God exists.

Welcome to this debate and I am glad that Con decided to participate. I will prove the proposition "God exists" and thus fulfill my burden of Proof using two proofs, at least for this round. 

Pro has to affirm that the universe was created by a necessary and intelligent creator that has objective reality or being.

I, as con, will be negating that the universe was created by a necessary and intelligent creator that has objective reality or being.

The terms of the resolution each have other terms within, so, to avoid descending into semantics and to ensure the debate stays on track, I shall supply definitions to relevant terms yet to be defined.

intelligent - having or showing intelligence, especially of a high level.

creation - the action or process of bringing something into existence.

process - a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end.

series - a number of events of a similar or related kind coming one after another.

after - in the time following an event or another period of time.

universe - all existing matter, energy, and space considered as a whole; the cosmos.

So, because neurological substrates didn't show up on earth until 700 mya, intelligence could not have preceded the universe, because there would not have been neurological substrates, on which intelligence is contingent.

Those 4 things are my case, that's it.

I reject this resolution.

As stated in the debate structure, this round will be for rebuttals or new arguments. On to Con’s case:
Origin of Temporal events
Con here argues that according to the evidence from physics there were no temporal events  prior to the big bang since the big bang was the first event and so no time existed before it.
Surprisingly, I actually agree with Con’s conclusion; matter of fact, if the two proofs I gave above are successful, then Con’s conclusion is further corroborated by my arguments that establish a prior timeless cause of the universe. However, Con has failed to highlight or show how this point negates the resolution by showing that God does not exist. I can grant that God exists and that he is timeless at the same time. If Con intended this to be a stepping stone to a further argument that timeless existence is impossible, then he is obliged to present this argument or else he fails to negate the resolution.
So in conclusion: I actually agree with this argument, but Con has failed to show how this negates the proposition. If anything, this is further corroboration of my case for the timelessness of the universe’s cause.
The universe was not created
Con here claims two things: creation can only be temporal and that precedence is temporal. Both claims are false.
To start with the latter, it is not clear that all causes have to be temporally prior to their effects. Some causes are causes in the sense of sustaining their effects in existence. This is the type of explanation integrated in Ibn Sina’s proof from contingency. For example, a candle sustains the flame in existence and this is a sort of ontological dependence because if there was no candle, there would be no flame. The candle does not have to precede the flame in time here since given the dependence causation at work here, the flame and candle could both exist eternally and the flame would still be dependent on the candle.
Moreover, the former claim is also false. Multiple models have been proposed for how creation ex nihilo could take place; even though such a question is not at all relevant to the Kalam argument presented above since the Kalam argument only proves that there is in fact a supernatural creator for the universe but does not attempt to prove how the creator created the universe. So even if it is inconceivable to the finite human mind how God may do this, it would not dent the Kalam argument. Since it is possible for creation to not be temporal, then con’s definition of creation is not exhaustive and does not include the possibilities of a timeless cause argued above. One of those models is William Lane Craig’s proposal that the cause existed timelessly for a past-eternity but through his volitional and intelligent nature decided to step into a temporal reality to create our universe. This model seems to also prove that the cause of the universe must be intelligent since if the cause was impersonal and unintelligent, then the universe would exist as long as the cause exists (since all the causal conditions are met). But since the universe began to exist while the cause did not then the cause is personal and intelligent.
A Universe Creator is not necessary
Con here tries to argue that a supernatural creator is not necessary because we have evidence for a naturalistic creator of the universe. This is supposed to act as an objection to my arguments because they contradict their conclusions. However, this can not be an objection to either of my arguments or an argument for Con because I can grant that scenario of the universe coming from quantum fluctuations and still believe that there is a supernatural creator and so even granting this scenario does not negate the resolution.
This scenario is compatible with Ibn Sina’s contingency proof because the quantum vacuum or quantum energy that gave way to the fluctuations can not be necessary due to failing to fulfill the properties of the necessary being like intelligence or omnipotence and so is contingent. If it is contingent, then it is part of the totality of contingent beings which would affirm the second premise of the argument and so there would still be a necessary being.
It could be seen as a bigger threat to the Kalam argument because this argument has to do with a cause bringing the universe into existence. However, the universe is defined in the kalam argument as all of the natural world including any quantum fluctuations and quantum vacuum energy. So even if the quantum fluctuations in a quantum vacuum energy was a prior stage to the universe as we know it today then given the second premise of the argument, the quantum vacuum energy or any other prior states would itself have a beginning and so it must have a cause per the first premise.  If Con tries to argue that the quantum fluctuations happen from nothing, then this is not possible considering the rational proof given for the first premise of the Kalam argument.
Contingency of Intelligence on Neuroscience
In Con’s final argument, they try to argue that intelligence is contingent on neuroscience. However, there are several problems with this argument.
Correlation is not causation: Con is right that there is a strong relationship between the neurological states in the brain and the mental states in the brain, for example, a certain drug will trigger certain emotions or mental states. However, is this relationship an indicator that one causes the other? No. For we can think of many examples where a correlation does not imply causation. For example, ice cream sales surge around the same time the number of forest fires increase. It would be clearly absurd to think that ice cream sales cause forest fires therefore despite the strong correlation between the two variables, there is no causation. The reason as it turns out is that both happen in the summer where the intense heat motivates people to buy ice cream as well as increases the chances of forest fires so here the correlation between the two variables is explained not by a causal relationship between the two variable but the explanation is grounded in a third variable - increased heat during summer.
Substance Dualism is interactionist: The conclusion that Con comes to is compatible with substance dualism, the view that the mind and matter are the two fundamental substances of reality. Under substance dualism, matter influences the mind as can be seen by the evidence Con brought forwards. However, the mind also influences matter. So there is no issue in positing an interaction between the two substances while denying that these two substances are identical. Considering this, the theist can still maintain that there is an immaterial mind even if it is influenced by a material body.
Fallacy of association: It is fallacious to infer that a rule that applies to a certain set applies to another different set merely because of a shared similarity. This is because the premise “If a rule applies to a specific set, then it should apply to similar sets” is not only unjustified but also false due to many counterexamples. For example, the set of apples in a farm will always fall to the ground when released but it is fallacious to infer that the set of apples in a swimming pool will also fall to the bottom of the pool when released merely because both sets are categories of apples. Similarly, the minds of animals and humans may very well be contingent on neuroscience but it would be fallacious to infer that all minds, including any alleged supernatural minds like the mind of God, would also be contingent on neuroscience merely because both sets involve minds.
In conclusion, Con’s arguments are not sound and even if they were successful, would not negate the proposition and would not show that God does not exist. As it turns out, I even agree with his first argument but Con has failed to highlight how it fulfills his burden of proof.
I now turn it back to Con who will provide rebuttals to my opening arguments per the debate structure.

