Instigator / Pro
Ehyeh's avatar
4
Ehyeh
1487
rating
31
debates
35.48%
won
Topic
#3790

THBT: All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God.

Status
Finished

The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.

Winner & statistics
Better arguments
0
3
Better sources
2
2
Better legibility
1
1
Better conduct
1
1

After 1 vote and with 3 points ahead, the winner is...

Bones
Tags
Philosophy
Parameters
Publication date
Last updated date
Type
Standard
Number of rounds
3
Time for argument
One week
Max argument characters
15,000
Voting period
One month
Point system
Multiple criterions
Voting system
Open
Contender / Con
Bones's avatar
7
Bones
1780
rating
30
debates
98.33%
won
Description

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil
Wikipedia advises: The problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God.

Rules:
No unnecessary/intentional forfeits
Stay within the parameters of the debate

Round 1
Ehyeh's avatar
Ehyeh
Pro
#1

RESOLUTION: THBT: All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God.
POSITION: Pro

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Roadmap:

  • Preface
    • Interpretation of the burden of proof {BoP}
    • A1. the subjectivity of evil
    • A2. the necessity of evil for goodness
    • A3. the existence of good and evil
    • A4. The cause of evil
    • A5. Good and evil, real and unreal
    • Crystallization 
==

Preface

Thank you for finding interest in this debate, Bones. I'm sure you will offer me a profound challenge all throughout our discussion. I look forward to hearing what you have to say on the problem of evil. Much of my argument will be built and constituted through the usage of syllogisms, along with the analytical dissection of the meaning of good and evil itself. After all, how can we know what evil is and its appropriate existence and application if we cannot properly define it? 
-
When humans look at reality, it is very easy for us to believe something has gone wrong with creation. In fact, that is what evil is: when we see something we believe should not exist or should not happen, something has gone wrong in reality. We question all evil with "why does this happen?" and "why does this have to exist?" "Why does this happen to me?" Evil, then, within human perception, must necessarily be harmful to creation itself.

-
Interpretation of the BoP {burden of proof}

 Pro is arguing in favor of the proposition: "All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God." And therefore, while also refuting Con's arguments, they ought to provide illustrative evidence in support of this assertion. Con needs to do the opposite of this. It is on Pro to demonstrate that the problem of evil is not logically infallible. It is Con's imperative to do the opposite by refuting Pros' assertions and building their own case with a logically sound alternative. During this debate, we will be discussing upon the resolution with the axiomatic foundation of assuming the existence of an omnibenevolent God. That means Pro must prove goodness to be real—and God capable of being all good without any of the apparent evil in the world being any sort of hindrance  to his goodness.

==
A1. the subjectivity of evil

P1: Evil is mind dependant.
P2: mind dependant things do not have objective, independent existences.
C1: Evil does not exist as anything objectively real.

The first issue that comes with the problem of evil is the subjectivity of evil. What is evil? I can't really say for sure, at least not in a way I can prove, or that others cannot simply disagree with. If it is true that evil is simply made within the mind—no different than the pretend rules we make up—similar to soccer—then there is no reason for God to play by those rules or see what humans view as evil as being evil.  It is then on Con, the maker of the assertion that the problem of evil is real, to demonstrate that evil is a real thing, which God, if he exists, has to view as being evil what he himself views as evil. A heavy burden to bring to a sound conclusion.
-
P1: For something to exist it must be real.
P2: Evil is not real but an illusion.
C1: The problem of evil is not real, until evil is proven real.

As pointed out through the usage of my syllogism, morality ought to be objective for God to be deemed contradictory or evil in his creations.
-
A2. the necessity of evil for Goodness

P1: Evil is necessary for the good.
P2: The good is necessary for the evil.
C1: Omni-benevolence cannot exist without evil.

