136
Metaphysical Solipsism is Most Likely Correct
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The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
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After 1 vote and with 6 points ahead, the winner is...
semperfortis
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Description
I had to create a new debate, because you can not edit the debate to add a contender after you publish it!
Metaphysical Solipsism: The philosophy of subjective idealism that asserts that nothing exists externally to the mind and that the external, physical world and other people are representatives of the mind and have no independent existence.
No Kritiks
BoP is shared; Con must also provide evidence to show that the resolution is most likely untrue.
R1: Opening arguments
R2: Rebuttals
R3: Rebuttals and defence
R4: Rebuttals/defence (no new arguments)
Round 1
Pro
#1
Thanks, Death23 for accepting the debate.
Overview
I intend to affirm the resolution by asserting two arguments
within this debate. Firstly, I intend to show that metaphysical solipsism is
the most epistemologically parsimonious ontology. Subsequently, I will affirm
the resolution by providing an argument for idealism (specifically monistic idealism)
which logically entails metaphysical solipsism.
== Aff ==
A1. Epistemological Parsimony
Munchhausen Trilemma
This was a thought experiment constructed to demonstrate the
seemingly futile task of proving the veracity of any fact or axiom [1]. “Trilemma”
refers to three options which represent the three distinct ways we could
attempt to prove the truth of any proposition. The first option is the circular
option; that is, using the conclusion of an argument as a premise. An
example of this is: ‘2 + 2 = 4, because 2+2 =4’. Clearly, this is unsavoury as
we can use circular reasoning to prove any proposition imaginable. The second
option is the regressive argument, where one proposition is supported by
another proposition, which is supported to another… ad infinitum. This option
is predicated on a fallacy as there is no foundation of knowledge to end the
casual chain of contingency. The third option is the axiomatic argument, which
rest upon accepted precepts. This is renowned as the most palatable option, yet
it is to assume the veracity of axioms. Thus, despite this option
appearing plausible, it lacks the cogent foundation to base knowledge from.
This invites the search for an indubitable fact that
presupposes all proceeding knowledge. Here, I assert that this indubitable fact
is the existence of the mind. As Descartes puts it, cogitio ergo sum (I
think therefore I am) [2]. Here, it is postulated that the only certain and
irrefutable fact is that one’s own mind exists, as one cannot doubt the mind’s
existence, because to doubt the mind would entail the existence of a doubter (you).
However, the external reality which is said to exist outwit the
mind does not share the same certainty. We perceive the external world through
various forms of qualia (senses including touch, taste, smell, sight etc.) [3],
however there is no fact which corroborates the existence of an external reality;
we can be sure that our qualia exists within the mind, but there is no justifiable
claim to assert that qualia represents anything truly external.
Occam's
Razor
This is a form of ontological
parisomony which deems a competing theory a
priori most
likely if that theory has less ontological commitments than the other
theory [4]. If two theories X and Y have the same ontological commitments, but
X is ontologically committed to Z and Y is not, it would deem Y as more
parsimonious than X.
Thus, this argument is frameworked by the fact that metaphysical
solipsism posits the fewest ontological assumptions. To promote an alternate
ontology would be to assume that qualia represents a physical reality, external
to the mind. It has been shown that such a fact is dubious and unjustifiable
via the Trilemma, thus metaphysical solipsism ought to be deemed a priori most likely.
A2. Monistic Idealism
Here, I aim to establish monistic idealism with the following
logical argument:
P1: The mind and the non-mind are
distinct
P2:The mind cannot interact with the non-mind
P3: IF P1&P2, then it is likely the non-mind
doesn’t exist
P4: IF P3, then it is likely metaphysical solipsism is true
C: It is likely metaphysical solipsism is true
Premise One
I assert this premise’s veracity is
contingent upon Leibniz Law of Identity of Indiscernibles. This law
dictates that for two entities to be considered equal, they must have all of
their properties in common [5]. Thus, it
is clear that the two are distinct axiomatically, as they have distinct
properties.
Premise Two
The cogency of this premise relies on the notion of the
incoherency of Pluralism, that is the metaphysical doctrine which professes the
multiplicity of substances [6].
A contention to solipsism would be that both the mind and external
reality exists and the two interact with each other as a conjunct via the
various forms of qualia we possess. This begs the question, how can two fundamentally different
substances interact with each other? This would be similar to something that
has no physical properties i.e an aberration or a ghost being able to interact with
reality. Clearly, there ought to be a third substance to allow interaction between the mind and the non-mind. However, there
is an absence of evidence for this third substance.
Premise Three
This is valid as it has been shown that if the non-mind were to
exist it would be irreducible to the mental and it would be incoherent to
assert that the two can interact, as it is analogous to a ghost being able to
move objects, open doors or do anything else to interact with reality. Moreover,
since it has been proven that it is certain the mind exists, it would entail
that the non-mind does not exist, for the reasons provided in the second premise.
Premise Four
Since it has been shown that it is likely the non-mind doesn’t
exist, but it is indubitable that the mind does exist, the likelihood of
metaphysical solipsism logically entails.
Conclusion
Hence, the conclusion coherently follows from the premises.
Conclusion
I have provided two arguments to affirm the resolution. Firstly, I
postulated that metaphysical solipsism is the most preferable ontology in
regards to epistemology – this is true due to Occam’s Razor – solipsism is simply
the least ontologically committed ontology. Secondly, I affirmed the resolution
by establishing monistic idealism. I provided that the mind and the non-mind
are two distinct substances, but certainty only applies to the former. I professed
that it would be logically incoherent for the two to interact with each other
and would logically require a third substance to act as a medium for
interaction; yet evidence of such doesn’t exist. As such, the likelihood of
metaphysical solipsism is entailed from both arguments, thus successfully upholding
the resolution.
Over to Con.
References
Con
#2
Resolution: Metaphysical solipsism ("MS")
is most likely correct
MS is the notion that one's mind is the only thing
that exists. There are notions similar to MS like the idea that we're living
within a computer-simulation (e.g. "The Matrix") or that we're
actually dreaming brains in vats. These similar notions don't deny the
existence of an objective reality; they merely deny that what is commonly understood
to be reality is the true reality. MS goes further than these other notions
- MS denies the existence of any objective reality. If you ask a metaphysical
solipsist what happens if a tree falls in the forest and he isn't there to
observe it, then he will answer that the tree makes no sound - Even if someone
else is there to hear it. Not only does the tree make no sound - The tree never falls in
the first place because no objective reality exists outside of his mind. This idea
is the subject of this debate. I now present arguments which show that MS is
most likely incorrect.
