The Ontalogical Argument

Author: Discipulus_Didicit

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Premise one: The Ontalogical Argument requires a maximum being to necissarily exist in every possible reality in order to be sound.

Premise two: It is possible to imagine a possible reality where no beings of any kind exist

Conclusion: The Ontalogical Argument is not sound.
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@Dr.Franklin
Solve that one real quick...
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So you are attempting to disprove The Ultimate Reality's existence by imagining it away?

Even sounds delusional.




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@Mopac
Go find a post where I say that reality is not ultimately real. You won't be able to, but while you are looking you will find several dozen in which I say that it is lol.
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@Discipulus_Didicit
So you believe God exists, but you think the ontological argument is stupid?

8 days later

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"Where no beings of any kind exist..."


Given the Ontological argument's contention that a maximally great Being would exist necessarily and not contingently, a possible world where no being exists, not even a necessary Being, is not really a possible world, just an imaginable world.
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@OntologicalSpider
How does one distinguish between an imagined world which is possible and an imagined world which is not possible? The world where no beings of any kind exist is not internally inconsistent, so you saying it is impossible to exist is an unfounded claim.
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@Discipulus_Didicit
Well that's a very good question. What distinguishes a metaphysically possible world from a non metaphysically possible world is can the propositions be instantiated.

For example, I can imagine a world with square circles, and two plus two being seven. That world, though imaginable, cannot be instantiated because they contain logical contradictions, which by definition are not parts of or even potential parts of existence.


The modal Ontological argument states that an MGB is possible, and an MGB is metaphysically necessary (cannot fail to exist in any possible world) if it does exist. That's the whole point of the argument, to get us a being which cannot fail across worlds, but has trans world necessity.

So to say there's a possible world where no contingent beings exist is perfectly logical. To say there's a possible world where no being even a necessary being exists already supposes an MGB is not possible, because if it was there would be no world where an MGB didn't exist. So to posit such a world to disprove an MGB already supposes one cannot exist. The proposition is circular.

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@Discipulus_Didicit
A world where God doesn't exists can not exist.

All existence is contingent on God. No God, no existence.

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God is existence itself. That is why a world cannot exist if it doesn't exist. That is, doesn't have God.


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@OntologicalSpider

I can imagine a world with square circles, and two plus two being seven. That world, though imaginable, cannot be instantiated because they contain logical contradictions, which by definition are not parts of or even potential parts of existence.

Okay.

an MGB is metaphysically necessary (cannot fail to exist in any possible world) if it does exist. That's the whole point of the argument, to get us a being which cannot fail across worlds, but has trans world necessity.

"If"... So if a necessary being exists then a world without said necessary being is logically contradictory and if such a world is logically contradictory then this counter to the Ontalogical Argument fails, therefore a necessary being might exist. Okay. I see what you meant before about circular arguments.

So how do we go about demonstrating that the concept of 'necessary existance' is a useful one outside the realm of thought experimentation?
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@Discipulus_Didicit
I would say we go about it using the Ontological argument itself... If an MGB is possible an MGB is actual
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@OntologicalSpider
Another pretty big if. How do we demonstrate that it is possible?
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@Discipulus_Didicit

Premise 1: It is possible that God exists.
Premise 2: If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
Premise 3: If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
Premise 4: If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
Premise 5: If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

The reasoning behind premise three is what we were discussing. God is a maximally great being, than what no greater can be conceived. If God is maximally great He exists necessarily, rather than contingently. If he exists necessarily, then He cannot fail to exist in any possible world. Although this is the modal Ontological argument, it builds on what St Anselm originally posited, once we understand who God is His existence flows from his definition.

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@Discipulus_Didicit
We demonstrate it is possible by showing there is nothing incoherent about an MGB. If an MGB is not incoherent it is logically possible and can be instantiated in a possible world
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@OntologicalSpider
The maximal great being thing works with The Ultimate Reality.

Because if The Ultimate Reality is not present in a world, ultimately it isn't real. A world without God cannot exist.

Thank you, I've come to understand the ontological argument better by reading your posts!




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What else do you guys believe in so much that you can't prove? 

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@OntologicalSpider
We demonstrate it is possible by showing there is nothing incoherent about an MGB. If an MGB is not incoherent it is logically possible and can be instantiated in a possible world

I am talking specifically about the property of necessary existance. How do we know this is a property that is actually possible to posses? Sure if it is possible to posses this property then a hypothetical max level thinggy will posses it, but I don't see it demonstrated that this is the case.
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@Mopac
Wow I'm happy to hear that, glad I could help

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@Discipulus_Didicit
I would start off by saying the idea of necessary existence in and of itself is not logically incoherent, so that alone entails it is possibly instantiated.