One might argue that if evil does not exist, then neither does goodness. Through my syllogisms of disproving the existence of evil and, therefore, the problem of evil—I also disprove the existence of goodness and, therefore, Omni-benevolence itself. It follows then that i must attempt to reinvent both good and evil in an appropriate, logically sound manner.
-
A3. the existence of good and evil
-
"The problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God."
An infinite God—or the type of God the problem of evil is prescribed for—is said to be the creator of all that is. If God is infinite, that means he is in all places, has all knowledge, etc. That then necessarily means that God is the creator of all that which is real.
-
P1: An Omni God is the creator of all that which exists and is real.
P2: That which is good is that which ought to be real.
P3: That which is evil is that which ought not to be real.
C1: An infinite God is all that which is real, therefore all that which he creates is the real and that which is good.
-
Premise one is quite self-explanatory. Premises two and three need justification. That which is commonly thought to be good is dictated by that which ought to be. That which is evil is dictated by that which ought not to be. Something is evil if it should not exist or should not happen. Something is good when it should exist or should happen. When we believe God creates things which we believe should not be, We believe God creates evil. If God creates something that makes creation better, we believe he has created more goodness.
-
If someone believes it is good for themselves to be rich, that is something they wish to see happen. Something that should manifest within reality. The good, then, can be described as real through working as an analogy to that which is real; the good and goodness then simply act as a mental abstraction from an objective reality—an objective morality into that which is real. God, within this framework, dictates what is real. God then dictates what is good through his very own being.
-
 It then follows that all that which is real, independent of what humans may think of God's creation, is the objective good. That which is good is that which is necessarily real, and that which brings evil upon and into humans' minds must then be based on unreality or illusion of good, the good of God. Evil, then, does not exist as anything real, but simply as an illusion. God cannot then be blamed for evil because it does not exist except through false perception of reality.
 -
P1: the unreal cannot interact with the real.
P2: something unreal can only affect you if you falsely think its real.
C1: Evil can only exist in so far as you falsely believe in it.

A4. The cause of evil 
-
Following all my previous premises, the cause of evil for humans then must be belief or expectation in wanting something to happen that in reality they should not wish to happen. They take on certain illusions of what reality should be, which it should actually not be. Through this understanding, we can come to realise that the good or the real can exist without the evil or the false, but the evil or unreal cannot exist without the real or good. Evil, then, is predicated on a false perception of reality and ignorance. None of these qualities can be had by God, for it would deny his omniscience. Therefore, God is that which is good, the ultimate reality.
 -
A5. Good and evil, real and unreal 
-
If God created humans, it would appear he created evil or illusion. But God did not actually create evil, as evil is an illusion with no objective reality, whereas good does have objective existence through God. Therefore, evil ceases when we stop believing in it, but good does not.
-
P1: That which is an illusion does not exist.
P2: Evil does not objectively exist.
C1:  Evil ceases to exist when belief in the illusion of evil ceases.


Crystallisation

  • I have demonstrated a rather consistent philosophy, a philosophy where goodness can have an objective essence within the body of God. Evil remains a false illusion which doesn't actually exist at all. Therefore God cannot partake in any sorts of evil or create any evil, as it doesn't exist. 
Con then has two possible ways of defeating my arguments:

  • Prove the existence of some sort of objective morality of which bounds the being of God (a hard task, considering he's infinite)
  • Prove my argument to be internally contradictory
If Con fails to fulfill the criteria for one or the other, it will suffice that I have found a logically sound solution to the problem of evil. Con will then have necessarily failed to fulfill his share of the burden of proof.





















Bones's avatar
Bones
Con
#2
THBT: All things considered; the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God.

Contention I.     Logical incompatibility 

To uphold my burden, I propose the following syllogism.
 
·      P1. If God exists, there would be no gratuitous evils (GE).
·      P2. There are gratuitous evils in the world.
·      C1. God does not exist.
 
P1.
As stipulated in the description, God possesses the four omni’s, namely omnipotence (having virtually unlimited authority or influence)and omnibenevolence (unlimited or infinite benevolence). Hence, we can deduce that all worlds actualised by such a being will be ones wherein it is inconceivable to conceive of a greater world, for the world we one is already the conceptualisation a being far greater and loving than ourselves. We can assert that, in such a world, for any action which is possibly conceived, the totality of the wrongmaking properties will never outweigh the totality of the rightmaking properties. Any action which is contrary to this sentiment (wrongmaking properties outweigh rightmaking properties) can be called “gratuitous evils (GE)”. Note, GE is not to be confused with any actions which may entail some minimal harm - it references that which, when considered in totality, has an abundance of wrongmaking properties which are not justified. For example, causing children harm is principally wrong, however, in certain contexts where the pain (wrongmaking) of say a vaccine is outweighed by the good of immunity (rightmaking), the act is weighed by its holistically and found to be good. Thus, a moral act can still possess some wrongmaking, so long as it is outweighed by the rightmaking.
 