Arguments against MS:
1. MS isn't consistent with observation. The
following are observations which aren't consistent with MS:
a) The products of other minds
i. There are things which by their nature required
thought or calculation to create. For example, literary works or mathematical
computations. We observed that these things exist yet we have no recollection
of doing any mental work to create these things. For example, the content of
this website or the chess moves of an opponent. We can tell when our minds are
working and when they aren't. A central tenet of MS is that only one mind
exists and nothing else exists outside of that mind. Yet, somehow, without the
mind doing any mental work, mental products are being created. This observation
implies that something other than that one mind is doing the necessary creative
work.
b) A lack of consistency between mind and reality
i. Let us suppose for the moment that MS is
correct - That no objective reality exists outside of one's mind. Mind and reality
would then be one and the same. If that were true, then one would expect the
mind and reality to share certain qualities. To illustrate - Consider that when
dream (or fantasize while awake) the experiences are the product of the mind
and thus share the qualities of the mind - The content of those experiences aren't
bound by natural law as reality is. These experiences can be fantastic and
nonsensical. Yet, reality does not behave like that at all.
ii. For example, minds are forgetful but reality
is not. The location of personal items are forgotten frequently, but I'm
unaware of a single instance where reality seems to have forgotten
anything. The sun has never forgotten to rise, nor has the moon ever
forgotten to have that distinct cratered pattern on its face. It's the same
every time. We, in fact, write things down because we know that our minds may
forget but reality will not forget - What's written on paper reliably remains
as it was written. What's stored within our minds does not.
iii. Consider also that it is uncommon for minds
to make mistakes, but the occurrence of "mistakes" in reality are
either uncommon or non-existent. The type of "mistake" I'm referring
to would be an observation in reality which flies in the face of natural laws -
An observation which clearly cannot have any rational explanation and which
would cause one to question reality itself - For example, suppose you turned a
corner and expected to see what was ordinarily around that corner but instead
you saw what was around an entirely different corner. To get an idea of what
I'm getting at - Consider the "deja vu" scene in the movie "The
Matrix" - (which isn't too far from the topic) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfEuxRDYiyc&t=4s - The cat moves past twice
and this is a "glitch" within the matrix. The computer which was
simulating the matrix made a mistake which manifested as the cat. Our minds do
make mistakes, but I have never observed any manifestation of that type of
mistake within reality.
iv. Consider that minds lack the details that
reality possesses. Recall or imagine speaking with someone familiar to you while
sitting in a living room. You hear the voice. You see the face. Continue
looking with your mind's eye in this scenario - Now look at the floor underneath
you, the walls, the smells. Your mind has to do quite a bit of imagining to
fill in all of the details. Yet, when you actually are doing this very thing, all
of the details are readily available without any imagining necessary. However,
the fact that the dreams and the mind's eye (two things which we know are of
the mind) are easily distinguishable from reality.
v. To reiterate - We know that dreams and the mind's
eye are products of the minds and one and the same with the mind. We have
observed that dreams and the mind's eye share qualities of the mind. If MS were
correct then reality would also be one and the same with the mind just as
dreams and the mind's eye are, and consequently reality should thus share the
qualities of the mind just as dreams and the mind's eye do. Yet, we have
observed that reality does not have those qualities. This observation is not
consistent with MS being correct.
2. The existence of an objective reality is more
likely than MS being correct
If an objective reality exists, then MS is
incorrect because a central tenet of MS is that no objective reality exists. There
are competing theories which are consistent with observation where MS fails to
be consistent with observation. For example, one theory would be that we exist
within a simulated reality (e.g. "The Matrix"). This would provide a
source for the mental work required for creative works, with either a computer
doing the required work or other minds connected to the simulation. This would
also explain why reality (or what is commonly understood to be reality) lacks
consistency with our own minds - Reality would be generated by something other
than our minds and would not be one and the same with our minds. There is, of
course, the traditional explanation that we exist and live our lives in the
real world. This theory similarly does not suffer from the observational
problems of MS.
The lack of consistency of MS with observation
and superior competing theories make MS unlikely to be true.
Over to Pro.
Round 2
Pro
#3
I thank my computer-simulated opponent for their response.
== Rebuttals ==
1. MS isn’t consistent with observation.
a) The products of other minds
Con effectively asserts:
P1: There exists things which require thought or calculation to exist which we cannot remember doing “mental work” to create
P2: If one cannot remember doing “mental work” to create these things, it implies there must be something else to do it.
C: There exists something other than the mind
Without even attacking the cogency of the premises, the conclusion would entail either dualism or substance pluralism; none of which Con has provided metaphysical justification for.
b) A lack of consistency between mind and reality
i) The mind and reality don’t share certain qualities
Con gives an example of how natural laws do not pertain to the ‘dream world’. But how does this pertain to the mind as a whole? Con is essentially asserting an argument that natural laws are grounded in “external reality”, but provides no reason why natural laws cannot be reduced to the mental. Dreams do not represent the entire mind; dreams are as nonsensical and fantastic to a metaphysical solipsist as they are to any other metaphysical doctrine. This doesn't show laws are irreducible to the mind.
ii) Minds are forgetful
This would be true if and only if the mind “as a whole” is forgetful. Con cannot continue to extrapolate from specific scopes of the mind. One cannot deduce the mind as a whole to have the exact properties of its parts; as such there would be no subsets of anything; all invertebrates would have backbones; all arachnids would have arms and legs; and all reptiles would birth live young. Clearly, we cannot extrapolate the properties of a subset to a superset, as such would be absurd. Extrapolations are useful if what you are extrapolating from is observed to be “a powerful statement” [4], thus having relatively grounded veracity to make testable predictions from. However, sans an observation of this capacity, Con would be delving into an unsubstantial form of abductive explanation or “inference to best explanation”. However, in light of my previously highlighted fact that there are layers to consciousness, thi tremendously reduces the accuracy of this extrapolation.
As aforementioned, there are layers to consciousness; of which indicate that memory is not a single faculty and that our subconscious mind has a great capacity for memory [5]. Moreover, in the book ‘Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing” by Roy Lachman, Janet Lachman, and Earl Butterfield, it is elucidated that our conscious mind accounts for only a small percentage of our total mental activity. The book illustrates:
“Most of what we do goes on unconsciously. It is the exception,
not the rule, when thinking is conscious, but by its very nature, conscious
thought seems the only sort. It is not the only sort; it is the minority.” (page 207)
[6]
This innately rebukes the accuracy of Con’s assumption, since the
conscious mind is an unfair representation of the entire mind.
iii) Mistakes
Con offers to the audience that reality doesn’t “make mistakes” and later defines a “mistake” as a physical contradiction to natural laws. Firstly, this argument is unsound because natural laws do not co-exist in harmony; they often refute each other. Physicists were desperately trying to find evidence for string theory to try and reconcile the compatibility between relativity and quantum mechanics. One could offer that each theory is a “mistake” as many factors of them contradict each other. Newtonian physics offer successful predictions for macroscopic entities with relativity small velocities, yet offers infinities with particles of small masses and when objects travel greater than around 0.3c. At this scale, special relativity would only apply for inertial frames of reference; and general relativity for non-inertial frames of reference. However, relativity on balance inherently clashes with the predictions made in quantum mechanics, especially with Aspect-type experiments utilizing Bell’s inequalities [7]. The empirical results of the experiments showed the instantaneous transmission of information through entangled particles, because no matter the physical distance between two quantum systems, when one system is observed to collapse to a specific chirality (spin) its entangled particle, which could be suspended a potentially infinite distance will “instantaneously” become anti-correlated. This is in distinct violation of predictions made in relativity; the principle of locality assumes that if two objects, X and Y are to causally affect each other, it must be from the mediation of space-time [8]. If Con’s argument was correct, we would expect all natural laws to exist in harmony, yet we have been stagnant in reconciling relativity and quantum mechanics for around 100 years now.
iv) Lack of detail
This doesn’t hold much substance. Con states that dreams and the mind’s eye are “easily distinguishable from reality”, yet the majority of the time one is unaware that they are dreaming – as only 50% of people can say that they have “lucid dreamed” at least once in their lives [9]. Con’s position would hold weight if and only if lucid dreaming would occur at least the majority of the time.
v) Summary
Prima facie acceptance of these arguments wouldn’t necessarily extend to the mind as a whole. Con makes a lot of unwarranted extrapolation – assuming that specific subsets of the mind either transfer their properties to the superset, or inherit those properties from the superset (which he hasn’t demonstrated). Con would need to show why something that might be true for one subset of the mind, applies to the whole mind. Or, he ought to demonstrate why the mind as a whole already shares those properties.