If you want a positive case for necessary existence, showing that it actually does exist and is not just possible, there are several other arguments independent of the Ontological argument we could employ.
I'll summarize one:

The  golden coin argument



Let's say that one day I'm hanging out with my friend. His name is "person A". My friend person A shows me this really beautiful golden coin. It is the only one that exists. I'm so intrigued by this coin, I make it my mission to find out where it came from. I say to person A where did you get that, he says that his friend "person B" gave it to him.

I go find person B, and I say, hey where did you get that, person B says oh my friend person C gave it to me. I go to person C and say where did you get that coin, person C says my friend person D gave it to me...

I'm starting to run into a problem now.

A borrowed from B, B borrowed from C, C borrowed from D, in my quest for the origin of this coin, I discover this goes on to infinity, each possessor of the coin borrowing from another ad infinitum.


I soon realize this is impossible. If the chain of coin borrowers were truly infinite, person A would have never received his coin. Because there would have been an infinite number of borrowers to traverse in order to get down to A. And it would take an infinite amount of time to traverse this chain, no less, A couldn't get the coin because there would always be one more person to get it from a previous person if there chain were infinite.

So I realize the only way A, or B, or C or D could have come into possession of the coin is if the chain terminates with someone who didn't borrow it.

Now, let's replace this golden coin with existence.

Why does A exist, well A exists because of B. Ok, why does B exist? Well B exists because of C.... As you can see we run into the same problem before.

The only way any member of this causal chain can have existence is if the chain of existence borrowers terminates with someone who didn't borrow existence. This being that exists self sufficiently must have existence in and of Himself. We call that a necessary being, or my more personal term, God Almighty.

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@OntologicalSpider
The only way any member of this causal chain can have existence is if the chain of existence borrowers terminates with someone who didn't borrow existence. This being that exists self sufficiently must have existence in and of Himself

I would say I don't know why the universe began to exist but you are claiming here that you do know and furthermore that it was definitely a being of some kind. Seems like a bit of a stretch to me.
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@Discipulus_Didicit
Well this line of reasoning doesn't really invoke the universe or any cosmology, no less the reason why it exists. I wasn't claiming the universe has a beginning like the Kalam argument states, just that, unless you have a being who is necessarily existent, nothing at all could exist.

And I say being for a very specific reason.


The non borrowing exister has effects that started a chain of borrowing existers. To illustrate:


NBE= non borrowing exister=necessary entity of some sort (we haven't gotten to person yet)

BE= borrowing exister, contingent things like you and me.


At one point it was

NBE alone because a necessary entity is eternal, contingent things are not eternal.

So we have:

NBE...............


At some point, since other things exist, we went from that to:


NBE+BE+BE+BE.... So on and so on. Starting the causal chain.



There's a conundrum though. If NBE is eternal, and the effects of NBE are  non eternal contingent things like you and me, how come the effect of the cause wasn't there with NBE from eternity? If the effect of cold temperature is frozen water, eternal cold temperature in eternity past means eternally frozen water in the eternal past.

The cause is eternal so must the effect be. The problem is we already saw an eternal/infinite chain can't happen. So the effects of the NBE were not always with it, extending infinitely into the past.

So this only leaves two viable options. Either the NBE is not eternal, which would be absurd, because then it wouldn't be a NBE, it would be contingent on a previous entity, getting us back to square one. OR, the NBE is eternal, but the only reason it's effects were  not eternally there with him is because it chose to bring them about at some point.

To summarize, if NBE had no volition, and it was the efficient cause of all contingent things, then the effects of NBE would have always been there with it. That's a problem though because we can't have an eternal causal chain like we saw before.

The only reasonable explanation then is that the effects were not there with the cause from the beginning because the NBE, at some point, chose to bring other things into existence. A being that makes a choice has a will.

Therefore whatever terminates the chain at the beginning of all things is a consciousness.


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@OntologicalSpider
So basically by necissarily existing you mean some hypothetical thing that is eternal and came before everything else.
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@Discipulus_Didicit
By necessarily existent entity I simply mean an entity that didn't borrow it's existence from something else. To use Thomistic terms, an unactualized actualizer. An entity that actualized everything else but was not itself actualized by anything else.