Question about A Priori propositions

Author: Sum1hugme

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  Is a (synthetic A Priori proposition = Impure A Priori proposition)?
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@Sum1hugme
I'm confused about what seems to be a contradiction between statements from sections I and II of the introduction of (Meiklejohn's translation of) Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

The section I statement is

"Every change has a cause," is a proposition á priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.
The section II statement is

If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, "Every change must have a cause," will amply serve our purpose.
This section II statement is meant to be exemplifying a judgement which is pure á priori. The section II example is basically the same as the section I example except now has the word "must", which seems to be functioning to guarantee that the latter example entails necessity, which makes the proposition pure. So on one hand, the section II example is pure because it entails necessity. But on the other hand, it is impure because, just like the section I example, it refers to the concept of change, which can only be derived from experience.

Is change in this section II example no longer a concept which can only be derived from experience? Or have I misinterpreted something prior? Or something else?
I've consulted also the Guyer and Wood translation, and that didn't clear up my confusion. [**]
In Section I Kant first distinguishes between empirical and a priori, then among the latter, between relative and absolute, and, finally, among the absolute, between pure and impure propositions/judgments. The "pure absolute" means that not even the concepts within are derived from experience.

Alas, this scope of "pure" turns out to be empty outside of mathematics, and the Critique is mostly about application of a priori cognition to empirical matters. What follows is a common phenomenon in language use: when a term becomes idle in some context (here, use of understanding outside of mathematics) its meaning is shifted to make it useful again.

So in the second section Kant redefines the "pure", without announcing it, by adding "strictly universal" to what he previously called "absolute". [**]

EVEN MATHEMATICS REQUIRES REAL-WORLD APPLICATION TO VALIDATE IT.