2. The existence of an objective reality is more likely than MS being correct
All of these competing theories are deemed less parsimonious via Occam’s Razor. For example, a ‘Simulated World Hypothesis’ (SWH) would have far greater ‘ad hoc’ assumptions than MS. An ‘ad hoc’ assumption is an ontological extension which prevents a theory from being falsified [10]. To assume the veracity of SWH, one would need the ad hoc assumption that there exists an intelligent species with the technology able to create an artificial reality. Since MS makes the least ontological assumptions, it remains more parsimonious than these competing hypotheses. Moreover, I have shown that the “observational inconsistencies” are misrepresentations of the entire mind, thus they hold no weight in preferring any other competing hypothesis with MS in epistemological grounds.
== Rebuttals ==
Neg
Con’s opening argument is synthesized with a lot of “intuitive observation” and consists of few tenable a priori or a posteriori postulates . If MS were an incoherent ontology it would be because it is either internally incoherent or externally constrained [1]. Therefore, non-existence is attributed when “something” is in violation of a priori truths, or a posteriori observations. For example, the concept of a “squared circled” is internally incoherent as it inherently oxymoronic as it is in violation with other truth-bearing assertions. Moreover, the proposition “semperfortis is dead” might be an internally consistent proposition, yet it is externally constrained by the nature of reality providing that semperfortis is actually alive. With this said, Con’s opening argument doesn’t provide a substantial argument that MS is “internally incoherent”, nor “externally constrained”. As aforementioned, he posits many “intuitive observations” to why MS would seem illogical, but doesn’t show it is incoherent a priori. However, my arguments are a priori justifications of the ontology of MS, for this reason, my arguments should take priority.
Con’s opening argument is synthesized with a lot of “intuitive observation” and consists of few tenable a priori or a posteriori postulates . If MS were an incoherent ontology it would be because it is either internally incoherent or externally constrained [1]. Therefore, non-existence is attributed when “something” is in violation of a priori truths, or a posteriori observations. For example, the concept of a “squared circled” is internally incoherent as it inherently oxymoronic as it is in violation with other truth-bearing assertions. Moreover, the proposition “semperfortis is dead” might be an internally consistent proposition, yet it is externally constrained by the nature of reality providing that semperfortis is actually alive. With this said, Con’s opening argument doesn’t provide a substantial argument that MS is “internally incoherent”, nor “externally constrained”. As aforementioned, he posits many “intuitive observations” to why MS would seem illogical, but doesn’t show it is incoherent a priori. However, my arguments are a priori justifications of the ontology of MS, for this reason, my arguments should take priority.
1. MS isn’t consistent with observation.
a) The products of other minds
P1: There exists things which require thought or calculation to exist which we cannot remember doing “mental work” to create
P2: If one cannot remember doing “mental work” to create these things, it implies there must be something else to do it.
C: There exists something other than the mind
Without even attacking the cogency of the premises, the conclusion would entail either dualism or substance pluralism; none of which Con has provided metaphysical justification for.
Moreover, the second premise is refuted in
light that there exists different layers to consciousness. For example, there exists the subconscious
which is a part of the mind which is not focally aware, yet influences one’s
actions and feelings [2][3]. Hence, it could be argued that all of the imaginative
capacity that one doesn’t “recollect” doing are done subconsciously. Taking
dreams as instances, I cannot “recall” creating or imagining the dreams, but it
is my mind that does all of the “creative work” for them. Why is it that when I
am dreaming I have the capacity to recreate a full reality, but somehow my mind
would be incapable of imagining all of reality as a whole?
b) A lack of consistency between mind and reality
i) The mind and reality don’t share certain qualities
Con gives an example of how natural laws do not pertain to the ‘dream world’. But how does this pertain to the mind as a whole? Con is essentially asserting an argument that natural laws are grounded in “external reality”, but provides no reason why natural laws cannot be reduced to the mental. Dreams do not represent the entire mind; dreams are as nonsensical and fantastic to a metaphysical solipsist as they are to any other metaphysical doctrine. This doesn't show laws are irreducible to the mind.
ii) Minds are forgetful
This would be true if and only if the mind “as a whole” is forgetful. Con cannot continue to extrapolate from specific scopes of the mind. One cannot deduce the mind as a whole to have the exact properties of its parts; as such there would be no subsets of anything; all invertebrates would have backbones; all arachnids would have arms and legs; and all reptiles would birth live young. Clearly, we cannot extrapolate the properties of a subset to a superset, as such would be absurd. Extrapolations are useful if what you are extrapolating from is observed to be “a powerful statement” [4], thus having relatively grounded veracity to make testable predictions from. However, sans an observation of this capacity, Con would be delving into an unsubstantial form of abductive explanation or “inference to best explanation”. However, in light of my previously highlighted fact that there are layers to consciousness, thi tremendously reduces the accuracy of this extrapolation.
As aforementioned, there are layers to consciousness; of which indicate that memory is not a single faculty and that our subconscious mind has a great capacity for memory [5]. Moreover, in the book ‘Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing” by Roy Lachman, Janet Lachman, and Earl Butterfield, it is elucidated that our conscious mind accounts for only a small percentage of our total mental activity. The book illustrates:
iii) Mistakes
Con offers to the audience that reality doesn’t “make mistakes” and later defines a “mistake” as a physical contradiction to natural laws. Firstly, this argument is unsound because natural laws do not co-exist in harmony; they often refute each other. Physicists were desperately trying to find evidence for string theory to try and reconcile the compatibility between relativity and quantum mechanics. One could offer that each theory is a “mistake” as many factors of them contradict each other. Newtonian physics offer successful predictions for macroscopic entities with relativity small velocities, yet offers infinities with particles of small masses and when objects travel greater than around 0.3c. At this scale, special relativity would only apply for inertial frames of reference; and general relativity for non-inertial frames of reference. However, relativity on balance inherently clashes with the predictions made in quantum mechanics, especially with Aspect-type experiments utilizing Bell’s inequalities [7]. The empirical results of the experiments showed the instantaneous transmission of information through entangled particles, because no matter the physical distance between two quantum systems, when one system is observed to collapse to a specific chirality (spin) its entangled particle, which could be suspended a potentially infinite distance will “instantaneously” become anti-correlated. This is in distinct violation of predictions made in relativity; the principle of locality assumes that if two objects, X and Y are to causally affect each other, it must be from the mediation of space-time [8]. If Con’s argument was correct, we would expect all natural laws to exist in harmony, yet we have been stagnant in reconciling relativity and quantum mechanics for around 100 years now.
iv) Lack of detail
This doesn’t hold much substance. Con states that dreams and the mind’s eye are “easily distinguishable from reality”, yet the majority of the time one is unaware that they are dreaming – as only 50% of people can say that they have “lucid dreamed” at least once in their lives [9]. Con’s position would hold weight if and only if lucid dreaming would occur at least the majority of the time.
v) Summary
Prima facie acceptance of these arguments wouldn’t necessarily extend to the mind as a whole. Con makes a lot of unwarranted extrapolation – assuming that specific subsets of the mind either transfer their properties to the superset, or inherit those properties from the superset (which he hasn’t demonstrated). Con would need to show why something that might be true for one subset of the mind, applies to the whole mind. Or, he ought to demonstrate why the mind as a whole already shares those properties.