The distinction here removes the classical objections to the problem of evil, namely, free will. If we are to hypothetically accept the freewill defence as valid, and that some evils are satisfactorily explained by human autonomy, those such evils would not be gratuitous evils and hence will be irrelevant to the discussion, for this premise merely stipulates that God is incompatible with gratuitous evil. Thus, any evil which PRO can ostensibly solve, whether it be through free will or some separate avenue, are discarded from the argument, for their justification renders them non-gratuitous. This premise deals with that which tautologically cannot be justified, thus, PRO bears the cumbersome burden of justifying every single evil that exists. 
 
God’s existence is thus tautologically incompatible with gratuitous evil.
 
P2.
This premise seems trivial. In just the January Australian wildfires, over three billion animals were burnt to death. Clearly, the number of mammals suffering such a fate in this short span of time is incomparable to the suffering of trillions other animals who have died in similar circumstances. The exorbitant number of deaths is clearly unjustifiable – there is no conceivable explanation for such a scale of suffering. Unless PRO can somehow justify such a this heinous reality as not only morally acceptable, but a part of an all loving beings plan, gratuitous evils certainly exist.

The implication of the alleged compatibility of the evils we observe in reality an omni–God is quite frankly, absurd. Perhaps the most important point of my contention is this. If we are to accept that there is truly a God as described by PRO, it would imply that every action is not moral, but morally obligatory in the morally archetypical world.That God is unlimited in benevolence necessitates the fact that he would create a world with the greatest benevolence conceivable. As such, we must accept that every instance of theft, rape and murder are necessary for the maintenance of the best possible world. Consider the following reductio ad absurdum syllogism;

p1. A being who is all-loving and all-powerful who created humans would place them in a circumstance compatible with infinite benevolence. 
p2. If we assume the PRO position, such a being exists. 
c1. Humans are placed in a circumstance compatible with infinite benevolence. 

That God exists entails our worlds infinite benevolence. PRO's position is quite frankly impossible, for the dichotomy proposed is on where 1) All the moral crimes we observe are conducive to the best possible world or 2) All the moral crimes we observe are not conducive to the best possible world. It is a rare instance of black and white - to uphold their argument, PRO must bite the bullet and assume the second horn. 

c1. 
Hence the conclusion follows. 

-

Rebuttals

Subjectivity of evil 

Two replies 

  • The problem of evil assumes Gods existence and then applies a reductio ad absurdum. The assumption in God also assumes a deontological moral theory, wherein right and wrong are objective. Thus, for the sake of the argument, an assumption in a real right and wrong is valid.  
  • PRO theorises 
    • Evil is mind dependant.
      • However, this line of thinking can be revered to good - CON can argue that good is mind dependent and by extension unidentifiable, creating a nihilistic world which is in turn incompatible with God. For one to refute the problem of evil, which requires the atheist to first grant God's existence, and then subsequently take away moral values after the atheists cumbersome concession is akin to playing soccer with the goals or ball. 
  • Thus, the subjectivity of evil cuts at  PRO. Without moral values, God cannot be all loving and infinitely just and moral etc, thus the argument undermines the very thing it attempts to prove. 
The necessity of evil for Goodness

  • PRO holds
    • Evil is necessary for the good.
      • This is clearly not the case. 
        • God is good yet not evil. 
        • People in heaven are good and presumably not evil - it would be very odd to claim that Holocausts and rapes occur in heaven, or even that people would ponder such things. 
        • Jesus was allegedly good yet not evil. 
          • The creation of a good being who lacks evil is clearly possible.
      • Furthermore, PRO conflates evil with gratuitous evil - they must explain why the Holocaust was necessary to create good (that is there is no possible way that any "good" from the Holocaust could have been instantiated without the murder of 14 million people). 
The existence of good and evil 

Here, PRO argues that as God is maximally good and as he created everything, everything he created is good. To recall my first contention, PRO seems to have taken the second horn, that "All the moral crimes we observe are conducive to the best possible world".  PRO thus holds that every single instance of murder, theft, rape and kidnapping are necessary for the creation of the best possible world. If this is the case, I offer three thoughts 

  • A being who requires such heinous crimes to actualise their intents is either not all loving or all powerful. 
  • A being who actively allows such act for the sake of creating the best possible world ought not be worshipped. 
  • A reductio ad absurdum can be applied - it is utterly illogical to think that the moral crimes I have listed are not only good, but necessary for the creation of the best possible world. 
If we are to really accept that this world is the best possible word in moral terms, and that "all that which he creates is the real and that which is good", we must 

