>Do you believe in free will, the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces?
This is such a curious question, mostly because the position from which it is asked is in the context of a debate about human nature which is as old as civilization itself. The question is especially interesting now, because even though it is an essentially normative question there have been very sincere attempts in the sciences to say something empirical about whether we as human beings have free will. So, now the contours of that debate, and the sort of theoretical framework in which it's asked is not merely a question of, say, contrasting theological or philosophical perspectives; but also a question about the epistemological character of what science can and can not do. Namely, is it true that we can positively describe free will in such a way that we can then empirically test it? Is the claim that human beings have free will one that is falsifiable, and, if so, on what basis could it be falsified?
There's obviously a lot more complexity to the question than can be easily dispensed with. Likewise, I don't think it's good enough to reduce that question ONLY to one that is nothing more than a choice between whether the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice or is determined by either physical or divine forces. Namely, because both of those things can be true, at the same time; which is to say, that they're not mutually exclusive, which is to imply that the way that you have framed the question itself is less than ideal. Though, that's probably not your fault, but I am going to be very clear that I reject your framing of just what exactly belief versus disbelief in free will entails.
I also think there's another dimension to that question to the effect that whether or not, from a scientific or empirical perspective, we can even sensibly talk about free will, the question itself is futile to answer because the foundation of our society and culture (at least in the West, and in every country and culture on earth that has not totally destroyed itself so far) we all ACT as if we have a degree of free will that is at least sufficient to make individuals responsible for their own actions. So, that's at least two other levels at which the issue can be considered: both the normative question of whether as a sort of grand narrative we ought to act as if people have free will (and it is obvious that we should), and if so, to what degree? There is also a way to positively frame that question, to the effect of "to what degree is a will free, if it is free in the first instance?"
I'll say this: it is very clear to me that we as human beings both do and should act as if people have free will, and it certainly seems to me like people have at least a degree of free will that is sufficient for them to be autonomous moral agents. I think viewing the world and the people who populate it as if they lack free will to at least that degree is fatalistic and vacuous. I also think that the so called scientific research into the subject is mostly bullshit on stilts, and the pop-sci conclusions that, for example, brooding high school misfits come to about free will from their casual misunderstandings of epigenetic research, for example, lack without limitation the ability to stand up to even modest scrutiny.
I could say a lot more on the subject, but you just asked me what I "believed". I told you what I thought, though not so much why I thought it. Don't have enough time for that.