"Trans women are women" Is A Valid Claim
All stages have been completed. The voting points distribution and the result are presented below.
With 1 vote and 3 points ahead, the winner is ...
- Publication date
- Last update date
- Time for argument
- Two days
- Voting system
- Open voting
- Voting period
- One week
- Point system
- Four points
- Rating mode
- Characters per argument
I will argue that it is valid to claim that biological males who honestly identify as trans women are women in a least one reasonable sense of the word "woman". It will be my burden to argue that they can claim to be women and it be actually true. It will be the burden of the contender to argue that only adult human biological females can reasonably be called women, and that calling biological males "women" in any sense is unreasonable.
Round 1 will be opening arguments (Con will not be required to respond to any of my arguments until round 2)
Round 2 will be for rebuttals
Round 3 will be for closing arguments and closing rebuttals
- Valid: sound; just; well-founded:
- We are debating the validity of a propositional assertion. Proposition a is the resolution.
- To affirm the resolution, my opponent is burdened to make an argument that indicates the truth of this proposition.
- For this proposition to be valid, my opponent must successfully include every trans person in the world under such a definition. This isn't an assertion that some trans women are women, but that all of them are.
- My propositional case for claim validity: For proposition a to be true and valid, all trans women must describe within the parameters of my opponent's definition.
- Pro's definition of a woman is "An adult human with a predominantly feminine psychology."
- Does this include all trans people? The answer is no. Many transgender people certainly don't have feminine psychology and nevertheless identify as trans women. Just like the biological interpretation, trans women exist in all forms and mental states. Pro's definition simply tells that some trans people could be women not that trans women are women, making the claim "trans women are women" invalid by his own assertion.
- Secondly, what defines feminine psychology? This seems like an arbitrary ontological category for which my opponent has provided no criteria. If we have no basis to evaluate feminine psychology anyone or no one could be a woman and the category would simply be meaningless.
- Pro could posit that there is a strict testable classification of this psychology, but that would mean that any "trans woman" that does not meet such criteria would simply not be a woman, and such would falsify the proposition as true because it fails to include all trans women. In essence:
- p1. For the proposition a to be true pro's definition must describe all trans women within its parameters.
- p2. Pro's definition does not describe all trans women within its parameters.
- c. Proposition a is not true, and is thus, not a valid claim.
- Conclusively: pro must argue that "trans women are women," is in itself a true proposition, however, pro's definition only asserts that some trans women could be women, or that we don't know who is and is not a woman as he has proposed no ontological grounding for his case.
- As the proposition expressed in the resolution is false and unproven, the claim is invalid.
It is reasonable for the term “woman” to have a traditional biological meaning and a newer psychological meaning as the one I outlined previously.
- Here pro argues that we ought to define women psychologically in addition to biologically.
- Take the case that there are many men who on average have psychological temperaments that are closer to the average among women. There are both effeminate men and masculine women.
- Under pro's view, effeminate men could be women and masculine women by converse could simply be men despite having no personal identification or active will toward such. Pro would have to argue that an individual can be both a woman and not a woman, in itself a logical contradiction.
- Overarchingly, I argue:
- p1. A valid definition of a woman must differentiate between men and women.
- p2. Pro's definition does not differentiate between men and women
- c. Pro has not validly defined a woman.
- In addition, men and women are psychologically more similar than different . In any psychological distribution between men and women, there is a large encompassing overlapping area between them and pole extremes that set respective modes. Take agreeableness or aggressiveness (images cited) as examples. Syllogistically:
- p1. To validly define a woman based on feminine psychology, an established methodology must exist to identify such.
- p2. Pro has not provided a methodology and can not identify such psychology.
- c. Pro has not validly defined women.
- Pro defines a woman as "an adult human with a predominantly feminine psychology." The empirical question must be what constitutes predominately feminine psychology when the majority of men and women psychologically coincide with one another?
- Secondly, by what means do we evaluate this feminine psychology? The largest study on gender personality differences shows that "personality differences between the sexes are largest in the most gender equal countries" . Could one be a woman in one country and become a man once they travel to another? Pro's case weirdly suggests this.