  1. Never interfere if we observe someone being kidnapped, raped or murdered, for we can reason that our finite minds cannot comprehend what is God's plan. 
  2. Abolish all criminal systems, for the criminals in prison were not acting immorally - they are acting through their desires which in turn was created, accepted and apart God's initiate to create the best possible world. 
Final point - if all is created by God and everything is good, there would be no such thing as evil - thus every act (I need not list the moral crimes again) are equally necessary for a maximally moral world - there is no distinction between saving your life to save a child and killing the child. 

The cause of evil 

Pro states 

  • Evil, then, is predicated on a false perception of reality and ignorance. 
PRO's argument here is essentially that the evils we think we know are a result of our ignorance, and that we as finite beings cannot understand the infinite mind of God. 

This ignorance into the mind of God, however, can be applied to almost all facets of his existence. CON can easily argue that, as God transcends humanity, we cannot understand him as "good", or understand him to have any property for that matter, for he is outside our comprehension.  If objections to God's supposed nature or behaviour can be dismissed on the grounds that humans are incapable of understanding the ways of God, then any description of God's nature or behaviour can be dismissed on the grounds that  humans are incapable of understanding the ways of God. 

Good and evil, real and unreal 

PRO closes here by asserting that "evil is an illusion". However, as I have already demonstrated, such an argument not only removes the goalpost, but the entire game as a whole. To discard the extraordinary amount of suffering as merely "illusionary" seems lazy - there is clearly gratuitous suffering which needs explaining. Furthermore, benevolence itself requires the existence of evil - there would not be a differentiation between merely mortal "love" with "infinite love" which God claims to have.   

-

Conclusion 

PRO's argument fails for some primary reasons 

  • Their attempted removal of "evil" as a mere illusion removes God's capacity for omnibenevolence - tautologically, there is deontological "good" and "evil" in this conversation. 
  • PRO's position is cut by reduction ad absurdum - there seems to be no ultimate justification for the evil we observe. To uphold their burden they must justify every single evil that exists as necessary. 
  • God could have logically created a world where there is no evil yet is still indicative of a benevolent creator - there is no contradiction between in having a free yet morally perfect person. 
Round 2
Ehyeh's avatar
Ehyeh
Pro
#3
RESOLUTION: THBT: All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God.
POSITION: Pro

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Thx, Bones!

Roadmap:

  • Interpretation of Cons constructive
  • Rebuttal I: misconstruing of the definition of Omni benevolence
  • Rebuttal II: Expounding The subjectivity of evil
  • Crystallization





Interpretation of Cons constructive:

Con and I both axiomatically agree within this debate that an objective morality exists, although it seems that we have different interpretations of what an objective morality could look like. It seems to me that Cons's own affirmative case is subject to one main premise (which he admits in his syllogism):

  • If God was omnibenevolent there would be no Gratuitous evil {which roughly translates to unnecessary evil}.
    • That which is evil is that which is non-loving.


Rebuttal I: misconstruing of the definition of Omni benevolence

As outlined within my interpretation of cons constructive, the idea presented by Con is that which is evil is that which is non-loving, which lacks gentleness, and so forth. To know whether this is an accurate definition of good, we must first know what omnibenevolence is. Benevolence can simply be translated most roughly to "good" as opposed to gentleness, kindness, etc. It therefore does not follow that goodness in its entirety ought to be strapped down to kindness or lovingness. In this sense, it would not be contradictory to omnibenevolence for someone to say power is a goodness, in this same sense, someone can say it is a goodness to kill insects. You may disagree, but it is not contradicting the meaning of benevolence to think as such. To demonstrate this fact: 
 

  • all bachelors are unmarried men
The word "bachelor" quite literally means "unmarried man. It therefore follows that the only thing it can possibly mean to be a bachelor is an unmarried man. No other interpretation is possible. It also follows that I don't need experience with all unmarried men to know they're bachelors.