2. The existence of an objective reality is more likely than MS being correct
All of these competing theories are deemed less parsimonious via Occam’s Razor. For example, a ‘Simulated World Hypothesis’ (SWH) would have far greater ‘ad hoc’ assumptions than MS. An ‘ad hoc’ assumption is an ontological extension which prevents a theory from being falsified [10]. To assume the veracity of SWH, one would need the ad hoc assumption that there exists an intelligent species with the technology able to create an artificial reality. Since MS makes the least ontological assumptions, it remains more parsimonious than these competing hypotheses. Moreover, I have shown that the “observational inconsistencies” are misrepresentations of the entire mind, thus they hold no weight in preferring any other competing hypothesis with MS in epistemological grounds.
References
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subconscious
[3] Google ‘define subconscious’
[4] http://www.batesville.k12.in.us/physics/PhyNet/AboutScience/Inductive.html
[5] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4355270/
[6] R Lachman, J Lachman, E Butterfield, “Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing”
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aspect%27s_experiment
[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality
[9] https://books.google.es/books?id=90Vh8wUThAgC&pg=PA572&lpg=PA572&dq=1988,+Snyder+%26+Gackenback+conducted+a+survey&source=bl&ots=xDwoID0P8D&sig=ACfU3U0GuAkvDlBqGWaKR11ompCyKhphNA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiQ09edzrbjAhXGxYUKHZeTAkAQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false
[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hoc_hypothesis
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subconscious
[3] Google ‘define subconscious’
[4] http://www.batesville.k12.in.us/physics/PhyNet/AboutScience/Inductive.html
[5] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4355270/
[6] R Lachman, J Lachman, E Butterfield, “Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing”
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aspect%27s_experiment
[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality
[9] https://books.google.es/books?id=90Vh8wUThAgC&pg=PA572&lpg=PA572&dq=1988,+Snyder+%26+Gackenback+conducted+a+survey&source=bl&ots=xDwoID0P8D&sig=ACfU3U0GuAkvDlBqGWaKR11ompCyKhphNA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiQ09edzrbjAhXGxYUKHZeTAkAQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false
[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hoc_hypothesis
Con
#4
Rebuttals:
Re: "A1. Epistemological Parsimony" -
I am in agreement with Pro that the existence of the mind is a most certain and irrefutable fact. I also agree that "the external reality which is said to exist [without] the mind does not share the same certainty."
However, Pro goes on to claim that "there is no fact which corroborates the existence of an external reality" and that "there is no justifiable claim to assert that qualia represent anything truly external." Here I disagree with Pro. The fact that we directly observe reality with our senses corroborates its existence. Further, certain observations of reality justify the claim that it is an external rather than internal reality. Specifically, the products of other minds and the lack of consistency between reality and the mind, as I put forth in my opening case.
Pro argues that ontologically parsimonious positions are more likely. Pro alleges that "[MS] posits the fewest ontological assumptions" because "an alternate ontology would [...] assume that qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." But MS does not "posit the fewest ontological assumptions" than an "alternate ontology". MS assumes that it is not true that "qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind" while an "an alternate ontology would [...] assume that qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." Stated differently, MS posits that no objective reality exists, while competing theories assume the opposite - That an objective reality does exist. With respect to the existence or non-existence of an objective reality, MS and competing theories both make a claim one way or the other. MS and competing theories are consequently on an even-footing in terms of "ontological parsimony" when it comes to assumptions about the existence or non-existence of reality. Pro's argument fails because Pro's allegation that "[MS] posits the fewest ontological assumptions" is a false premise. More clearly:
Consider the following statements:
Statement A: "The mind exists."
Statement B: Some "qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." (from Pro's text)
Statement C: "An objective reality exists"
The common view posits the following:
1. Statement A is true.
2. Statement B is true.
3. Statement C is true.
MS posits the following:
1. Statement A is true.
2. Statement B is not true.
3. Statement C is not true.
A "simulation hypothesis" (e.g. "the matrix"; "brain in a vat") posits the following:
1. Statement A is true
2. Statement B is not true
3. Statement C is true
None of these positions are more "ontologically parsimonious" than the other because all have specific ontological positions as to the existence of the mind, the existence of an objective reality, and the nature of qualia. They are on an even-footing. A truly superior position in terms of ontological parsimony would be one which claims only that "Statement A is true" and takes no position as to the truth of statements B or C. Such a position would be more likely to be correct than MS or an alternate ontology because the truth of such a position wouldn't be contingent on the objective truth of statement B nor C. To illustrate:
A truly "ontologically parsimonious" position:
1. Statement A is true
This position is more likely to be correct than the other positions because, unlike the other positions, whether statements B and/or C are true or not true has no impact on whether or not this position is correct.
Re: "A2. Monistic Idealism"
The gist of Pros' argument here is that MS is superior because it avoids the mind-body problem. (Overview: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind-body_problem ) If the mind is all there is, then there is no mind-body problem because the body (and everything else) doesn't exist.
Any advantage MS may have by avoiding the mind-body problem is outweighed by the unavoidable logical problems associated with denying an objective reality. For example, the lack of any explanation for why and/or how qualia representing reality came about and the lack of consistency of MS with observation. Competing explanations do not suffer from these problems and are superior to MS despite the mind-body problem. Some competing explanations do not suffer from the mind-body problem at all (e.g. physicalism).
Re: The products of other minds
Pro now asserts the existence of different layers of consciousness and the subconscious and attributes the generation of qualia to these "layers". This mental work is supposedly being done without any awareness of the mind actually doing it.
Pro's argument here is largely self-defeating. These explanations for observations go against the grain of MS. Strictly speaking, the scope of the "mind" as contemplated by MS doesn't encompass the subconscious and other aspects of the human mind other than which we're not directly aware of. This is because MS is generally denies the existence of what isn't supported by direct - superdirect - observation. It's not logically consistent to acknowledge the existence of only what is superdirectly observed (i.e. the mind itself) and then to posit the existence of things which aren't supported by that same type of observation. This is precisely what Pro is doing - Asserting the existence of things which aren't directly observed as ad hoc explanations for MS's lack of consistency with observation. This explanation should be rejected.
Re: A lack of consistency between mind and reality
My argument was generally as follows:
If MS is correct, then reality would be of the mind. If reality were of the mind, then reality would likely be like the mind. We have observed that reality is not like the mind. Therefore it is unlikely that MS is correct.
Pro does not dispute the observation that reality is not like the mind. Rather than accepting the implications of the observation, Pro's response is to assert that reality represents an aspect of the mind which is uniquely unlike the rest of the mind. This explanation is unlikely to be correct because there is no reason why such an aspect of the mind would be unlike the rest. My argument was a simple and legitimate generalization.
Re: The existence of an objective reality is more likely than MS being correct
Re: "A1. Epistemological Parsimony" -
I am in agreement with Pro that the existence of the mind is a most certain and irrefutable fact. I also agree that "the external reality which is said to exist [without] the mind does not share the same certainty."
However, Pro goes on to claim that "there is no fact which corroborates the existence of an external reality" and that "there is no justifiable claim to assert that qualia represent anything truly external." Here I disagree with Pro. The fact that we directly observe reality with our senses corroborates its existence. Further, certain observations of reality justify the claim that it is an external rather than internal reality. Specifically, the products of other minds and the lack of consistency between reality and the mind, as I put forth in my opening case.
