There is a Universal Moral Law
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
After 3 votes and with 8 points ahead, the winner is...
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Moral Law: Principles describing conduct that is right and wrong.
No solipsism.
including or covering all or a whole collectively or distributively without limit or exception(Merriam Webster)
- It is true that abortion causes pain of the mother
- Thus one ought to not abort
Always treat persons as ends in themselves, and never solely as a means.
One ought to treat persons as ends in themselves, and not (them) solely as a means.
Finally, by virtue of being rational, persons are morally responsible, and have dignity. By respecting this dignity, we can, with the framework laid out above, derive a Universal Moral Law.
- It is proven that treating others as ends in themselves(and not solely as a means) is beneficial
- I want to bring as much suffering as possible to people, and not happiness
- Thus, I ought to not treat others as ends in themselves, but solely as a means.
"Though it is accepted by many that having dignity and respect our moral responsibilities are things one ought to do, It cannot be objectively true."
"What if I specifically want women to suffer? How do we know that is wrong, or we ought to not intentionally cause pain of the women?"
"In the end, we cannot consider moral statements true or justified fully and rationally just by facts."
"Pro's assumption of this being universally true is ultimately an illusion of that all people would consider something that Pro considers correct as correct..."
The "is-ought" distinction is not a problem for the morality I proposed, since moral truths are reasoned A Priori. No state of affairs is necessary to describe moral obligation in the model I've presented. Rational beings ought to be treated as such, as ends in themselves, because that is what we are considering when we do ethics at all: How ought rational beings act?
A priori knowledge is that which is independent from experience. Examples include mathematics, tautologies, and deduction from pure reason.(Wikipedia)
The moral law that I've presented, is of course only applicable to morally responsible individuals. A sofa or a celestial body are not rational beings, and thus have no moral responsibility.
including or covering all or a whole collectively or distributively without limit or exception(Merriam Webster)
I argue that the spheres of facts and duties are metaphysically separate, and irreducible to eachother.
We don't need empirical facts to acquire morals A Priori. We are deriving morals from pure theoretical reason.
It's not an assumption, I've justified it. just because some people think that the world is flat, doesn't mean that it being a sphere isn't true, and just because some people are blind, doesn't mean that the sun doesn't exist.
- Pro agrees that this moral law does not apply to inanimate objects, which means that there is something in the "whole" of our realm, that does not follow the moral law, which means it isn't universal.
- Just because Pro thinks something is wrong doesn't mean that universally, it is wrong. To the people that disagrees with Pro, Pro is the wrong one here.
- The is-ought structure applies as this moral law cannot be purely derived by logic according to what Pro has given us. Pro has used things considered a posteriori to prove his point and Pro did not even attempt to prove that my argument about the is-ought structure is flawed.
- If my goal is simply to not treat others as rational beings, then this moral statement does not apply to me, and no, this is an existing state of mind. According to those who do that, this moral statement is wrong. One cannot say that universally, the statement is correct because these people think it is wrong.
- In the end, the universal moral law isn't universal. It may be interpersonal, or apply to many people, but definitely not all.
A priori knowledge is that which is independent from experience. Examples include mathematics, tautologies, and deduction from pure reason.(Wikipedia
"Plus, Pro's proof is that why treating others as ends in themselves is desirable or "respectable" from how I interpret Pro's argument.""Pro is attempting to dismantle the "is-ought" structure by simply treating the statement as an objectively-true statement...""Using Pro's logic, just because Pro thinks murder is wrong or that treating other people as inanimate objects is wrong, doesn't mean they are ACTUALLY wrong."