  • Omni benevolence means goodness
Within the word omnibenevolence, the only thing contained within it is the meaning of goodness. Not kindness, not love, but simply goodness. It therefore does not follow that kindness or love are necessarily contained within the word omnibenevolence. This then highlights two facts that Con must address:

  • It is not analytically evident that goodness is lovingness.
    • Since it is not analytically evident that lovingness is goodness, Con must have a posteriori (sense experience) confirming to him that killing pandas is objectively immoral.
To come to know through a posteriori knowledge that hurting things is contradictory to omnibenevolence Con must do two things:

  • Con must have met every being in the universe and come to know them to share the same moral framework as him.
    • After Con has met every being in the universe, if not all of them didn't share his sentiment on morality, he has somehow come to know them all to be hypocrites, saying one thing while believing another.
Even in the best-case scenario for con (after meeting all beings in the universe and discovering them to be hypocrites), I could simply argue that it is a universal subjective. Con has thus far failed to show his moral framework to be an objective morality. Within my argument, goodness is contained within the concept of an Omni God, and therefore does not have to go outside of the concept of this God, meaning I do not have to consult experience to come to know my argument to be true. This is not the case for Con. Cons framework possesses weak epistemic foundations, of which none of these epistemic issues are contained nor possessed in any of my arguments.


Rebuttal II: Expounding The subjectivity of evil

  • Con must prove even sadism and cruelty to be an objective evil to begin with.
    • Con must let us know when an evil becomes unnecessary within all occasions.
It appears intuitive to us that burning pandas is an objective bad, and in day to day living i would say such a belief is rather reasonable. In a debate of philosophy however, such assumptions must be superseded and justified beyond simple feelings and preference. Con never actually justifies the Australian fires as objectively immoral beyond his own subjective feelings on the matter. He deems it unnecessary yet never:

  • Proves the fires unnecessary
    • why God should see this as immoral even if unnecessary
Even if these fires were unnecessary. Can Con prove God to view this as evil in the way he does? morality has changed all throughout time, depending on culture and personal preference. How does Con convince someone who's axiomatic goal in life is to attain as much power as possible, even at the expense of others that such a thing is wrong? how does con convince a psychopath to have empathy for others? I don't think he can, truthfully. 
-
To further expound the problem, i propose the following syllogism:

P1: What is not internally contradictory is metaphysically possible.
P2: Aliens with the sole life enjoyment of dying in battle is not internally contradictory.
C1: Aliens with the sole life enjoyment of hunting and killing others is possible.

for a fast breeding alien species which seeks to spread their queens colony, they could have a very different perspective on what it means to be a good being, to live a good life and a good way to treat other beings. This species would appear to be wholly incompatible to live alongside humans, simply due to having wholly different moral axioms and wishes from life. How does Con prove them objectively wrong in wishing to die for their colony and queen at the expense of all other species?
-
we can even see this same behavior within bees and ants. Ants are said to likely be sentient beings. It then is also metaphysically possible to imagine beings who think the good and just in life is to attain power, control or to create suffering. What Con may subjectively argue is evil, is the good for another. I ask him once more: How do you prove these aliens objectively wrong?
-
if Con is incapable of proving them objectively wrong (mind independent morality) he will have failed to fulfill his share of the burden of proof. If this comes to pass, he will have demonstrated he does not know what evil is, as he cannot properly show where it resides beyond his feelings. It will then come to show that Cons argument is based upon an anthropomorphism of God, where he is unjustifiably projecting himself onto God. None of these issues exist within my philosophy.

X. Under view

There really is not a whole lot more to respond too, unfortunately. Cons entire constructive thus far has been based on a good offense, with no defense. As such, all cons arguments to "the illusion of suffering being lazy" have subsequently fell apart through him failing to demonstrate suffering objectively evil to begin with.


Crystallization

  • All of cons premises have completely fell apart, con no longer has an argument at all. 
    • Pros arguments remain as strong as ever,  if anything through the breaking of all of Cons premises, it maintains integrity stronger than before.
    • Con arguing that evil is necessary for goodness is unreasoned and never demonstrated by Con to be true. What is asserted without evidence can be refuted without evidence.
    • Pros argument to the existence of objective goodness was not rebuked at all, con didnt even properly comment on it but only on Pros argument to the illusion of evil.
    • Pro has a sound argument for objective goodness, while Con does not for his interpretation of evil being an objective evil.
    • Con thus far has failed to fulfill his burden of proof.



