Instigator / Pro
14
1922
rating
117
debates
97.44%
won
Topic
#3519

THBT: Over the course of the American Civil War, US Grant's generalship proved to be superior to the generalship of RE Lee

Status
Finished

The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.

Winner & statistics
Better arguments
6
0
Better sources
4
4
Better legibility
2
2
Better conduct
2
2

After 2 votes and with 6 points ahead, the winner is...

oromagi
Parameters
Publication date
Last updated date
Type
Standard
Number of rounds
3
Time for argument
Two days
Max argument characters
10,000
Voting period
One month
Point system
Multiple criterions
Voting system
Open
Contender / Con
8
1527
rating
14
debates
39.29%
won
Description

THBT: Over the course of the American Civil War, US Grant's generalship proved to be superior to the generalship of RE Lee.

DEFINITIONS:
The AMERICAN CIVIL WAR was "a civil war in the United States from 1861 to 1865, fought between the northern United States (loyal to the Union) and the southern United States (that had seceded from the Union and formed the Confederacy)."

ULYSSES S. GRANT was "an American soldier and politician who served as the 18th president of the United States from 1869 to 1877. Before his presidency, Grant led the Union Army as Commanding General of the United States Army in winning the American Civil War."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulysses_S._Grant

ROBERT E LEE was "an American and Confederate soldier, best known as a commander of the Confederate States Army. He commanded the Army of Northern Virginia in the American Civil War from 1862 until its surrender in 1865."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_E._Lee

GENERALSHIP [noun] is "the skills or performance of a good general; military leadership, strategy."
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/generalship

SUPERIOR [adjective] is "higher in quality."

BURDEN of PROOF
Burden of Proof is shared.
PRO must prove that Grant was superior to Lee in military leadership.
CON must prove that Lee was superior to Grant in military leadership.

No alternative approaches are invited (i.e.' Sherman was superior to both', or 'Jackson was the only true leader of men', etc)

PRO is requesting sincere and friendly engagement on this subject.

No trolls or kritiks, please.

- RULES --
1. Forfeit=auto loss
2. Sources may be merely linked in debate as long as citations are listed in comments
3. No new args in R3
4. For all relevant terms, individuals should use commonplace understandings that fit within the rational context of this resolution and debate

Criterion
Pro
Tie
Con
Points
Better arguments
3 point(s)
Better sources
2 point(s)
Better legibility
1 point(s)
Better conduct
1 point(s)
Reason:

I think this debate largely comes down to framing. Pro frames this discussion mostly around bigger picture tactics with an emphasis on how the two armies should have behaved to best harness their advantages. Part of showcasing this is just in the numbers of casualties and the overall qualitative victories in the war, but there's also the factor of better addressing the mandate that the army needed to follow, better recognizing how the battle would work with his more modernized military, and, on Lee's side, failing to recognize when the cause was lost and failing to utilize their superior defensive position.

Con's focus is largely on individual battles, and though Pro does spend time here, it's really the lion's share of Con's argument. He's much more focused on tactical superiority in these encounters, with some broader concerns as well. Rather than focusing on a mandate, Con discusses the need for Lee to act offensively in order to strike at the North and potentially end the war, viewing any protracted effort as an automatic loss. This somewhat contrasts with his own argument that Grant wasn't the reason for the Union's success so much as the Union's resource advantages, suggesting that the Union's victory was inevitable regardless of their leadership.

One of the key factors to consider that I'm surprised doesn't get that much attention in this debate (it does get mentioned later in the debate but rather minimally) is that much of how we evaluate their effectiveness now is the result of good hindsight. We know now that the Confederacy likely could never have won the war, so does that mean that, at the time, Lee should have been aware of it? I agree with Con that he likely wouldn't, but that introduces a lot of questions as to whether, at the time, a lot of these choices made sense. Lee's tactical choice to act offensively was contradicted by many others at the time. In retrospect, it was probably his only way to effectively win the war, and even at the time he would have been aware of the resource disparity and how that would have affected a defensive effort, but I'm unclear that this isn't another instance of hindsight playing a role. Considering hindsight was mentioned for the first time in R3 (admittedly in response to an argument Pro made in R3), it's hard to know how much of a role it plays in evaluating what these generals should have done at the time.

That being said, I think Pro takes this debate. Even if I buy a lot of what Con is telling me about Grant's successes and how they came from other elements beyond Grant, he was the general in charge and the results came from his utilization of those resources. Another general might have been able to do it, but Pro presents examples of generals that were clearly failing in that regard. Maybe they were all just really bad at their jobs, but Grant presents as a clear step up. By contrast, while Lee certainly had impressive victories in many battles, it's unclear that he made good wider view strategic choices. He used outdated tactics that didn't recognize the modernization of weaponry beyond Napoleon's era, he pushed the highly risky effort to invade the North, prioritized defending their capital over more strategic sites (Con's response to that comes in R3 where Pro could not address it, despite Pro's making that point in R1 and R2), and while the attack on the North might have made sense in retrospect, it's unclear that it was the smartest move at the time with a highly aggressive, multipronged attack from Grant proceeding into the South. The defensive effort had its flaws, but it would have at least been responsive to the existential threat they were facing at the time. Even if I gave Con the point on attacking North being the best possible choice, that alone with the individual tactical successes just doesn't stand as enough to win over the successes of Grant that stand largely unopposed, if somewhat mitigated by the uncertainty of who/what caused them.

Criterion
Pro
Tie
Con
Points
Better arguments
3 point(s)
Better sources
2 point(s)
Better legibility
1 point(s)
Better conduct
1 point(s)
Reason:

This is a fairly close one. Due to time constraints, I will not be able to properly express that in this vote (preventing such a good debate from being wholly unvoted, takes priority; and yes, I'll gladly expand this later in the comments if anyone would like).

Napoleon:
I think con focused way too much here, when it was an obvious double standard which when applied topically said so many bad things about Lee. As for the source not factoring in the benefits of an airforce... Need I even say it? A navy is somewhat applicable, but I did not see the push on that front.

Casualties:
This should not be understated. 0.87 vs 0.81 is not that wide a margin, but first it favors Grant, and second Lee had less replacements available anyways magnifying the effects of any losses.

Grant's ineptitude:
Con seemed to present Grant as merely a yes man who did what he was told, but pro was able to show that Grant directly disobeyed orders to secure victories for the north; putting his career at risk in a way other Union generals did not. His men then repeating that insubordination, was a in retrospect an amusing bit of Irony. He may have been a Babe Ruth figure standing out due to other Union generals being so mediocre, but he did stand out, and further quickly bested Lee when other generals had failed to do so.

Lee's cost to the confederacy:
Had Lee's ambition to crush the north worked, we'd be recalling this so differently... But the fact is, much like Napoleon's blunder in Russia (which con faults the data for not costing him more), it didn't work, and it cost his side more than it could afford to pay on such a gamble.

Moneyball:
Even if it's an imperfect analysis, it seemed well done. As a numbers guy who constructs charts, it is appealing to me; even if I don't see the exact inputs used. I am not spotting a similar statistical analysis offered by con which puts Lee ahead of Grant; which would be a good way to challenge the conclusions it made.