My opponent is stuck on this argument that if one person does not accept the proposed moral law, then it isn't Universal. This argument misunderstands what it means for a moral law to be universal. The universality of a moral principle is necessitated by moral epistemology. Like the veil of ignorance, where we must consider moral agents behind a veil where we do not know where in society they and we will be placed. Furthermore, a universal moral law must necessarily be reasoned A Priori, because theoretical deduction is the only way to conclude such a law, since the problem of induction would not allow the kind of certainty that a universal moral law would require, and appeals to empirical facts are inadequate for making moral judgments. The moral law presented, is binding universally to all rational beings, regardless of if they accept it as a true law, It still applies to them.
We ought to treat rational beings as ends in themselves because that's what they are. Rational Being = end in itself, that's the link my opponent demands.
Finally, by virtue of being rational, persons are morally responsible, and have dignity. By respecting this dignity, we can, with the framework laid out above, derive a Universal Moral Law.This law is:Always treat persons as ends in themselves, and never solely as a means.
We are deducting from pure reason. This knowledge will always be an impure A Priori, because we can know that "all bachelor's are unmarried," but we have to have some experience of what a bachelor is, and the concept of marriage to have that knowledge. But we don't have to meet every bachelor to know A Priori, that all bachelors are unmarried. We can know without reference to experience, that the moral law applies to all rational beings.
- Pro still has not proven that inanimate objects which exist are bound by this moral law. As a result, it is not universal.
- Pro has not deducted this statement purely theoretically. In fact, all moral statements can be written in the form of "One ought to...", and you know the rest from the "is-ought" of Mr. Hume. Since one cannot prove with certainty that there is one motivation shared even by all rational beings, and that it requires one's motivation in order to establish a connection between the "is" and the "ought". As a moral statement needs to have a non-objective motivation in order to be true subjectively, and it needs to have a universally-held motivation in order to be true universally. Not only inanimate objects have no motivation, we cannot prove that there is any objective motivation out there.
- Pro has never proven that people ought to be treated like rational beings and not like inanimate objects. Pro has never proven that we ought to act rationally. Both of these require subjective motivations, thus making this moral law not universal.
- In the end, what Pro has given cannot be proven to be universal since it isn't deducted purely of reason and requires subjective motivation in order to be true for someone, which makes it not universal. For inanimate objects with no motivation, this moral law does not apply at all, thus making it not univesal.
- VOTE CON.
I can't say I know enough on this subject to speak knowledgably about it, and it feels a bit awkward to provide a vote on it when I still feel as though there are elements of the main argument from Pro that I don't fully understand.
As I see it, what most of Pro's opening round aims to do is establish that a universal moral law is one derived from reason and is inherently a priori. In a theoretical sense, that makes sense to me as a basis for believing that it's possible that there is a universal moral law. I don't see Con challenge this point. However, I'll note that use of the word "possible" and how it is distinct from the topic at hand. It can't just be possible. It must be that there is such a universal moral law. Pro proposes that one exists, namely "Always treat persons as ends in themselves, and never solely as a means" but it's unclear why this specific moral perspective is a moral law.
Much of Con's responses detail reasons why individuals might perceive it as non-universal and might even disagree with it entirely, which doesn't start out as a strong response for me. If your definition of universal is that everyone must accept this (including inanimate objects and theoretical aliens for some reason), then I'd say that that is both an impossible standard and doesn't comport with the implicit definition ascribed to by Pro (later made explicit) that it must be universally binding as rational thought. It is, however, in response to that position that I think Con hits at an important point: that the actual process of figuring out whether this specific moral law is universal requires more than just a priori reasoning. In this sense, it's not a matter of whether there are those who disagree with it, but rather whether there is a mechanism to test it. Pro argues that this is a priori and therefore doesn't require a mechanism, but I'm struggling to find a place where he clearly reasoned that this specific moral law is universal without ascribing some kind of example to support that perspective. Saying that we should respect the dignity of persons because we are all rational beings just generally invites questions that the logic base that you could employ a priori is ill-equipped to handle.
I think much of Con's responses are more superficial than this, but they still hit at the basic point that more must be done to establish this specific rule as universal moral law, and that ends up being enough for me to vote his way.