Thanks for your last round Pro.

This round I'm allowed to rebuttal, so I'll focus on Pro's 1st round arguments.

P2 is what I am challenging, because a) the totality of all contingents is not known or defined, and b) if we're to use the universe as the presumed totality of contingents, it's not clear whether or not the universe is an isolated system or whether or not the universe contains the totality of contingent beings.

Here' where I need Pro to get.

What I think Pro fails to understand is that when there was no universe, there was no remaining energy or space, and instead you had quantum fluctuations in an actually perfect vacuum that is void of remaining particles, radiation, spacetime, and forces.

Nothing remains, instead it all fluctuates together.

I had defined and sourced why creation is a temporal process and given no contentions with the definitions or their sources from Pro, I urge voters to use these definitions when gauging the debate.

I'm only addressing Pro's first round arguments, but for now, Pro should answer these questions.

1. Can you explain, without using temporal concepts like precedence, how one tells the difference between a creator and its created product?

2. If you are unable to explain a creator existing-->creating-->created product without mentioning precedence, how do you know the universe did not create your god when there was no remaining time for precedence or creation?

3. Do you understand that an unstable quantum fluctuation is what our universe is so our universe was not created by quantum fluctuations rather our universe is the unstable expression, not creation, of quantum fluctuations?

The instability can originate without remaining time, but the temporal process of creation cannot occur without time, especially if one cannot indicate precedence, so I would like Pro to address these facts.

Pro?

Thank you Con for the rebuttals. To respect the debate structure, this round will also be for rebuttals.
Argument from Contingency
Con’s rebuttals to this argument were especially weak. Con raises two objections. He argues that the totality of all contingent beings is not identified. His second objection is that the universe may not exhaust all contingent beings. He also brings up tangential points from Quantum Mechanics which will be addressed when we discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
The totality of all contingent beings is not identified
Con here asks what the totality of all contingent beings (cited as BCF from hereafter) would like. However, he has not demonstrated why the argument needs to identify the BCF. He has not demonstrated why the argument would fail if the proponent does not identify the BCF. The only two premises that the argument needs to get off have been demonstrated above. Perhaps Con is asking if the BCF exists? But such an argument was already provided. Whatever exists either has an external explanation or not. Whatever has an external explanation is called contingent and whatever does not have an external explanation is called necessary and we know that this distinction is exhaustive according to the law of the excluded middle.  If the beings that exist are necessary, then we can skip to the conclusion. However, if the beings that exist are contingent, then it is the case that there are contingent beings and so there is a group or a totality of contingent beings.
So in conclusion, Con has failed miserably to highlight how this objection rebuts the argument or why we should even be concerned with the ability to identify the BCF. The ability to identify the BCF is not a premise in the argument and so the proponent need not worry about it.
In a very loose sense, we can identify the BCF merely because it is the group of all contingent beings.
Can Con explain why it matters even if we can not identify the BCF? Even if the proponent of the argument can not, in what way will this disprove the argument?
Is the universe the BCF?
The second objection is more of an inquiry from Con about whether our universe exhausts all contingent beings. However, this is also irrelevant. Suppose there is a multiverse, then the multiverse would be included in the BCF. Matter of fact, if there are such contingent beings like angels, demons and jinn, then those beings would be included in the BCF. A contingent being is not any being that is inside our universe but rather any being that depends on an external explanation. There is no premise in the argument that claims that the universe is the BCF so Con is not objecting to any part of the argument provided. Con towards the end argues that the multiverse is both contingent and necessary however, this is contradictory and therefore impossible. A contingent being is a being that relies on an external explanation while a necessary being is one that does not rely on an external explanation. A being can not both have and not have an external explanation. Even if you can explain each universe in the multiverse in virtue of an earlier universe, that would be insufficient for this argument is not concerned about the individual contingent beings within the BCF but it is rather concerned with explaining the BCF itself rather than its components. Does Con think that by explaining each contingent being in the BCF that he has explained the entire BCF? That would be a fallacy of composition on the level of saying that because each atom in the ocean is unobservable to the naked eye then the whole ocean is unobservable to the naked eye or that because each cell in the human is very small then the human also must be very small. It is fallacious to infer about the whole from the parts. So even if Con can explain each individual contingent fact inside the BCF, that does not explain the whole BCF. Moreover, we have already given a rational proof for why the BCF is contingent in the second premise. Notice that the argument does not concern itself with the size of the BCF. There could be an infinite or even five contingent beings and there would still be a contingent BCF that would per premise 1 require a necessary being.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that an explanation, as used in the argument from contingency, does not have to be a creator cause but could be a sustaining cause that keeps the contingent being in existence like a candle sustains the flame in existence.
So in brief, one of the two objections Con has is irrelevant and has not been demonstrated to refute the argument even if true. The other objection is very weak and rests on the fallacy from composition as well as being contradicted by the rational proof provided for the contingency of the BCF in the second premise.
Kalam Cosmological Argument
Con makes a more interesting objection to the Kalam argument.
Is the Kalam argument invalid?
Right off the bat, Con’s charge is false because Kalam follows the valid rule of inference called modus ponens. Modus ponens says that an argument is valid if it follows this structure:
P1) If A, then B.
P2) A
Therefore, B
And we can see that the kalam follows the same form.
P1) If something begins to exist, then that being has an extrinsic cause
P2) The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has an extrinsic cause.
Con starts with a tangent that the Kalam initially had the premise “Whatever exists has a cause”. This is a strawman fallacy. Con is attacking a premise that I am not defending. As it turns out, no proponent of the Kalam argument in the history of philosophy has ever defended this premise. Matter of fact, Con argues that this is the original Kalam argument however, if we go back to Al-Ghazali who is the first proponent of this argument then we can see that this is not true. Instead of assertions, Con has to defend that claim.