- Additionally, must we accurately identify the global average of psychological traits in order to define feminine psychology? In that case, the resolution must be false because we don't have this information yet.
- If we do get such information, that would make the average range of traits less distinct given that less equal societies have fewer psychological differences . This would invalidate more trans women as women (as pro defines), and further prevent us from telling the difference between men and women.
- Pro brings up examples of other words that have different meanings such as the word "cloud."
- Conclusively, pro is trying to redefine women in a supplementary way to accommodate trans individuals. The biological conception is as pro acknowledges the traditional definition of a woman. Both descriptions: traditional and proposed by pro seek to categorically interpret reality around a range of characteristics predicated upon and around biological sex.
- To state it simply; pro is trying to supplement the ontological category of the traditional and commonplace definition of a woman.
- One could easily define a woman as a dog, but that would be futile and irrelevant to our discussion of expanding the criterion from which a woman is defined by biological sex. In a similar sense cloud computing and cloud used in weather fall under distinctively different planes of ontology and have no supplementary relationship with one another despite being the same word.
- As I have shown, each reduction reinforces the idea that the "traditional definition," as pro labels it, serves as the reasonable definition of a woman, and pro's definition is simply unreasonable. As a recall, we are debating whether or not "trans women are women," is a valid claim. The resolution fails; its proposition has been proven false.
I...outlined a reasonable definition of woman in terms of gender that can apply to trans women who are biological males.
- Has pro? Well, pro must argue that trans women are women. So far he has made a case that says:
- Some trans women could be women based on some floating vacuum of non-existent ontology.
- Pro doesn't know the criterion that makes one a woman: thus there exists no determining metric and anyone could be one or not one. In other words a vacuum of ontology. Meaninglessness.
- People can be women and not women at the same time.
- Our resolution is 'trans women are women is a valid claim. Pro's burden is to prove this proposition true, my burden is to prove it false.
- This is not some trans women could be women, but that all trans women are women. With the absence of specifications, pro commits himself to arguing that all trans women that exist are women under his definition.
- Do not let pro distract you from the resolution. If the resolution is a false proposition, the claim is invalid and pro loses the debate.
- Pro tries to reject p1 of my first syllogism but makes a very obvious mistake. Barking is a function, not an ontology. This is a case of teleology vs ontology.
- Functions are described with teleology, identities are described with ontology. A teleological claim will be rationally valid if it is grounded in a reasonable interpretation of an organism's ontological classification. In essence, teleology depends on ontology.
- When you assert that trans women are women you state that all trans women fall under the same ontological category you have defined. In a similar sense, if you assert tigers are cats, you argue that every tiger that exists falls under the feline taxonomy.
- The correct analogy would be with the claim dogs are canids. This means that every dog that exits is of the canidaes family.
- Therefore, if even one trans person in the world does not fall under pro's definition, he has not met his burden of proof.
- Remember, we don't even know who falls under pro's definition.
- Pro has not given a methodology or criteria for his "feminine psychology." This could mean anything. As long as this remains the case the resolution fails as we simply don't know who is and who is not a woman. Pro's definition does not show that "trans women are women," is a valid claim. It asserts that some trans women may or may not be women and we have no idea which is which.
- Pro seems to concede that his definition does not apply to all trans women. There are trans women in all forms of mental states that pro has not accounted for. Frankly, we don't know how many trans women it applies to. Pro has not told us what "predominately feminine psychology" is and has shown no evidence all trans women possess such within a methodology. The resolution fails in every aspect.
underlying general mental states that are typically found in females in comparison to males
- These are words that don't say anything. What is the methodology within this that decides what makes one a woman or not? Which mental states? How many?
- What is a "predominately" female psychology? Which traits are required to be possessed, and to what degree does it become predominant? Pro has no ontological grounding for what he asserts here. This could mean anything.
- The source pro cites is really bad. It talks about topics from Myers-Briggs tests to alpha vs beta females. It provides nothing useful. Is pro saying that anyone who doesn't have a certain Myers-Briggs personality type isn't a woman?
even if some trans women are women then I have self-evidently met my burden of proof
- False. The claim is that "trans women," are women not some trans women are women. Some could be 2 people.