Pro argues that ontologically parsimonious positions are more likely. Pro alleges that "[MS] posits the fewest ontological assumptions" because "an alternate ontology would [...] assume that qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." But MS does not "posit the fewest ontological assumptions" than an "alternate ontology". MS assumes that it is not true that "qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind" while an "an alternate ontology would [...] assume that qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." Stated differently, MS posits that no objective reality exists, while competing theories assume the opposite - That an objective reality does exist. With respect to the existence or non-existence of an objective reality, MS and competing theories both make a claim one way or the other. MS and competing theories are consequently on an even-footing in terms of "ontological parsimony" when it comes to assumptions about the existence or non-existence of reality. Pro's argument fails because Pro's allegation that "[MS] posits the fewest ontological assumptions" is a false premise. More clearly:
Consider the following statements:
Statement A: "The mind exists."
Statement B: Some "qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." (from Pro's text)
Statement C: "An objective reality exists"
The common view posits the following:
1. Statement A is true.
2. Statement B is true.
3. Statement C is true.
MS posits the following:
1. Statement A is true.
2. Statement B is not true.
3. Statement C is not true.
A "simulation hypothesis" (e.g. "the matrix"; "brain in a vat") posits the following:
1. Statement A is true
2. Statement B is not true
3. Statement C is true
None of these positions are more "ontologically parsimonious" than the other because all have specific ontological positions as to the existence of the mind, the existence of an objective reality, and the nature of qualia. They are on an even-footing. A truly superior position in terms of ontological parsimony would be one which claims only that "Statement A is true" and takes no position as to the truth of statements B or C. Such a position would be more likely to be correct than MS or an alternate ontology because the truth of such a position wouldn't be contingent on the objective truth of statement B nor C. To illustrate:
A truly "ontologically parsimonious" position:
1. Statement A is true
This position is more likely to be correct than the other positions because, unlike the other positions, whether statements B and/or C are true or not true has no impact on whether or not this position is correct.
Re: "A2. Monistic Idealism"
The gist of Pros' argument here is that MS is superior because it avoids the mind-body problem. (Overview: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind-body_problem ) If the mind is all there is, then there is no mind-body problem because the body (and everything else) doesn't exist.
Any advantage MS may have by avoiding the mind-body problem is outweighed by the unavoidable logical problems associated with denying an objective reality. For example, the lack of any explanation for why and/or how qualia representing reality came about and the lack of consistency of MS with observation. Competing explanations do not suffer from these problems and are superior to MS despite the mind-body problem. Some competing explanations do not suffer from the mind-body problem at all (e.g. physicalism).
Re: The products of other minds
Pro now asserts the existence of different layers of consciousness and the subconscious and attributes the generation of qualia to these "layers". This mental work is supposedly being done without any awareness of the mind actually doing it.
Pro's argument here is largely self-defeating. These explanations for observations go against the grain of MS. Strictly speaking, the scope of the "mind" as contemplated by MS doesn't encompass the subconscious and other aspects of the human mind other than which we're not directly aware of. This is because MS is generally denies the existence of what isn't supported by direct - superdirect - observation. It's not logically consistent to acknowledge the existence of only what is superdirectly observed (i.e. the mind itself) and then to posit the existence of things which aren't supported by that same type of observation. This is precisely what Pro is doing - Asserting the existence of things which aren't directly observed as ad hoc explanations for MS's lack of consistency with observation. This explanation should be rejected.
Re: A lack of consistency between mind and reality
My argument was generally as follows:
If MS is correct, then reality would be of the mind. If reality were of the mind, then reality would likely be like the mind. We have observed that reality is not like the mind. Therefore it is unlikely that MS is correct.
Pro does not dispute the observation that reality is not like the mind. Rather than accepting the implications of the observation, Pro's response is to assert that reality represents an aspect of the mind which is uniquely unlike the rest of the mind. This explanation is unlikely to be correct because there is no reason why such an aspect of the mind would be unlike the rest. My argument was a simple and legitimate generalization.
Re: The existence of an objective reality is more likely than MS being correct
Please refer to my rebuttal to Pro's Occam's Razor // parsimony
argument.
Round 3
Pro
#5
Format Violation
I ought to point
out that from the description of the debate, the format is as follows:
R1: Opening argumentsR2: RebuttalsR3: Rebuttals and defenceR4: Rebuttals/defence (no new arguments)
Con has defended his opening
case in the second round, meaning I will have one less round to defend my own
opening arguments.
== Aff ==
A1.
Epistemological Parsimony
It is important to note
that Con concedes:
i) The mind’s
existence is the only indubitable fact
ii) That external
to the mind does not share the same certainty as that of the mind
Furthermore, Con states:
“The fact that we directly observe reality with
our senses corroborates its [reality reducing to non-mind’s] existence”
Con affirms the veracity
of this with the claims that MS “lacks consistency” and because of “the
products of other minds”. It should be noted that Con has dropped the argument that his case uses mere intuitive reasoning, rather than
utilizing a priori or a posteriori evidence to refute MS. I
argued that my a priori / a posteriori arguments for MS should
take precedence over intuitive reasoning and it was dropped by Con.
1.1 Ontological Parsimony
Here, Con misinterprets what
an ontological commitment is, by assuming non-existence as a predicate –
famously refuted by Immanuel Kant [1]. He asserts that all of the
competing theories are “equally parsimonious” because MS entails the non-existence
of an external reality. Something is an ontological commitment, by definition, ‘if
and only if’ it entails the existence of something. The Stanford Encyclopaedia
of Philosophy stipulates and better describes what ontological parsimony
entails:
“What does it mean to say that one theory is
more ontologically parsimonious than another? The basic notion of ontological
parsimony is quite straightforward, and is standardly cashed out in terms of
Quine's concept of ontological commitment. A theory, T, is ontologically committed to Fs if and only if T entails that F's exist“ [2]
Thus, Con’s rebuttal is
extraneous to the true intentions of ontological parsimony. Revaluating Con’s
propositions it depicts MS as the most parsimonious ontology:
“Statement A: "The mind exists."Statement B: Some "qualia represent a physical reality, external to the mind." (from Pro's text)Statement C: "An objective reality exists"The common view posits the following:1. Statement A is true.2. Statement B is true.3. Statement C is true.MS posits the following:1. Statement A is true.2. Statement B is not true.3. Statement C is not true.
A "simulation hypothesis" (e.g. "the matrix"; "brain in a vat") posits the following:1. Statement A is true2. Statement B is not true3. Statement C is true”
Thus, the veracity of A1 is upheld.
A2. Monistic
Idealism
Con actually provides no
refutation to A2, but offers that it [MS] “is outweighed by the
unavoidable logical problems associated with denying an objective reality”.
It ought to be restated that these “unavoidable logical problems” are
neither internal inconsistency (i.e false via a priori) and neither external
constraint (i.e false via a posteriori). Con’s arguments are wholly
intuitive; it is prudent to consider that intuition alone is not very
compelling -- intuition contradicts virtually all quantum physics and
relativity, but does this mean they are unlikely to be true? It is unintuitive
to think that an inertial-frame of reference > 0.3c experiences time more
slowly than an observer on Earth, but this does not supersede the physical evidence
that suggests it’s true.