Key question to Con: Which proponent of the Kalam argument ever argued that “whatever exists has a cause” and how would you prove that the proponent did in fact say this?Con’s two charges could be easily refuted.
Con argues that the argument begs the question by creating the category of things that exist but did not begin to exist. Firstly, it is not clear that the argument does in fact do so in the first premise. There is no implication in the premise “whatever begins to exist has a cause” that says “there are beings that did not begin to exist”. Con is reading into the premise what it is not saying. Secondly, even if the argument does create such a category of things that did not begin to exist, that is not the same claim as the conclusion. To claim that there are beings that did not begin to exist is not the same as claiming that there is an external cause to the universe. So Con commits the false equivalence fallacy.
Moreover, Con argues that the argument commits special pleading. But let’s understand what special pleading is. Special pleading is when we argue that a rule applies to a set and then exclude a member of the set from the rule without proper justification. For example, if I argue that all apples are red but then exclude one apple from that rule without a justification, then that would be special pleading. It should be clear now that the argument does no such thing. It applies the rule of having an external cause to the set of things that begin to exist. It is not possible in principle to exclude God from the set of things that begin to exist because God is not in that set to begin with, i.e. God does not have a beginning by definition. This would be equivalent to Con saying that I am committing the special pleading fallacy by excluding bananas from the rule of being red because they are not apples. It is an absurd objection.
Key Questions
>Pro, other than bare assertions like, "the creator of the universe must be supernatural," how is god exempt from the beginning to exist rule that you openly endorse?
There is no such rule of beginning to exist. No premise in the argument argues that everything begins to exist. This is a strawman from Con. Rather God is not in the set of things that begin to exist because God does not have a beginning so by definition, he can not be in such a set.
>Pro, could you explain the mechanism by which god accomplishes this exemption?
By using the word exemption, you imply some sort of rule. But as I said, there is no rule that says that everything began to exist. If you are asking why God is not in the set of things that begin to exist, then the answer is above.
>If you can't, then how do you know that this exemption has occurred?
Answered above.
An objection to the first premise
Con here argues that it is not necessary to postulate the first premise that whatever begins to exist has an external cause because quantum vacuum fluctuations have been observed  to occur without seeing their cause. However, this is false. The cause for quantum vacuum fluctuations is the quantum vacuum energy so there was a cause namely unstable energy. [1] Moreover, even if we observed a quantum vacuum fluctuations happening without at the same time detecting its cause does not mean that the quantum vacuum fluctuations happened without a cause. Rather, according to the rational proof provided for premise 1, it would mean that we observed the quantum vacuum fluctuations happening by an unobserved cause. For example, the ancients argued that things fall to the ground without a cause because they did not observe a cause at action when things fell to the ground. However, we now know that they were wrong and that there is an unobserved cause for things falling down to the ground, namely gravity. Con’s interpretation of Quantum Mechanics violates the rational proof given for the premise.
Creation is not temporal

It is true that Con provided a definition for creation as commonly understood by the laymen but the definition provided was not exhaustive of all instances of creation as argued before.>1. Can you explain, without using temporal concepts like precedence, how one tells the difference between a creator and its created product?
I can appeal to temporal concepts when describing the created product. I can not however do so when describing the creator in the act of creation since the creator or the cause is timeless. The way that the created product would be distinguished from the creator is already provided in the second premise of the argument. The created product or the universe would have a beginning while the cause would be timeless since it is external to the natural world and the universe.
>2. If you are unable to explain a creator existing-->creating-->created product without mentioning precedence, how do you know the universe did not create your god when there was no remaining time for precedence or creation?
This one is relatively simple. The Kalam argument argues that the universe began to exist and therefore needs a cause. The cause is then argued to have all the divine attributes making it God. God can not have a cause since a cause in the Kalam is what brings the being into existence but God is timeless therefore there is no time when he did not exist then was brought into existence so God is uncaused.
>3. Do you understand that an unstable quantum fluctuation is what our universe is so our universe was not created by quantum fluctuations rather our universe is the unstable expression, not creation, of quantum fluctuations?
That might be the case. However, by the Kalam argument, the universe, no matter what state it goes through, must have a beginning and so must have an external cause.
I now turn it back to Con for additional rebuttals.

Notes

Thanks for that Pro.

Pro gives a huge concession:

My response:

Precisely.