Bones's avatar
Bones
Con
#4
Thanks Ehyeh, 

Preliminary

  • PRO has not responded to CON's critique of their five contentions. I am to take them as dropped. 
    • Thus, I will dedicate this round to responding to PRO's critique of my contention. 
  • To remind voters, the resolution of this debate is as follows THBT: All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God. It is not whether objective moral truths exists. CON must merely demonstrate that the POE, and all it's entailments, render the God hypothesis null. 
-

Contention I.     Logical incompatibility

Recall the initial syllogism proposed in this argument. 

  • P1. If God exists, there would be no gratuitous evils (GE).
  • P2. There are gratuitous evils in the world.
  • C1. God does not exist.
PRO's Misconstruing of the definition of Omni benevolence

PRO's first rebuttal observes the lack of an analytic linkage between "goodness" and seperate properties. PRO argues that the subjectivity of any justification for the link between "goodness" and say "lovingness" or "kindness" is unfounded and entails that any description can be appropriately substituted into what constitutes "goodness". I provide two responses. 

I.     Inherently fallacious. 

It is clear that PRO's attempt at hypothesising a definition wherein "good" is compatible with cruelty falls to both the stipulative definition fallacy and persuasive definition fallacy wherein in proposes an uncommon or altered use, usually to support an argument for some view. It is clear that the most common definition ought to be adopted, and that ambiguous interpretations must be substantiated. 

II.     Ignorance of epistemic boundaries 

More pressingly, however is the fact that PRO utilizes the epistemic boundaries in human discourse to cast subjectivity over the link between "goodness" and "lovingness". I assert that this link is valid via axiomatic proof - that is, because we hold such a link as true because it is self-evident and unquestionable. PRO may argue that such a proof is unjustified, however, such an observation cuts equally at their own position. Through the Munchhausen trilemma, all knowledge is found to rest ultimately on unsatisfactory proofs, namely circular (mere repetition of the stipulation in question can be used to justify any proposition), regressive (resulting in an infinite regress) and/or axiomatic (asserts X is because it just is) presuppositions. PRO attempts to cite the "unmarried bachelor" as a tautological and objective truth to contrast it from the "subjective" notion stipulated by CON, however,  from the trilemma, it is clear they too presuppose the veracity of an axiomatic argument. What is the proof that "unmarried" is a necessary requisite for being a "bachelor" - PRO must argue the fallacy of ipse dixit, Latin for "he said it himself", in order to justify this. Clearly, this line of thinking does no good for either side and is akin to invoking solipsism to render any proposition or impact as false - it disregards presuppositions which are innate in a topic, and our axiomatic presumptions that we possess the capability for debate and discussion. 

On top of it being oddly bad faith, PRO's attempt at utilising the epistemic boundaries of human dialect cuts their own thesis. If they wish to challenge CON based on their use of epistemically unjustifiable rationalities (something necessarily invoked in all stipulations), they themselves cannot postulate God's existence. All of their arguments thus far have rested on circular, regressive or axiomatic grounds thus, from an ultimate skeptics position, nothing can be known. Syllogistically;

P1. If it is the case that invoking the POE entails circular, regressive or axiomatic arguments which are unacceptable, the God hypothesis cannot be invoked. 
P2. The POE rests circular, regressive or axiomatic arguments (namely axiomatic) which are unacceptable (as proposed by PRO)
C1. The God hypothesis cannot be invoked. 

Of course, no one truly believes in the impossibility of dialectic - instead, we accept, to reason, arguments which are founded on circular, regressive or axiomatic. PRO as the instigator of this debate, founder of the claim and thus holder of the burden, has with them a dichotomy - either they can accept epistemic presuppositions which are truistically indefensible yet necessary for rationality, or they will question them, thus excluding their ability for dialectic and by extension removing their ability to substantiate their burden of proof. Thus, CON's equating of "benevolence" as that which is incompatible with "burning pandas" and "insect killing" is an entirely reasonable axiom to hold. 