Moreover, Con opines
that “competing theories don’t suffer from these problems” e.g “the
lack of explanation for why and/or how qualia representing reality came about
and the lack of consistency of MS with observation”. Firstly, the former
isn’t exclusive to MS; it would pertain to every doctrine. Secondly, Con states
that these problems “outweigh” the mind-body problem but provides no reasoning
for it. I could retaliate and say, these problems simply do not outweigh
the mind-body problem which MS rectifies.
== Neg ==
C1. The Products
of Other Minds
Con drops the contention that prima facie his argument entails doctrines that entail
the multiplicity of substances, which Con still hasn’t provided evidence for.
Furthermore, Con dismisses
that there exists different layers to consciousness e.g the subconscious,
because it isn’t supported by “direct – superdirect – observation”. This
is unsourced and begs the question to what “superdirect” observation is? Con’s argument is self-refuting, observe:
P1:The mind is all that one can be certain to
exist (accepted by Con)
P2:The subconscious mind, is of the mind (by
definition)
C:The subconscious mind certainly exists (P1, P2
Modus Ponens)
*Why should a Metaphysical
Solipsist reject something that is of the mind, when only the mind is
what a Metaphysical Solipsist believes in?*
Con misrepresents MS. He
states it is acceptable for a Metaphysical Solipsist to “acknowledge the
existence of what is superdirectly observed (i.e the mind itself)” but then
contradicts himself by saying that observing the subconscious is “positing
the existence of things which aren’t supported by the same type of observation”. To a metaphysical solipsist *everything
observable is the mind*, by definition. MS acquires knowledge the
exact same way as any other doctrine i.e a priori or a posteriori,
except that whatever the knowledge is, MS posits that it is ontologically
reducible to the mind [3]. For example, if a Metaphysical Solipsist
were to look through a telescope and see Venus, they would conclude that “Venus
empirically exists (like any other doctrine would)” & “Venus is reducible
to the mind”.
The subconscious mind is
not incongruent with the definition of MS provided; Con would need to substantiate
his claims with sources to show that my argument “goes against the grain
of MS” and would need to define what “superdirect observation” is
before this argument has any efficacy.
C2. Lack of Consistency
Between Mind and Reality
i) The
mind and reality don’t share certain qualities
Dropped by Con.
ii) Minds
are forgetful
Dropped by Con.
iii) Mistakes
Dropped by Con.
iv) Lack of
detail
Dropped by Con.
==
Con has not addressed
any of these individual points, but simply dismisses my argument about the
subconscious without evidence. Specifically, he states:
“Rather than accepting the implications of the
observation, Pro's response is to assert that reality represents an aspect of
the mind which is uniquely unlike the rest of the mind. This explanation is
unlikely to be correct because there is no reason why such an aspect of the
mind would be unlike the rest.”
Con continues to state
that logical inconsistencies are ubiquitous in MS, but drops my
contentions to every single one of his ‘inconsistencies’. I ask Con to address
b) ii) in my last round where I extensively refuted the fact that extrapolating
in this way is unsubstantial.
C3. Competing
Theories
My clarification of ontological
parsimony nullifies this contention.
Over to Con.
References
Con
#6
Re: Format Violation
The format violation was unintentional. I forgot
about the rule. I won't defend my case this round but will next round. Pro now has the same number of rounds to defend
his own opening arguments.
Re: A1 Epistemological Parsimony
Pro has restated what I wrote here. I'm not sure
for what purpose. Pro did insert brackets in to one of my quotes - saying
"[reality reducing to non-mind's]". I don't know what Pro meant by
that.
Pro has stated that I dropped his argument that my
"case uses mere intuitive reasoning, rather than utilizing a priori or a
posteriori evidence to refute MS. I argued that my a priori / a posteriori
arguments for MS should take precedence over intuitive reasoning". My response
to this is fairly straight-forward: I have already offered a posteriori
evidence (i.e. observations). These observations were offered in my opening
case. They were the lack of consistency between mind and reality and the
products of other minds.
MS is not falsifiable. There is no observation nor
reasoning which can disprove MS with absolute certainty, but it is not
necessary to disprove MS for me to win this debate. Due to the wording of the
resolution, it is sufficient to show that MS is not likely to be correct. Using
inductive reasoning, such as extrapolations, is appropriate. To that extent,
observations which show MS to be unlikely are relevant a posteriori evidence.
Re: 1.1 Ontological Parsimony
MS posits that a single mind exists and that
nothing else exists. Pro's position is that reality is but a dream of a single
mind. Pro has no evidence indicating that a single mind is capable of
generating everything. Pro points toward mentally created pseudo-realities such
as dreams and day-dreams as evidence, but these phenomena do not support Pro's
claim. These mentally created pseudo-realities fall far short of actual
reality. They lack the full spectrum of sensory input; lack the detail and
complexities of the real world; and lack the complex products of other creative
minds, etc. There is no evidence showing that a single mind can do what Pro
claims it can.
Yet such simplicity is merely ostensible. For if
God or the mind really did it, then the "How was it done?" becomes .
Granted the existence of God isn't as evident as the existence of the mind.
However, replace the X with the existence of something which is largely
undisputed, the vacuum of space, for example, and you may easily imagine the
inevitable complexities which cause such "X did it" explanations to
be merely ostensibly simplistic, but not actually.
Regarding Pro's contention that asserting
non-existence doesn't count for purposes of ontological parsimony: Such a position
is weak and is refuted by his own source. Pro says that saying that something
doesn't exist doesn't count for purposes of ontological parsimony. Pro is
wrong. Saying that something doesn't exist does count as an "ontological
commitment".
See here:
The basic notion of ontological parsimony is quite straightforward, and is standardly cashed out in terms of Quine's concept of ontological commitment. A theory, T, is ontologically committed to Fs if and only if T entails that F's exist (Quine 1981, pp. 144–4). If two theories, T1 and T2, have the same ontological commitments except that T2 is ontologically committed to Fs and T1 is not, then T1 is more parsimonious than T2.
It is important to know what it means to
"exist" within ontology. The Pythagorean theorem exists as an idea in
people's minds. Santa Clause exists as an idea in people's minds too, but Santa
Clause does not exist as a real, concrete and objective thing in actual
reality. It is the former, more expansive sense of the word "exist"
that is used. To illustrate:
Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan (the hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier), the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly.One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent object is this: to be able to say truly of an object that it doesn’t exist, it seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn’t a thing have to exist if we are to make a true claim about it?[...] what a speaker means when she utters the sentence ‘Ronald McDonald does not exist’ is not the false proposition that that sentence expresses but instead the true proposition that (the fictional character) Ronald McDonald is not a real person or is not concrete. Indeed, this is suggested by the natural amendment, ‘‘Ronald McDonald does not exist; he's a creation of advertisement!’’ On this view, then, there are no genuinely true singular negative existentials. All meaningful singular existentials are true and their negations false. We mistakenly take some singular negative existentials to be true because we conflate or do not sharply distinguish existing from being concrete.
Pro is conflating "exists" with
"real" or "concrete". In an ontological context, MS asserts
that objective reality is not real nor concrete, not that it doesn't exist. MS
posits that objective reality, in fact, does exist as an idea. This is
important because this is the true and correct meaning of "exist" with
Pro's sources. Objective reality must exist in as an idea in order that
something may be said about it. More fundamentally, this interpretation is
superior than Pro's because it fits well with the sense of ontological
commitments and ontological parsimony:
the notion of ontological commitment for theories is a simple matter. Theories have truth conditions. These truth conditions tell us how the world must be in order for the theory to be true; they make demands on the world.