My response:

Pro is selling a creator that never could have created without time existing first in order to allow the being to precede its creation and enact such a temporal process like creation.

The creator of the universe has been negated here.

Pro mentions:

My response:

My response:

Pro misrepresents:

My response:

Nope.

I argued that naturally the universe can originate without creation.

Fluctuating-->remaining is not creation, it is a guaranteed instability of quantum fluctuations which, when unstable, are expressed as remaining energy and space instead of fluctuating energy and space.

origin - the point where something begins.

Pro grants:

My response:

Ok, well fluctuating quantum nothingness-->remaining energy is NOT CREATION, so by agreeing to this, Pro concedes quite a bit here.

Pro says:

My response:

Quantum fluctuations ARE NOTHING.
They never remain.
Pro, can you explain how quantum fluctuations WITHOUT A UNIVERSE never remain because of annihilation, yet are something.
How can one consider a thing something if it never remains?

When there was no remaining space, time, energy, and forces, there was nothing because nothing remained from all of the annihilating.
No remaining, no existing...just nothing.

Pro strawmans:

My response:

No.

The mind is a construct, not made of physical particles itself, that is contingent on the brain and neurological substrates.
No brain, no mind.

The mind is not a substance at all.

Pro, can you explain how there would be a mind or mental concepts without a brain or neurological substrates?

Pro tries one mroe time:

My response:

Ok, Pro, I'm claiming that intelligence is necessarily a property of neurological substrates, and that all evidence indicates that if these neurological substrates do not exist, then neither does consciousness, intention, or intelligence.

Pro can you show an example of intelligence that does not use or is not contingent on neurological substrates?
Like a computer is intelligent, but it's contingent on humans' neurological substrates to exist and process.

So, Pro, give an example of how intelligence can exist WITHOUT neurological substrates.
I'm saying that all of our examples indicate that intelligence and neurological substrates are inextricably connected, so we've no reason to infer that intelligence can exist outside of these neurological substrates, even if we assert supernature.

Great debate Pro; I now turn it to you.