- Pro has not proven that a single trans woman is a woman based on his definition because his classification of "feminine psychology" floats in a meaningless ontology.
"It is not a contradiction"
- Like the cloud example, these are distinctively different ontological planes. Our conception of women is of the same ontology. We seek to characterize individuals based on characteristics predicated upon the female sex.
- Pro's definition is supplementary in nature. It is constructed around the same mode of ontology as the biological definition. If pro denies this his definition is ontologically meaningless and has the same justification as defining women as cats. Arbitration.
- It is a contradiction to affirm the negation of a proposition within the same ontology. If pro is creating a new ontology he is simply not defining women but some random ungrounded metaphysical value. Conclusively:
- Pro posits his definition should secondary the traditional definition of woman.
- Pro's definition falls under the same ontology as the traditional one.
- If pro's definition falls under the same ontology it ought to include all women not just trans women.
- Pro uses examples of homonyms that have distinctively different ontologies. To be consistent with his definition of woman, he must deny any ontological relationship.
- If so, he is not defining a woman but a meaningless metaphysical object and loses any justification.
- Pro drops my argument here. I extend it.
- Pro hones in on the fact that "men and women are psychologically more similar than different" and does not respond/object to any of my premises.
- Distributions of gendered psychological traits overlap in paradigm, and have extreme minor outliers set the modes. As stated, the empirical question is what constitutes predominately feminine psychology when the majority of men and women psychologically coincide with one another.
- As we know men and women are extremely similar and overwhelmingly overlap psychologically, there would be nothing that separates the majority of women from the majority of men. There would be no essential psychological difference.
- I extend my syllogism of differentiation between men and women. Pro drops every premise and thus my conclusion. As pro cannot differentiate between men and women with his definition, the resolution fails.
The study was pertaining to the people in that region
travelling to another piece of land would not change anything
- Pro takes the second path of responding to my point, insisting that the person maintains their identity as a woman while traveling to areas that have vastly different average gender psychological inclinations.
- This means pro is suggesting that this "feminine psychology," he describes is based on a global average and not a regional one. This makes my opponent's burden much larger.
- As stated: "the resolution must be false because we don't have this information yet." Pro has presented no evidence that shows the average global psychological temperaments. Given this, under pro's logic, we simply don't know who is a woman or a man.
- As countries that are less gender egalitarian have fewer gender psychological differences, this would reduce the modal difference between men and women, and thus pro's definition would exclude more trans women.
- Under pro's definition, we don't know who is or isn't a woman. Pro hasn't told us what a "predominately feminine psychology," consists of.
"The definition of woman pertaining to biology (“an adul thuman [sic] female being”) still remains completely valid and intact"
- Pro concedes the biological definition is valid here. We have a baseline. As I have shown pro's definition is invalid, he has currently not upheld his burden, and mine stands upheld.
- My response to the cloud analogy also applies to the cold-blooded one. If pro drops his argument based on my rebuttal, he must also drop this one.
A dog is a different species and has nothing to do with human femininity or anything
- Pro acknowledges that definitions that operate on distinctively different ontological planes are invalid to the range of traits we wish to classify. This refutes all his examples.
- Now, pro says we should not re-define dogs as women. So why should we secondarily define women with meaningless feminine psychology with no criteria, evidence, or factors?
- Should we define disabled people as people with body integrity identity disorder (BIID) who want to be disabled?
- Different animals as people who believe they are animals trapped in the wrong body?
- Even age to people who psychologically feel a certain age?
- p1. If psychology is not sufficient to add a new definition to ontological identities it is not sufficient to add a definition to women.
- p2. Psychology is not sufficient to add a definition to such ontological identities.
- c. It is not sufficient to add a definition to women.
- This was the summation of my entire constructive.
