It is likely God doesn't exist
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
Winner & statistics
After 1 vote and with 4 points ahead, the winner is...
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- Two days
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- One week
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BoP is shared
'God' - "the sentient, eternal. efficient cause of the contingent universe"
'Contingent' - "actual world"
'Exist' - "to have necessary, metaphysical existence"
R1: Instigator waives - Contender forwards opening arguments
R2: Instagator forwards opening arguments, with rebuttal - Contender rebuts and defends
R3-4: Defence and rebuttals
R5: Last defence and argument summary
BoP can be fulfilled without deductive argumentation; inductive and/or abductive reasoning will suffice.
If God didn't exist metaphysically, we wouldn't be having this conversation.
My opponent didn't message me before accepting per the debate description -- despite this maybe we can still have a thought provoking debate.
== Aff ==
This is a form of ontological parisomony which deems a competing theory a priori most likely if that theory has less ontological commitments than the other theory.  If two theories X and Y have the same ontological commitments, but X is ontologically commited to Z and Y is not, it would deem Y as more parsimonious than X.
Thus, my argument is frameworked by Theism versus Metaphysical Naturalism. Metaphysical Naturalism has two ontological commitments: the physical universe and the laws that govern the universe. Whereas, Theism has three ontological commitments: the physical universe, the laws that govern the universe and God.
Hence, the theory sans the inclusion of God is deemed a priori most likely.
Thus, the resolution is upheld as the contrapositive would dictate if the theory not including God is likely, then it would logically entail that the theory including God is unlikely.
== Rebuttals ==
Epistemic vs Metaphysical Possibility
Con merely illustrates God's ontology as a concept, which conveys His epistemic possibility of existence . However, this argument is unsound in negating the resolution as it lacks a cogent, metaphysical/subjunctive conclusion. Hence, it would be necessary for Con to provide actual evidence to why God exists.
Even if I were to concede this, Con hasn't demonstrated God's 'necessary' existence -- that even the concept of God must exist, as a truism, through every possible world; not just contingently.
I would suggest that everything is conceptual, as far as we know.
And why would a God's existence be necessary?
And why does god exist.?
Because everything is conceptual, as far as we know.
I think about God, therefore it is.
And I think that this more than it is.
But I realise that it isn't.
Is there an honest objective?
Well, yes I suppose there is.
Otherwise I would be contradicting myself.
My opponents intent is clear.
Occam, Instigator, Contender.
The Pot Calling the Kettle Black.
Non. Monsieur Descartes?
== Aff ==
Con concedes this argument as he has not attempted to rebut it.
== Rebuttals ==
Con's argument is entirely unsourced and is absolutely circular. He states that because God is conceptual, it must be a necessary truth. However, this is what separates contingent concepts with necessary truths; if everything conceptual is necessary, it would entail the existence of unicorns in this universe. Necessary truths like 2+2 = 4 are mathematical axioms and are necessary i.e exist in all possible worlds. Concepts without metaphysical conclusions have no objective/necessary bearing. I reiterated this in the previous round and Con hasn't mentioned any of it.
Occam was a wordsmith.
There he is, twice rebutted.
And my opponent is also a wordsmith and I likewise attempt to be.
And there might be a God up there hiding behind a cloud.
Just as there might be a Unicorn hiding up there somewhere.
And there is definitely a God in there somewhere.
As is the Unicorn.
And 2+2 could just as easily = 6. Depending on the point of view of the judge.
In fact the likelihood of 2+2 =4.
Is the same as the likelihood of God either existing or not existing.
All things considered.
My whole argument is based on a concept with a metaphysical conclusion.
Internal database sourcing.
== Rebuttals ==
Con seems to be speaking in riddles for the most part. However, he states:
"Because everything is conceptual, as far as we know."
This is a bare assertion. Nonetheless, even if it were true it doesn't mean that an instance of that conception objectively exists. I can conceive a unicorn to be in my room but that does not mean there objectively exists a unicorn in my room. As I have stated, epistemic concepts that lack metaphysical conclusions don't demonstrate necessary existence.
Moreover, instead of addressing Occam's Razor he instead ascribes Occam to be a "wordsmith". It is an interesting refutation.
Did Occam himself not speak in riddles?
"Because everything is conceptual as far as we know"...…...Think about it.
"Exist: To have necessary, metaphysical existence"...…...Therein lies a riddle.
"Epistemic concepts"...…..How else?
"Necessary existence"...…….Yep, Metaphysical conclusions.
Objective existence?...……Therein lies another riddle.
When is objectivity truly never subjectivity?
How can we truly differentiate?
When is or isn't the unicorn?
When is or isn't God?
I think, therefore it is.
== Rebuttals ==
Con is dancing around a kind of metaphysical solipsism/epistemic nihilism framework. None of which suffice in negating the resolution.
"And 2+2 could just as easily = 6. Depending on the point of view of the judge.In fact the likelihood of 2+2 =4.Is the same as the likelihood of God either existing or not existing.All things considered."
No, it can not. The analytic a priori proposition that is 2+2=4 is an immutable truism and is a 'necessary' truth as we cannot conceive a possible world that is logically congruent without this fact. This is corroborated by provability logic, where if the statement □p (using the modal operator □ meaning 'it is necessary that')
and proposition “p" (that is provable in Peano Arithmetic) valid principles from the metamathematics of arithmetic turn into familiar modal axioms .
Moreover, he states:
"When is objectivity truly never subjectivity?"
I'll accept this, insofar as objectively true entities are instances of their (I suppose) subjective concepts. However, this does not entail that whatever can be conceived must have objective existence; it proves that what objectively exists must have an epistemic concept.
Con hasn't provided any evidence to why God exists necessarily, or why his argument has a metaphysical conclusion. Just because he says it does is inadequate proof. The essence of his argument is that, "everything exists", "what is truly objective or subjective, or how can we distinguish between the two?". Moreover, he conceded my opening argument regarding Occam's Razor. Even though God can be perceived by Con does not mean God is true in actuality, just as if I perceive myself as Michael Jackson doesn't make it true in actuality.
Thanks for the debate, Con.
I'm invited to the dance.
Where Jacko grabs his crotch and whoops excitedly.
And Occy and his cronies loiter in the corner, enshrouded in a haze of psycho-babble.
And the Big Guy's here too. Who'd have thought it!
As ever, Internal databases.
Oh okay ;3
I'm still experimenting with the formats - the contender needn't waive the last round because the instigator is shoehorning a rebuttal with their opening argument.
Will the contender waive the last round since the Instigator (you) are waiving the first round?
I've also supported His non-existence in a previous debate as well :)
On another debate you supported the idea that God's existence is likely. Now, you're supporting the opposite. Why?