I confirm Con’s request that Raltar and Ramshutu should avoid voting on this debate and so we ask the moderators to remove their votes in case either user avoids our restriction.
Rebuttals
Origin of temporal events
A hidden premise or a merged argument?
“Therefore since precedence is necessarily temporal and composed of temporally related events, Pro concedes here that nothing preceded the universe because time hadn't originated yet.”
Notice the new premise introduced here: “Since precedence is necessarily temporal”. This premise was never mentioned in Con’s original presentation of the first point in the opening arguments. The original conclusion of Con’s first argument was that the origin of the temporal events must be timeless and that was the only conclusion made in Con’s first argument. Of course, I naturally agreed since this conclusion is implied in the conclusion of the Kalam argument that the cause of the universe is timeless and that is the only conclusion I conceded. However, it was Con’s second point that argued that because creation and precedence are temporal and since the causal origin of the universe is timeless then the origin of the universe can not be a creation event. To avoid further confusion, this argument will be addressed in the rebuttals of the second point.
Pedantry
The other two objections that Con provide miss the big picture and are concerned over irrelevant details like whether “prior” is the best word to use. He argues that “prior” actually means precedes in time and so can not have the sort of connotations that I draw upon in my first argument. But again, objections to the extent that precedence is temporal are in the domain of Con’s second point not in this point since the only conclusion made in this argument is that the origin of temporal events or the universe is timeless or not subject to time. The objections related to precedence and creation are in the domain of the second point and so will be addressed there.
Since the only conclusion made here in this point is that the causal original of the temporal events or the universe is timeless and since Con has failed to show how the universe having a timeless cause negates the proposition then no real rebuttal needs to be provided here. If anything, this argument only supports my case by providing further corroboration of the Kalam argument by showing that the cause of the universe is necessarily timeless. Con had to show how the origin of the universe or temporal events being timeless shows that God does not exist. Since he has failed to do so, then this argument does not negate the resolution and so Con has failed to fulfill their burden of proof and support their case.
Con’s Second point
A Brief Recap
Con’s point here was that since the origin of the universe would be timeless and since precedence and creation are temporal, then the origin of the universe can not be a creator.
However, as argued before, this argument is misconceived on two occasions. Firstly, even if the cause exists timelessly, that does not mean that his action of creation can not be temporal. As argued before, many models allow us to understand how it is possible that a timeless cause could bring the universe into being. However, it should be emphasized that such a project is not necessary since the Kalam Argument is only concerned with proving that a timeless cause did in fact create the universe but makes no claims about how it might have done so. One such model would be the model that I briefly introduced after defending the Kalam argument in my opening arguments. The actual model is simple: God exists timelessly then due to his intelligent volition decides to create the universe. This act of creation is simultaneous with the beginning of the universe and the beginning of  time and so can be temporal. So while God’s existence is timeless, his act of creating the universe is temporal. This also coheres with the conclusion of the Kalam argument that the cause is volitional. Given the timelessness and the eternity of the cause; if the cause of the universe is impersonal and unintelligent, then the universe would be eternal. But since the universe began to exist, then the cause is personal and intelligent.
Moreover, God could be the creator of the universe in the sense of being the sustaining creator of the universe so that if God did not exist, then the universe will not exist. In the same sense that a candle sustains its flame in existence and so it is its active creator. So that even if we grant Con’s argument here, the resolution will not be negated since God could be the sustaining cause of the universe while not being its originating cause.
Creators and Causes
“It's not enough for Pro to talk about cause and effect here, rather he has to talk about creator and created product.”
There is a very a clear sense in which a creator is a being that is responsible for the existence of effect. A sustaining cause likewise is responsible for the existence of the effect in the sense that if the cause did not exist, neither would the effect. So Con is mistaken here. A sustaining cause absolutely is a creator. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a creator as any being that creates [1] where one of the understandings of “create” is to cause [2]. If Con has any other understanding of how I use the word “create” or “creator” then he is misunderstanding my argument and subsequently attacking a strawman.
How can God timelessly create?
Con repeatedly asks:
>“Without using time or temporal concepts, how do you know the flame is dependent on the candle and not the other way around?”
>“Pro can you explain how the candle sustains (present indicative tense) something without preceding time or the passage thereof or "timelessly" as you claim?”
This has already been answered. The proponent of the Kalam argument need not maintain that God’s act of creation is timeless nor is any such conclusion implied in the Kalam argument. The proponent of the Kalam argument need only maintain that God’s existence is timeless without having to make any claims about his act of creation being timeless. I even provided a model above that shows how God could exist timelessly while his act of creation could be temporal since it is simultaneous with the beginning of the universe.
What if God has a cause?
Con repeatedly asks:
>“We know the origin of temporal events has a beginning, but without time, how do you know that the origin of temporal events didn't bring about the existence of your creator?”
> “Can you differentiate between the initial cause and the initial effect without using temporal concepts/relationships?”
> “How do you know the flame isn't ontologically causing the candle if you're claiming there's no time difference between the two?”
>“Without any justification from Pro, god "not beginning to exist" is a bare assertion and it can;t be used to discern the difference between the creator and the created product.”
This one is also relatively easy to answer since it is based on a misunderstanding of the Kalam Argument. Notice the first premise of the Kalam argument “whatever begins to exist has an external cause”. The Kalam then goes and argues that the universe began to exist and so needs an external cause. This external cause or God can not even in principle have a cause since he did not begin to exist and so does not require an external cause. What’s the proof that the external cause did not begin to exist? The proof of this is that the cause is external to the universe and so is outside the natural world (supernatural) and its dimensions (spaceless, timeless, immaterial, non-physical). Since the cause is timeless, then there is no passage of time or events so there is no event where he does not exist and another later event where he begins to exist since, as stated before, his existence is timeless and does not experience a passage of time or events. Therefore, the cause is everlasting and beginningless. We also argued in the argument from contingency that God is necessary. It is impossible for the necessary being to have come into or went out of existence since coming into being would mean that it was preceded by a period of non-existence prior to its emergence and going out of existence means it ceases to exist. But the necessary being cannot possibly not exist, thus the being is eternal and everlasting.
“Multiple models have shown that remaining energy and space is an expression of fluctuating energy ex nihilo and space. Fluctuating-->remaining is simply not creation ex nihilo; it's remaining energy instead of fluctuating energy.”
This point is more in-line with Con’s third argument and so will be addressed in the rebuttals of the third point to avoid further confusion.
A creator of the universe is not necessary
“I argued that naturally the universe can originate without creation. Fluctuating-->remaining is not creation, it is a guaranteed instability of quantum fluctuations which, when unstable, are expressed as remaining energy and space instead of fluctuating energy and space. This is not creation at all. Origin and creation are simply not the same thing, because an origin is necessarily a point at which something originates and creation is a series of related events, one after the other, used to bring about the existence of something. The two terms are different. origin - the point where something begins. Oxford Dictionaries - origin”
If Con wants to argue that the universe originated, that is fine. According to Con, to originate is to begin to exist so if Con argues that the universe originated or began to exist then he would be supporting the Kalam argument by defending the second premise. However, as stated in the Kalam argument, whatever begins to exist has an external cause, so the universe would need an external cause that would have the key divine attributes like timelessness and immateriality, as demonstrated in the opening arguments. It is not enough for Con to assert that the universe can begin to exist without a cause for we have already provided rational proof for the premise that “whatever begins to exist has an external cause”. Con has to demonstrate that the evidence provided for the first premise of the Kalam Argument is mistaken. As argued before, quantum events like quantum fluctuations do not happen without a cause nor is it possible for them to do so since that would contradict the rational demonstrations given for the premise “whatever begins to exist has an external cause”. Rather, Quantum fluctuations do have a cause namely, the unstable quantum vacuum energy [3]. Moreover, even if the Quantum fluctuations were observed without observing a cause, that does not mean that they were uncaused. It could very well be that they have a cause that we could not observe.
Question to Con: Suppose you see a virtual particle fluctuating into existence, how would you know that the virtual particle was uncaused rather than had a cause that you did not or could not observe? [4]
“Ok, well fluctuating quantum nothingness-->remaining energy is NOT CREATION, so by agreeing to this, Pro concedes quite a bit here.”
No, I do not. I agree that the universe could have came out of nothing but I believe that in this case, God would be the cause of the universe that brought it into existence out of nothing because the universe beginning to exist could not happen without an external cause as demonstrated in the first premise of the Kalam Argument.
Consciousness is contingent on neuroscience
A strawman?
Con claims that I strawman them. However, I do not. All the evidence that Pro has provided in his opening arguments suggests that consciousness is contingent on neuroscience in the sense of being altered and changed by it. The evidence does not support any other conclusion and if Con wants to infer another conclusion from the evidence, he has to show how the conclusion is entailed by the evidence rather than merely assert it.
The only sort of data we have is that varying some neuroscience in the brain (coffee, drugs, etc.) also alters mental events and our consciousness by giving us different emotions, feelings, etc. In this sense, these states of consciousness are contingent on neuroscience. The substance dualist absolutely grants that matter can affect the mind. It does not follow that because matter affects the mind that the mind cannot exist without matter. That is a non-sequitur.
So I have not strawmanned Con. If anything I am being charitable with Con for if Con claims that the existence of consciousness is contingent on neuroscience, then that conclusion is a non-sequitur that does not follow from any evidence that we have at all.
Minds, humans and associations
“I'm claiming that intelligence is necessarily a property of neurological substrates, and that all evidence indicates that if these neurological substrates do not exist, then neither does consciousness, intention, or intelligence.”
If Con wants to make the above claim, that is fine. They are expected to prove their claim. Con has provided no evidence for the conclusion that all evidence proves that the mind can not exist if there is no neuroscience or a brain.
Question to Con: What evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt proves that the mind cannot exist without neuroscience?
Con has absolutely failed to provide any such evidence.
Dropped Points
If anything, given the three points I provided above: the fallacy of association, correlation does not imply causation, and the interactionism of substance dualism; no evidence that Con will bring will prove his fourth point. But since Con has not provided any evidence for his claim that “the mind or consciousness will not exist if there is no neurological substrates”, and has absolutely failed to engage any of my three rebuttals, then this point has failed to support Con’s case.
Some Questions
>”Pro, can you explain how there would be a mind or mental concepts without a brain or neurological substrates?”
>”Pro can you show an example of intelligence that does not use or is not contingent on neurological substrates?”
Do I have to, Con? Given the complete lack of justification given for the fourth point, why is Con trying to reverse the burden of proof? Anyways, God would be an example of a disembodied mind that does not rely on neuroscience or a brain. A mind because he has intelligence and will. God is disembodied and immaterial as proven in the Kalam Argument.
I have a quick note to make to the readers and the voters.
Excellent debate so far. I now turn it back to Con for their final round of rebuttals.
Notes:
[1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/creator#synonyms
[2] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/creates third definition.
[3] Quantum fluctuations do have a cause in the disturbances of the quantum field or the quantum vacuum energy. So Con’s claim that quantum events provide a counterexample to the first premise of the kalam argument and so show that the universe could begin without a cause are false.
[4] Con can not appeal to the principle of parsimony not only because the conclusion of something beginning to exist without an external cause contradicts the rational proof given for the first premise of Kalam argument, but for a more important reason. If we seriously take the suggestion that the simplest explanation with the fewest entities is more likely, then we might as well posit solipsism as the most likely explanation. Positing that the virtual particle does not exist at all but rather just a part of our imagination posits less entities than either an uncaused virtual particle or a virtual particle with a cause. I doubt Con would like to adopt solipsism. Lastly, the principle of parsimony is heavily contested and lacks any sound arguments for its validity. In many cases in science, the more complex explanation turned out to be true.