- Pro seems to say that I have given no reason to believe that the biological or traditional definition is valid. I have, and pro even concedes that it is valid here in quote:
The definition of woman pertaining to biology (“an adul thuman [sic.] female being”) still remains completely valid and intact
- I argued in round one that the reductions from con's position make him unable to show who is a woman or not show that the traditional definition is the most reasonable and valid definition of a woman. All other points are truisms.
- I'll place it simply for my opponent: The definition based on biology fulfills all the arguments I posit. Pro's fills none of them.
- Ontologically consistent and grounded.
- Differentiates between men and women.
- Has an objectively established methodology (sex: the biological reproductive role of human organisms).
- Does not suffer from all the reductions pro seems to struggle with.
- Con is welcome to challenge any of these points.
- Pro must prove that "trans women are women," is a valid claim. This means all trans women.
- Does pro's definition include all trans women? No. Pro does not even dispute this. We don't even know who it includes making it essentially meaningless.
- Does pro's definition differentiate between men and women? No.
- Is pro's definition ontologically grounded? no. Consistent? no.
- Valid? no.
we are discussing trans women, not trans people in general.
- Semantics. I am obviously referring to trans woman as this is the literal subject of the debate. Voters can ignore this.
- Our resolution is trans women are women is a valid claim. Pro must prove that every trans woman that exists can be validly claimed to be a woman under his case.
- If the resolution is a false proposition, pro fails to affirm the resolution and loses the debate.
- Voters can focus on these dropped points alone that show pro has failed to affirm the resolution.
- Pro drops his previous mistake of analyzing a teleological claim like an ontological one.
- This means as it stands if one trans woman in the world does not fall under pro's definition, he loses the debate. We have already shown this as truism as trans people exist in all temperaments and mental states many of which would fall out of "feminine psychology," even if pro told us what exactly this is. On this, pro has lost the debate already.
- Pro fell into a trap where he was forced to affirm that despite large average gender psychological differences between regions, one would remain a woman if they relocated to an area where they don't have the average feminine psychology.
- This means that pro must argue that feminine psychology is a global average criterion. This would by truism show that pro has no idea who is and isn't a woman because the data that would differentiate between male and female psychology on such a scale does not exist. The resolution is epistemically unjustified and thus invalid. We don't know and can't know how many trans people fit under this definition. It is thus invalid to claim trans women are women.
- We have established that pro has given us no criteria for what "feminine psychology" is or means. He gave us a really bad (seemingly lazy/unread) source that talked about MTBI tests etc.
- Pro has not given X psychological criteria that make one a man or woman. Pro thus cannot differentiate between men and women.
- Conclusively: the claim "trans women are women," is invalid.
"don’t mean anything"
- Pro defines feminine psychology as "the underlying general mental states that are typically found in females in comparison to males." That could mean anything. Pro has not shown the specific criteria of mental states that make one a woman as opposed to a man. I even express this in round 2:
These are words that don't say anything. What is the methodology within this that decides what makes one a woman or not? Which mental states? How many? What is a "predominately" female psychology? Which traits are required to be possessed, and to what degree does it become predominant? Pro has no ontological grounding for what he asserts here.
- The verdict is that pro has no ontological grounding for his position. He has not given us there method that distinguishes between masculine psychology and a feminine one so that one could ontologically exist as a man or woman. This makes pro lose the debate on its own. His definition is incoherent as it fails to differentiate between men and women.
The term “coldblooded” in terms of psychology means to lack empathy or pity. This is trait is typically found in cold blooded animals like reptiles.
- Citation needed?
- Cold-blooded: (of a kind of animal) having a body temperature varying with that of the environment; poikilothermic. The difference between such and warm-blooded is how their bodies regulate body temperature. Cold-blooded animals like any sentient being have a range of emotions including empathy and attachment. Did pro even provide evidence that reptiles lack empathy or pity?
- We can conclusively say that a coined perspective of human emotions and the thermal regulation of body temperature are on distinctively different ontological planes. My argument stands unrefuted.
Caitlyn Jenner is not a woman biologically but she is psychologically.
- How do you prove that? How do you know Caitlyn Jenner isn't a psychological man? Pro has not given us a method to tell the difference.