Given the foregoing, Pro's contention that MS's tenet
that objective reality is not a real nor concrete thing makes an incredible
demand on the world - A fundamental demand on the nature of the entire universe.
Yet, Pro is apparently stuck with the untenable position that a theory which
asserts that objective reality is not real nor concrete makes no demand on the
world. This is a clear contradiction. Pro is mistaken and must withdraw this
contention if he is to maintain credibility.
Re: A2 Monistic Idealism
(Note: Regarding "intuitive" arguments
etc; see my discussion last paragraph under heading "Re: A1
Epistemological Parsimony" in this round)
There is strong evidence that the mind is either a
physical thing or that the mind is contingent on the brain. That evidence is
the neural correlates of consciousness. See, e.g.:
An array of radio receivers, connected to electrodes in contact with the occipital pole of the right cerebral hemisphere, has been implanted into a 52-year-old blind patient. By giving appropriate radio signals, the patient can be caused to experience sensations of light in the left half of the visual field.
This is merely illustrative. There is no evidence
that mind can happen without the brain, and this subject has been studied
extensively. So certain are we of this fact that one of our legal definitions
for death is as follows:
An individual who has sustained [...] irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.
If idealism (of which MS is a subset) were true
then there would be no reason for the existence of the neural correlates of
consciousness. The existence of the correlates suggests that the mind is
contingent on an objective reality rather than the opposite being true.
Further evidence of the mind being contingent are
the existence of evolved psychological mechanisms - hunger caused by low blood
sugar, pain in response to injury, romantic jealousy begotten by infidelity,
etc. Taken as a whole, these psychological mechanisms cause people to act in a
way which would increase the probability that a person's genes would pass on to
the next generation in a paleolithic environment. The collection of
pscyhological mechanisms suggest that the nature of the mind was created by //
selected for by natural processes during the formative period of human
evolution. The mind is therefore likely contingent on an objective reality.
This squares with what I have said previously regarding the neural correlates
of consciousness. Both pieces of evidence suggest that it is the mind that is
contingent on reality, not the other way around as would as with monistic
idealism (MS is a subset of monistic idealism).
Relating this to Pro's argument and being a bit more formal, Pro's P2 is
false ("mind cannot interact with the non-mind"; "how can two
fundamentally different substances interact with each other? This would be
similar to something that has no physical properties i.e an aberration or a
ghost being able to interact with reality.") Occasionally there are
observations which are extremely difficult to accept but are spooky-true. For
example, those Pro draws attention to such as time dilation. These defy our
notions, but they are observed nonetheless. The mind indeed can interact with
the non-mind. It has been observed. If we are to accept Pro's argument then we
retreat to an even spookier position - Pro rassles with how two fundamentally
different substances can interact. Yet, has Pro answered the question of how
one single mind can create all there is?
Round 4
Pro
#7
== Aff ==
A1. Epistemological Parsimony
Intuitive reasoning & a priori
/ a posteriori
Con states that he wouldn’t defend his case this round, but
defends this argument that was not stated in my opening case, but as a rebuttal
to his case in the second round. I wouldn’t have minded, but Con has only
touched on parts of the argument and has dropped the fact that intuitive
reasoning is unsubstantial and has dropped my analogy of relativity and QM.
Con argues that his argument is a posteriori as it is inductive
and uses extrapolations. Whilst it is true that it is a posteriori, I was
specifically referring to an a posteriori observation that would externally
constrain MS as noted in the second round. There is a difference in
weight between an a posteriori observation that deems something as
unintuitive vs an a posteriori observation that deems something cannot
exist. If I observe that there is “only
a shoe in a box”, this observation externally constrains the
notion of “an empty box”. In this
context, the direct observation of different substances (that the mind and
non-mind exist) would externally constrain MS (as MS posits that only the mind
exists). This is why I asserted Con’s
opening argument is lacklustre, because the a posteriori observations,
if true, would only show that MS is an unintuitive concept, like infinity, or quantum
mechanics. Con’s argument
does not show that anything other than the mind has to exist, nor has he shown
that MS is logically contradictory. I
have repeatedly stated that this form of prima facie intuition is
unsubstantial, because almost all physical and mathematical concepts are unintuitive
– this is yet to be responded to by Con.
1.1 Ontological Parsimony
Pro begins by asserting:
“Pro has no evidence indicating
that a single mind is capable of generating everything”
Dreams that I am unable to distinguish
from objective reality clearly demonstrates that the mind is capable of this. Con contends that dreams are so unlike
reality, yet *drops* my point of lucid dreaming. If dreams were so easily distinguishable from
reality, why is it that only 50% of people can ever say they have lucid dreamed? This was dropped by Con in the second round.
Subconscious Pertaining to MS
Further addressing Con’s dismissal of
my contentions of the subconscious, no matter what definition or
interpretation of MS Con, or anyone else has, unless it contradicts the
interpretation in the debate description, it is to be rejected as sound
argumentation. Since the subconscious
mind does not contradict the definition of MS I provided in the
description (a definition Con agreed to by accepting the debate) it is a
strawman. Thus, my affirmations
regarding the subconscious ought to be considered with veracity. There are many subsets of MS which include
the subconscious, like absolute solipsism [1].
Semantics of “exist”
Con essentially states MS asserts
that objective reality is “not concrete” or “real”, not that it “doesn’t
exist”.
Con’s quote regarding non-existence
is incorrectly interpreted -- it would
be true that “Objective
reality must exist as an idea in order that something may be said about it” if
and only if it is a
coherent concept. If MS were true and
only the mind exists, then “objective reality” would be an absurdity like a “squared
circle”. Incoherent concepts have no
meaning outside of the linguistic ascription placed on them. For example, I could state “asdf” exists
as an idea because to even talk about “asdf” presupposes an idea of it
– however outside of the arbitrary name I ascribed to it there is no meaningful
concept. An apple as a concept would be a
red or green edible pome fruit – the existence of an apple would be an entity
that instantiates the properties of the concept. If MS were true, your notion of “objective
reality” would actually be of the mind – no-one would know what non-mind
looks like or what its properties are, similar to how no-one can imagine a colour
that they’ve never seen before, or can imagine what a ‘squared circle’ looks like. This is why they are exempt because they exist as purely fictitious, pre-conceived notions of
the imagination, which is limited to metaphysical possibility (as one cannot
imagine a metaphysical impossibility). If MS is true then objective reality (i.e material) is a metaphysical
impossibility, akin to a married bachelor, or a squared circle. Even
semantically, this does not entail any form of existence of “objective
reality”.
Non-Existence as an Ontological
Commitment
Con completely misunderstands the intentions of these sources. Firstly, if my source refuted my argument, why does it directly assert
that a monistic ontology like materialism is more parsimonious than an ontology
affirming two substances, like Dualism? Observe:
“Thus Cartesian dualism, for example, is less qualitatively
parsimonious than materialism because it is committed to two broad kinds of
entity (mental and physical) rather than one” [3]
Moreover, from the same source, it
states:
“ Unrestricted
Occam's Razor favors monism over dualism, and nominalism over platonism”
This is because an ontological
commitment is evidently the positive claim of existence. This is often described of how many kinds of
entity a theory is committed to. Con
references truth conditions that make demands on the world – this is elaborated on and is clearly
illustrated to convey positive ontological claims -- described here:
“Sometimes, perhaps always, they demand of the world that
certain entities or kinds of entity exist. The ontological commitments of a
theory, then, are just the entities or kinds of entity that must exist in order
for the theory to be true." [4]
Moreover, the
notion of non-existence as an ontological commitment inherently assumes
existence as a predicate of individuals – I asserted this last round and Con
dropped it.