Pro lost me in round 1 by defining 4 levels of ethical discussion, while stipulating a universal moral law. Pro lost me again by rendering a description of personal desires, then defining autonomy and heteronomy, then saying desires are heteronomous, not autonomous when desires, while they may be shared, are personal motivations. Pro's argument fails on that point in round 1 and never recovers. Con successfully demonstrates that universal law is not at work her, rebutting that
Pro's "universal" does not apply if pro insists, in round 2 "In conclusion, the Universal Moral Law I have presented indeed applies to all rational beings." This totally ignores that irrational beings exist, even though pro even discusses irrationality. Again, argument by pro at cross purposes.
Con wins on sourcing with sources that support his argument, while Pro's sources are as confusing as the arguments they attempt to support.
I'm calling this a tie because the core components of the debate, the terms themselves that comprise the debate resolution are never clearly defined.
This makes a "win" impossible.
Thank you for voting
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That's the core problem with the concept of "duty".
It's something the capricious authority of the moment gets to define.
The only context in which I can see possibly justifying a moral duty for a soldier to kill would be in a just war. Otherwise, I can't say that soldiers have a moral duty to kill. That's a different form of duty.
> I don't think we have a duty to act immorally.
Does a soldier have a duty to drop bombs ?
"I'm pointing out that "respect for ones duty" is NOT a reward itself."
Yeah, sure. Respect doesn't have to be rewarding. Acting morally doesn't have to be rewarding.
"The feeling you get when you either self-recognize or when others recognize you for "respecting ones duty" that feeling of "I am a good person" that good feeling is the reward function."
The reward doesn't constitute the morality.
"A lot of people throughout history have used "respect for ones duty" to get people to do all kinds of atrocious things."
Okay? You asserted that there is no motivation besides feeling good to do ones moral duty, and I gave the example of respect for ones duty to the moral law as a defeater. Also, I'm calling on the motivation of respect for ones duty to act morally, so it makes no sense to say that's the same as calling on someone's respect for their perceived duty to do something immoral. I don't think we have a duty to act immorally.
"Nope. A debate requires technical definitions. A debate resolution must be logically-coherent."
Which it is.
"If you check the definition of "truth" you'll find that it requires correlation with "fact" and "fact" must be empirically demonstrable and or logically necessary."
Truth is a property of sentences. We can know that all bachelor's are unmarried without meeting bachelor's and asking them.
"This is indistinguishable from moral impulse and or moral intuition and or moral preference and or PURE UNFETTERED OPINION."
Nope. Just because you define right as moral opinion does not mean that is correct. I gave a non-opinion based, right action in the debate.
"Does this inverse definition of "RIGHT" leave any room for morally neutral actions and or motives ?"
Yes, and I gave an example of an amoral motive in the debate.
> I don't understand what you mean. Are you saying that respect for ones duty isn't motivated by reward, or that it isn't grounds for granting points in the debate?
I'm pointing out that "respect for ones duty" is NOT a reward itself.
The feeling you get when you either self-recognize or when others recognize you for "respecting ones duty" that feeling of "I am a good person" that good feeling is the reward function.
A lot of people throughout history have used "respect for ones duty" to get people to do all kinds of atrocious things.
The phrase "respect for ones duty" is a brainwashing technique.
The phrase "respect for ones duty" is an indirect appeal to authority.
> How much do you need defined to know what we're talking about? Just use the normal, applicable definitions, that's what you should assume.
Nope. A debate requires technical definitions. A debate resolution must be logically-coherent.
> Principle: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning.
If you check the definition of "truth" you'll find that it requires correlation with "fact" and "fact" must be empirically demonstrable and or logically necessary.
This means that PRINCIPLE requires TRUTH which requires FACT which requires EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION AND OR LOGICAL NECESSITY.
PRINCIPLE must be QUANTIFIABLE
> Right: morally good, justified, or acceptable.