Thanks for that last round Pro.

I'll be using this round to respond to the rest of Pro's rebuttals from the 3rd and 4th round.

Pro had used this argument to prove that the creator of the universe must be necessary, because if the totality of all contingents is contingent, then the totality of all contingents is contingent on this necessary god or "explanation" as Pro calls it.

Well, if the universe is itself contingent on a contingent multiverse system then a) the universe needs not be created since it's an unstable quantum fluctuation and b) the totality of contingents, a multiverse, would not have an external specifier or external explanation because universes are just unstable expressions of quantum fluctuations and quantum fluctuations are just unstable expressions of universes rendering both the multiverse and quantum fluctuations contingent on and necessary for each one's existence.

My response:

Well, if you're using the BCF to show that your universe creator has objective reality because it's the necessary explanation for the universe, but it turns out that the BCF is not the universe and that on which the universe is contingent (quantum fluctuations + multiverse system) is ALSO contingent, then not identifying what the BCF is is problematic to showing how the universe specifically has a necessary explanation.

Nothing indicates that quantum fluctuations are god because nothing indicates that the universe was created in any fashion.

Pro supposes:

My response:

Pro, what about the multiverse system depending on itself and fluctuations?

This would not indicate a necessary creator of our universe, rather it would indicate that the multiverse, which seems to identify what the BCF is, is itself contingent on this multiverse system, which makes the system itself necessary and contingent and negates a necessary external creator of the universe.

Pro continues:

My response:

All of the universes are contingent on unstable quantum fluctuations which would make unstable quantum fluctuations the "external explanation," but since true, stable quantum fluctuations are themselves contingent on unstable spaceimtes, this multiverse system of quantum fluctuations + multiple remaining universes both relies on itself and is self sustaining.

Pro says:

My response:

My response:

If your answer to this question is that because god didn't begin to exist, then that's precisely begging the question right there by putting the conclusion in the premise and you've shown how mentioning "begin to exist" necessarily implies that there is something that didn't begin to exist.

Pro tries:

My response:

However if there are things, like this external cause, that exist outside of the set of things that begin to exist, then by your own admission, P1 of the KCA separates things that exist into two sets only to later claim there is only one thing in one of the sets...it's precisely circular reasoning.

I had asked Pro HOW god is exempt from beginning to exist and...

Pro asserts:

My response:

So god didn't begin to exist because "by definition" he didn't begin to exist?

Pro adds:

My response:

This is just not correct.

Quantum fluctuations have no cause, they fluctuate in and out of existence, and a true vacuum is not anything, literally, it is the absence of EVERYTHING, i.e. no particles, radiation, space, time, or forces, the absence of everything.
Where there is absolutely nothing, there are non-remaining quantum fluctuations, so they literally have zero cause.

I had asked Pro:

1. Can you explain, without using temporal concepts like precedence, how one tells the difference between a creator and its created product?

This has to be answered because Pro has already conceded that the origin of the universe is the origin of temporal events so Pro would have to explain the difference between the universe and its creator without the origin of time to allow for temporal concepts.