Observe the following
statement:
∃x Unicorn(x) -- “there exists x, such that x is a unicorn”. –
a valid proposition.
Now observe Con’s
notion of assuming non-existence as a predicate.
∃x (Unicorn(x) ^ doesnotexist(x)) “there exists x, such that x
is a unicorn and that x does not exist”
This is a contradiction.
Asserting non-existence as a predicate is what makes the idea of non-existent
concepts incoherent in the first place. Following Con’s quote regarding Ronald
McDonald, the source goes on to state:
“That, Russell complained, runs contrary to a robust sense of
reality, according to which everything exists. So, we should reject the claim
that existence is a property of the designation of subject terms in existential
sentences.”
This is what led to the famous
refutation of existence as a predicate of individuals by Kant and Hume in the
first place.
A2. Monistic
Idealism
This has essentially boiled down to
MS vs Dualism – Con already conceded that the mind exists, therefore he is
affirming something similar to Cartesian Dualism. However, Con’s evidence for dualism lacks the
necessary justification for I) the multiplicity of substances and ii) how two
different substances can interact! Con
mentions the brain and neuro-correlates, behaviourisms likely brought about
through evolution, but both do not entail a multiplicity of substances, nor the
interaction between them. In MS, the
brain is reducible to the mind. Thus, the fact that there are correlates between consciousness and the
brain means absolutely nothing unless Con can prove they are different
substances. Con states that there is no
evidence that the mind can occur without the brain, but Con has already
conceded the fact that all that can truly be known is that the mind exists –
thus, the analogy can be reversed; there
is no evidence that the brain, or anything else can exist without the mind. Really, this argument is moot since it does not
objectively prove that there is anything else but the mind! This doesn’t provide nearly enough argumentative
inclination to prefer Dualism over MS.
I highlighted the interaction problem between the mind and
non-mind – it is analogous to a ghost that exists sans mass, or any
physical properties, being able to interact with reality e.g opening doors and
lifting objects. We observe particles
interact with either gravitational, electromagnetic, weak or strong nuclear
forces – immaterial has no mass to exert gravitational forces, does not have charge
to have an electric or electromagnetic field and are not made up of particles
to have necessary properties like isospin or colour charge to
interact via weak/strong nuclear forces. An interaction barrier has not been
observed! For the mind to interact
with the body (non-mind) would require an interaction barrier – the mediation
of information between substances. For
example, my conscious thought to move my leg first requires my conscious (mind)
and results in my leg (non-mind) moving. How does this happen, if none of the known
ways of mediation of information is occurring (gluons, photons, Higgs, z,w
bosons etc)? To affirm Dualism over MS
would be to reject our standard model of physics.
He then goes on to state:
“If
we are to accept Pro's argument then we retreat to an even spookier position -
Pro rassles with how two fundamentally different substances can interact. Yet,
has Pro answered the question of how one single mind can create all there is?”
This strawman’s the second premise
entirely – he provides no refutation to the second premise and conveniently
ignores the mind-body problem; it should be Con that is “rassling” with
how two fundamentally different substances can interact because he is affirming
Dualism.
Criterion
Pro
Tie
Con
Points
Better arguments
3 point(s)
Better sources
2 point(s)
Better legibility
1 point(s)
Better conduct
1 point(s)
Reason:
See comments:
https://www.debateart.com/debates/1136/comment_links/19674
Admittedly this is a case where I wish I could assign one less point for arguments, as a way to give credit for how good a job con did against the odds he faced.
Thanks for taking the time to vote and your detailed anaylsis.
Related but not part of my decision:
The resolution is really hard to disprove, even if the outcome has no bearing on our lives. It’s similar to pointing out that altruists enjoy doing good things so aren’t true altruists; as if that would in any way corrupt the good work they do (it’d actually be pretty creepy if they hated helping other people, and did it full of resentment).
However it's fine for philosophy explore in these directions.
---RFD 1 of 2---
Gist:
Con drops a lot of points even stating he would defend his case against rebuttals in a future round that he did not publish. Even without this, pro was pulling ahead, perhaps due to con trying to rule of the complexity of the mind, which no theory I know of rejects. Were the resolution the MS is true, I would probably mark this a tie, as is, the argument that it is the most likely hypothesis (non-testable, so I won’t call it a theory) held up.
1. Epistemological Parsimony
The only certainty is that we exist, and Occam’s Razor says we should trust that certainty.
Con gives a tentative concession, “I am in agreement with Pro that the existence of the mind is a most certain and irrefutable fact. I also agree that ‘the external reality which is said to exist [without] the mind does not share the same certainty.’” But he goes on to assert that Agnosism is the most likely, we just can’t know... Which dances around the issue, rather than actually giving a hypothesis which can be likely or not (even if it is the best to follow, it’s not one that makes any claims on its likelihood of being true). Con moves on to trying to twist pro’s strongly supported case into a didit fallacy... It’s grasping at straws.
2. Monistic Idealism
Surprised to see ghosts referenced here (that they can’t touch stuff as evidence for the mind and body being distinct), but it was a nice break from the hard stuff...
Anyway, con challenges that this focuses on the mind-body problem, which MS rejects the existence of the second half. This was a strong point, which both missed (pro opted to respond to other parts, and con did not extend his best piece in light of that).
---RFD 2 of 2---
3. MS isn't consistent with observation
Between dreams and reality seeming to not be glitchy, con makes some solid points.
Pro counters with reminding us that con has not justified the need for these things to exist outside the mind. Then moves on to the bigger issue that (simplifying it down) we don’t remember our dreams or understand them if we do, but still have them.
Con basically says the mind being complex and layered defeats MS, but I missed how and why it would do this.
4. The existence of an objective reality is more likely
Short, but sweet; even using The Matrix as an additional alternative. Sadly, pre-refuted with the explanation of how Occam’s Razor applies to MS.
After that it basically morphs into repeated content from other argument lines.
---
Arguments: pro
See above review of key points.
Sources: pro
Con only started really trying to support his case with external evidence in his final round (as much as I enjoyed that Matrix clip),
S&G: tie
Not penalizing, but con’s interest shortage showed in R2 when he ceased applying special formatting to his case. Pro on the other hand offered a steady stream (but not spammed) of reliable sources giving extra insight to his case. Of note I should point to Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics, which potentially offered a path to falsifiability. Additionally the article “Conscious and Unconscious Memory Systems” was leveraged very well to demonstrate layers of the subconscious, defending against attacks to the mind being limited only by the conscious.
Conduct: pro
Missed round.
Sorry buddy. I lost interest.
If any of you have time could you vote on this debate? Thank you.
I don't necessarily buy into it. It's an interesting position though. Solipsism has been philosophically obstinate -- it seems ridiculous but it's very difficult to disprove.
we construct our own realities, we believe what we want to, that doesn't mean objective reality isn't a thing
Pity a 2 month long
debate ended this way.
Yes! I have been reading it.
You may be interested in this debate I started: https://www.debateart.com/debates/1216/the-self-is-god-unrated-practice-debate
It's almost over as my opponent just needs to post a concluding round. A lot of it is based around solipsism.
TBH just forgot about the rule. A simple solution would be for me to not do any defense in my next post.
Yes haha.
Someone has been reading too much Descartes lol