This is indistinguishable from moral impulse and or moral intuition and or moral preference and or PURE UNFETTERED OPINION.
Also, "justified" is begging the question somewhat.
> Wrong: unjust, dishonest, or immoral
Does this inverse definition of "RIGHT" leave any room for morally neutral actions and or motives ?
"'What do you mean by reward function?'
A reward function is a core reinforcement mechanism."
I don't understand what you mean. Are you saying that respect for ones duty isn't motivated by reward, or that it isn't grounds for granting points in the debate?
How much do you need defined to know what we're talking about? Just use the normal, applicable definitions, that's what you should assume.
Principle: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning.
Right: morally good, justified, or acceptable.
Wrong: unjust, dishonest, or immoral
> What do you mean by reward function?
A reward function is a core reinforcement mechanism.
"Moral Law: Principles describing conduct that is right and wrong."
Even worse.
PRINCIPLES = ?
CONDUCT = ?
RIGHT = ?
WRONG = ?
What do you mean by reward function?
I defined moral law in the description, and Intel defined universal in r1
"respect for ones duty" IS NOT A REWARD FUNCTION.
DEBATE RESOLUTION: "There is a Universal Moral Law"
UNDEFINED TERMS:
UNIVERSAL = ?
MORAL = ?
LAW = ?
What terms are you referring to?
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respect for ones duty
> In the dick and Jane example, I never said it made her feel good. You're painting that motive onto her, so the criticism doesn't apply.
There is no reason to fulfil a "sense of duty" unless doing so makes you "feel good".
In the dick and Jane example, I never said it made her feel good. You're painting that motive onto her, so the criticism doesn't apply.
The moral law can be considered objective in so far as it's intersubjective.
I would have opened with this.
If someone does not agree that this law applies to them, then they are wrong.
NO TRUE SCOTSMAN
You started off strong with "Argument: Hume's Guillotine",
But then you wound yourself in circles muddying the water.
(IFF) you are capable of understanding this (AND) you value your own existence (THEN) you must value the lives of at least some of those on which you directly and indirectly depend (humans, plants, and animals)
In conclusion, as autonomous beings, we should be acting out of a sense of duty to the moral law we give ourselves. The reason we should respect the dignity of persons is because we are all rational beings. The exercise of that capacity for reason makes us worthy of dignity. Since it's the same capacity for reason, it is unqualified by the particulars of circumstance. It's the same Universal capacity for reason that delivers the moral law. So, to act autonomously, is to act according to a moral law we give ourselves, exercising our Reason. Not the particular reasons we have because of circumstance, but the reason that legislates A Priori, regardless of empirical ends.
I am a big fan of deontological ethics and the categorical imperative.
However, you seem to have quite a different understanding of both of these terms than I hold myself.
Jane sincerely believes that she donates to the needy because it is her duty.
However, Jane actually donates to the needy because she believes this act is part of what makes her a good person and she enjoys the feeling she gets when she believes she is a good person.
This is ultimately a selfish motive.
You are quoting Pro, aren’t you.
Happiness isn't intrinsically good
Desires are intrinsically motivating. They are not however, all that is intrinsically motivating. Right and wrong are also intrinsically motivating concepts. Since right and wrong are both concepts, then they are subject to the laws of Reason, such as the law of non-contradiction which states that to contradict oneself is inherently irrational. For this reason, the basis upon which our moral principles must lie is Reason alone. If my opponent was to question the reason of Reason, then he would implicitly be committing to using reason.
GOOD = things that make me happy
BAD = things that cause me pain or make me sad
Can do
Remind me, shouldn't be a problem.
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My original draft got deleted, so I had to rewrite it as best I could this morning.
What took you so long?
Paragraph 2
Considering your R2 argument isn't exactly what we call "tiny", I don't know where in the argument you are talking about.
Apologies, in my round 2 I meant to say "...and thus have no moral responsibility."