Pro answers:

My response:

There you have it readers.
You can tell the difference between the two because...the repeated assertion that god didn't begin to exist and is timeless.
Noted.

Then I asked Pro:

My response:

So just more assertions of your argument that it must be god?
Noted again.

Pro alleges:

My response:

Creators not only use a temporal process consisting of one event after another, they also necessarily precede their creations.

My response:

But if the action itself results in the origin of temporal events, then that action CANNOT be temporal, it's actually precisely what it means.

You can't use time before time has originated, think about it.

At this point, I can't read Pro simply asserting that "god is beginningless because he has to be beginningless" and "I know that god is uncaused because god must be uncaused"  anymore, he's not answering my questions.

The truth is that without precedence or temporal concepts, one could not tell the difference between the universe and that which created it, because one wouldn't know which came first, in fact, given Pro's contradictory "timelessly prior" claim about god, one can just conclude that in fact the human concept of god is illogical and merely an emergent property of the universe, not the other way around.

The universe wasn't created because it's an unstable quantum fluctuation, intelligence is a property of neurological substrates as the study I provided on consciousness decrees is the case, Pro's arguments can only assert and use circular reasoning, and one cannot tell the difference between a creator and its created product without precedence or temporal concepts, so the origin of temporal events was not created by something necessary or intelligent.

I would like to thank Con for an interesting debate. Since this is the final round of this debate, it is designated for the concluding thoughts and will not include full-length rebuttals but merely a recap that I will try to keep as short as possible. I will make a few notes on each of our cases as well as final appeals with a brief exposition of the implications of the resolution.
The Affirmative Case
My case consisted of two arguments. The first one was an argument from contingency inspired by Ibn Sina with two premises that were defended in my opening arguments. Con made two objections, both of which were trivial and failed to engage with the essence of my argument. The first one was the possibility of the multiverse which would seem to create issues for identifying the BCF. This objection is absolutely irrelevant; even if we can not identify the BCF, that would not dent the argument since the argument makes no claims about the specific identities of the content of the BCF. Whether there is a multiverse, colliding branes like we see in String theory or even other dimensions, none of this would affect the argument. As stated in the opening arguments, that being, be it the multiverse or whatever it is, either has an external explanation (contingent) or it does not have an external explanation (necessary). If it is necessary, we can skip to the conclusion of the argument. If contingent, then it would, by definition, be a part of the totality of all contingent beings (BCF).
The second objection that Con made to this argument was perhaps even less threatening. Con seems to argue that if we can explain the individual components of the BCF or if we can explain each universe in virtue of a prior universe in the multiverse then we have explained all the components of the BCF and thus explained this totality without appealing to an external explanation. If this is the case, then this would not threaten the argument because then the BCF would not have an external explanation and so would be a necessary being which means that Con implicitly grants the conclusion. So a proponent of this argument can grant Con’s scenario but that assumption that the necessary being is the BCF falls flat after we explore the attributes of a necessary being. However, even if Con succeeds in explaining all the components of the BCF, that would not mean that he succeeded in explaining the whole BCF because as noted before, that would commit the fallacy of composition rendering Con’s argument invalid.
In response to my second argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Con has claimed that the argument is invalid and that the first premise is false. However, to rebut the former, we demonstrated that the Kalam argument adheres to the valid principle of inference called modus ponens. Moreover, there is no question-begging in the Kalam argument since the premise “there are things that exist but did not begin to exist” is not the same claim as the conclusion “The universe has an external cause”. We also argued that the Kalam does not commit the special pleading fallacy since the rule “whatever begins to exist has a cause” only applies to things that have a beginning. But since God does not have a beginning then he has no cause. The only way it would be special pleading is if God had a beginning but we asserted that he has no cause anyways; that would violate the premise “whatever begins to exist” but nobody is arguing that God has a beginning. The second claim that Con made was that quantum events begin to exist yet have no cause providing counterexamples to the first premise. However, I quoted two scientists, both of which hold PhDs in physics, showing that Con’s claim is wrong. Even if we could observe quantum events like virtual particles coming into existence without at the same time observing its cause, we would have no way of telling whether the particle came into existence uncaused or was created by a cause that we simply could not see or detect.
So the affirmation of the resolution stands and Con’s objection could not defeat my arguments.
The Negative Case
Con attempted to provide four points against the resolution yet none of them were successful.
For his point, he argued that the origin of the universe must be timeless. Well and good, that is even one of the conclusions of the Kalam argument that the cause of the universe must be timeless. If anything, this point further corroborates the Kalam argument for the affirmation of the resolution. To argue that the cause or the origin of the universe must be timeless does nothing to show that the cause does not exist.
For his second point, Con argued that since the origin of the universe is timeless, then the origin of the universe can not be a creation event by a creator since creation is temporal. However, even if this point is true, it does not refute the resolution since God could be a sustaining cause or explanation of the universe as proven in the argument from contingency. Moreover, it is false that just because the creator exists timelessly that therefore his act of creation can not be temporal. William Lane Craig’s model that was explained in the earlier rounds allow us to understand how a creator that exists timelessly could use a temporal act like creation to bring about the universe. However, such a project is not really a problem for the Kalam argument, since as stated before, the Kalam is not concerned nor makes any claims about how the creator creates the universe.
Con’s third point is that quantum events could explain how the universe could have originated or began to exist, and I quote, “when there is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING” like we see in quantum events. However, such a project is refuted in the first premise of the Kalam argument. Whatever begins to exist can not have absolutely no cause or be caused by nothing whatsoever because whatever begins to exist has an external cause. Since the universe began to exist, it must have an external cause. Moreover, I have used two physicists as sources that quantum events are not uncaused but absolutely do have causes so Con’s claim is simply false again.
Con’s final point was that intelligence depends on neurological substrates. However, Con failed to provide any evidence for this premise and so this point is unjustified. I provided three refutations that shows that no scientific evidence could prove that intelligence cannot exist without neuroscience namely, the fallacy of association, correlation is not causation, and interactionism of substance dualism. All the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness says that is of relevance is that:
“Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors”
Nothing about intelligence being necessarily contingent on the brain or neurological substrates.
Final Appeals
In this section, I will provide a few appeals for the readers before they potentially vote. Here is a brief list. Pro has used unreliable sources to argue his case. The most prominent example of this is Con using a website called Logically Fallacious to make his case in Round 2. If you click the “about the author” tab from the section “menu” on the header, you will arrive at this webpage where the author talks about his credentials.
Here is an excerpt that summarizes his credentials:
“Bo's interest in psychology began as an undergraduate studying marketing, specifically, consumer behavior. After many years immersed in the business world, Bo returned to school and received his master's degree in general psychology and PhD in social psychology, focusing on social, cognitive, and positive psychology. Bo's dissertation is in the area of social intelligence and online education, and can be found online at proquest.com”
Bo Bennett, the source that Con linked, has no credentials about philosophy; not even a bachelor’s degree or any other degree. He is a psychologist and his PhD is in psychology. Con used a psychologist as a source for philosophy. Con used an unreliable source.
I only used two sources, both of which to support the claim that quantum events are caused. Both sources were physicists with PhDs in their respective fields and so are reliable sources to discuss quantum mechanics. One being Paul Sutter, a professor at the University of Ohio with a PhD in physics. The other being Matt Strassler, who is a theoretical physicist with a PhD from Stanford. So I hope it is clear to the voters that my case had superior sources than Con’s case.
Implications
The existence of a necessary creator of the universe is perhaps one of the most important questions that we can ask due to its significant implications. If the conception of God argued for in this debate does exist, then it seems that a lot of issues in the philosophy of religion can be easily answered. It would seem very easy to make sense of how a necessary being answers the problem of evil and divine hiddenness. A necessary God has no obligation, need, want or desire to end suffering or nonbelief of atheists and so observing these two phenomena would not be unexpected given theism. Matter of fact, if God’s goodness entailed having these needs, wants or desires, that would make him contingent on external circumstances like humans believing in him or moral agents ceasing from moral evil. But since God and his nature are not contingent on any external circumstances by virtue of being necessary, then God does not have these needs, wants or desires to stop evil and nonbelief.
Moreover, God’s existence sheds light on some of our deepest existential issues. The existence of God would falsify atheism and confirm the central claims of the major world religions as well as corroborate other religious doctrines; for example, the doctrine of prophethood becomes significantly more probable given God’s existence. Another doctrine that would be more probable given God’s existence would be heaven and hell. The significance of heaven and hell is all too clear to us. If God exists, then we would want to avoid being atheists since being an atheist, according to the largest world religions, would entail spending an afterlife of eternal conscious torment. If God exists, then we would want to believe in God and explore which religion is true, because finding the correct answer, according to the largest world religions, would allow us to rejoice with a benevolent God for all eternity potentially with our dead loved ones and relatives.
I would like to thank Con for this exciting debate.
Vote Pro.