- Extend. Pro says I drop his rebuttal essentially showing that he did not read anything in this section.
there is more overlap than differences when comparing a Granny Smith apple to a McIntosh apple as well
- The difference between these apples is physical characteristics and this is analogous to the biological definition.
- We can make distinguishing criteria with material characteristics, no one denies this. For gender psychology, it is nearly impossible to separate men and women by criterion.
- In the distribution, each human is an individual object. It is not to say there are no differences but there are no differences that would set a criterion between men and women where one goes from X a woman to Y a man because the psychological distribution has extremely large converse and extremely minor modes.
- My argument is that it is impossible to create a distinct psychological criterion, that evaluates a distinct difference between men and women, thus we cannot differentiate. Remember, pro has not even given us criteria as to what makes one a woman.
- We discussed this in Dropped. Extend.
- Let's be clear. If pro's "feminine psychology," is not re-evaluated by region, it must be a global average. Pro has not given us this global average, and without this, we cannot possibly say trans women are women or that anyone is a psychological woman. This point is the debate.
- Pro tries to reject p2. however, we have already dealt with his case. Cold-blooded in respect to temperature regulation is on a completely and distinctly different ontological plane than a term coined to ponder human emotions.
- Thus, pro hasn't rejected p2.
There are literally 0 examples of this...
- Pro here repeats the exact same criticism of his position. He posits certain things one would have to do to have the psychology of a wolf, but does not do the same for women? This is of course special pleading. According to pro, a specific observable method must exist for animals, but not women.
- As long as we don't have the specific criteria of psychology that make a woman as opposed to a man, we simply have no idea who is or isn't a woman.
- The debate resolves that "trans women are women" is a valid claim. If this proposition is proven false, the debate defaults to con.
- Ontologically consistent and grounded.
- Differentiates between men and women.
- Has an objectively established methodology (sex: the biological reproductive role of human organisms).
- Does not suffer from all the reductions pro seems to struggle with.
- I welcomed pro to challenge any of these points. Pro drops them all and objects to none. Apart from this, my job is to show that pro's concepted defintions are unreasonable.
- Ignore pro's lies about me secretly not meeting my burdens. Pro has failed to affirm the resolution and I have shown his claims to be invalid allowing us to default to the conceded validity of the biological definition.
Con’s main argument here is that there is some ambiguity in what constitutes a “feminine psychology”
- Incorrect. I argue there is no basis at all. I argue that there is no ontological grounding because you have not given us the methodology for the criterion of feminine psychology. This could mean anything. You have not given us parameters. You have not distinguished between men and women. My argument is that pro floats in a vacuum of ungrounded ontology.
According to science the answer is “yes”
- And what is the first thing that pro's own source asserts: "Conceptions of masculinity and femininity vary widely across cultures."
- Recall, pro said that traveling to different areas will not change your identity as a man or woman, meaning pro must argue that the criteria of feminine psychology that makes one a woman is based on a global average something that he can not substantiate.
- Conclusively, under pro's own definition, he cannot tell who a man or a woman is. This is the debate here. If pro cannot tell who a man or a woman is the claim "trans women are women," is invalid.
- Pro makes a big mistake here.
- The universe is soundly grounded as everything. "It includes all of space and all the matter and energy that space contains." Space is simply a metaphysical property of the universe (see properties and relations).
- Pro however defines woman as an ontological category definitionally. So he is making a categorical classification of objects that is not ontologically grounded. Definitions are logically circular (P is X and X is P). Pro's ontological claim is expressed in its description. The description is its ontology.
- This is simply a case of properties vs ontology itself. The universe is grounded as a distinct ontology. Pro's definition is not.
- The conclusion seems like an obvious decision to me. The resolution is that "trans women are women" is a valid claim.
- Has pro proven that trans women are women? No.
- Has pro shown a psychological criterion that differentiates between men and women? No.
- Has pro shown us what qualifies as feminine psychology? No
- Epistemology: invalid. Ontology: ungrounded and meaningless.
- As we established that the biological definition is valid, and established that pro's notions of other potential definitions are invalid the debate defaults to con.