Well this was a long one, but a good one and it should be pretty easy to vote here.

Pro had to prove that the universe was created by a necessary, intelligent being and given 1) Pro's concession on the origin of temporal events being the origin of the universe, 2) Pro's inability to show HOW god atemporally existed prior to and created the origin of temporal events, and 3) Pro's refusal to show intelligence without neurological substrates or a brain, Pro cannot have met his burden.

Pro only had 2 arguments for the existence of an atemporally-prior-necessary-intelligent-bringer-into-existence-of-the-universe being.

Both asserted necessity, and Pro's only defense to attacks on god being timeless or beginning-less is yet more assertions.

1. Pro tried to show that a creator of the universe was necessary because the universe is necessarily contingent on god.

The problem is that Pro doesn't push back on there being a multiverse or that these multiple universes, including the one related to the resolution, ours, are contingent on quantum fluctuations, which I have shown are also contingent on the multiverse system as unstable universes.

This makes the universe contingent on another contingent and therefore does not require that the universe needs a necessary being to bring about the universe..the contingent fluctuations are sufficient.

Pro never really tells us where the totality of contingents ends or begins so we really don't know where to insert this imaginary necessity Pro speaks of.

There's just no necessity to point to here.

2. Pro tried to use the KCA to prove a beginning-less creator and instead presents a fallacious argument that goes in circles and special pleads god's exemption from beginning to exist.

Pro desperately tries to show that my source on logical fallacies is less than credible, but luckily fallacies are universal, so don't take my simple source's word on the matter, take these source's word on circular reasoning and begging the question.

Pro was never able to show how god was timeless or beginning-less without asserting one with the other...truly check the debate with me asking HOW god is timeless and Pro always answered because he has no beginning.

So I asked Pro how he knows god didn't have a beginning and he answers because god is timeless.

Any voter can go to the first round and see my 4 points against Pro's case, and an astute voter would recognize that Pro conceded my #1 point and Pro claims that god was TIMELESSLY PRIOR the the universe, which is a contradiction.

Pro also ADMITTED to dropping my "precedence is temporal" point, by claiming I never made the argument in the opening arguments.

Not only did I make the argument in my opening arguments, it was central to my case.

Pro dropped it, and it further validates that one cannot precede ANYTHING without time, no matter how many contradictions Pro uses

to argue this silly creator into existence.

Without neurological substrates, time, or precedence, Pro's god's not possible.

VOTE CON.