Expounding The subjectivity of evil

III.     Ignoring tautology 

PRO begins by asserting that "CON must prove even sadism and cruelty to be an objective evil to begin with". Such incredulity is easily nullified by virtue of tautology - that by definition, cruelty and sadism is, in most instances, conducive to evil. PRO may argue that "mere defining" is hardly an argument, however, I assert that all arguments fundamentally rest on a definition which is set via tautology. PRO's attempt at requiring definitions such as "omnibenevolence" to have objective truth is a standard wholly apart from all other words in the English dictionary. Take, for example the term 1, which we as a society has denoted as carrying a specific unit. How would PRO react if a skeptic came along and asserted "how do you know 1 denotes only a single unit? Have you tested this hypothesis in the depths of the universe? How do you know our observation that 1 denotes a single unit isn't merely a quirk in our universe, and that objectively, 1 denotes a different number of units?". Such a line of reasoning is simply absurd, and it is the one which PRO has adopted. We as a society create language, and we decide what each word denotes, thus, when we earthlings speak terms such as "omnibenevolence", we ought, and in fact can only do so with reference to our language. When we stipulate that God has certain properties, we define them in terms of our understanding, just as how we define "1" in terms of our understanding. When we speak of God, we are asking whether this concept which we have come to know actually exists - we postulate some of his attributes and deduce whether he in reality exists. In our comprehension, benevolence is non compatible with cruelty and torture thus we can only reason that God is incompatible with our observation of the state of things. 

IV.     Ad hoc rescue and ontological burden 

PRO then argues that it is impossible for humans to know whether God views [acts] as evil in the way [CON] does, however, this is clearly a case of ad hoc rescue, wherein instead of accepting a conclusion for what it is, PRO instead prevaricates and posits speculation to savour their thesis. However, such a method is rendered ineffectual via occam's razor, a form of ontological parsimony which deems a competing theory a priori most likely if that theory has less ontological commitments than a competing theory. Consider the competing models in play. 

PRO's worldview posits: 
  • POE finds that God is incompatible with the existence of gratuitous evil, defined in a manner which avoids the stipulative definition fallacy. 
  • PRO (speculatively) postulates that perhaps God's conception of evil is different to ours. 
    • Therefore, the God hypothesis is unharmed and he still exists. 
CON's worldview posits: 
  • POE finds that God is incompatible with the existence of gratuitous evil, defined in a manner which avoids the stipulative definition fallacy. 
    • Therefore, the God hypothesis is harmed and he does not exist. 
Notice the underlined, highlighting the ad hoc ontological burden which PRO postulates. Instead of accepting the conclusion, PRO postulates some variable which is not inherently contradictory. Yet, the burden is on them to substantiate such a claim as true - thus far, the unsubstantiated observation is a burden for PRO, for they have not given any reason in a God with different moral values, thus, via occams razor, we ought not accept their ontology. 

V.     False equivocation with an alien race 

PRO questions why it is the case values such as "murder is wrong" are objective, and postulates that their could possibly be a world wherein aliens enjoy killing and dying for a queen. Ignoring the fact that this was quite literally Britain in the 16th century, PRO conflates "objectively true" with "universally true for all beings". Consider, for example, a vaccine for humans. Clearly, these have beneficial effects for humans, that is, objectively, it is the case that they are, more often than not, beneficial for human beings. However, this is not to say that it is beneficial to all living beings. Much is the same for the case of murder - even if it were the case that some tribe truly views murder as moral, we could discard it as an individual creates moral values. Furthermore, one could still argue that the tribe is objectively wrong, and that their way of life is immoral, thus avoiding the entire problem. 

VI.    Ignorance of moral values entails ignorance of all properties

PRO argues that we cannot know whether God's morality and that it is ultimately foreign to us. We can apply this logic to the rest of God's properties and find him to be ab unknowable phenomenon. If it is the case that such trivial notions such as "cruelty is not benevolent" can be questioned, we could extend such skepticism to attributes such as "omnipotence". We could postulate that God's notion "omnipotence" is far different from our understanding of power - his measure of potency is not through the ability to actualise things, but rather the ability to not actualise things (impotence in our language). Just as how PRO throws the burden on CON to prove why it's "really the case that panda burning is wrong", CON can throw the question back and ask why omnipotence means what we mean by it? As I stated in the last round. 

This ignorance into the mind of God, however, can be applied to almost all facets of his existence. CON can easily argue that, as God transcends humanity, we cannot understand him as "good", or understand him to have any property for that matter, for he is outside our comprehension.  If objections to God's supposed nature or behaviour can be dismissed on the grounds that humans are incapable of understanding the ways of God, then any description of God's nature or behaviour can be dismissed on the grounds that  humans are incapable of understanding the ways of God. 

Conclusion 

PRO has removed the ball, goal and pitch from the field and attempted to maintain that a game is still in operation. The way that PRO strips God of all his meaning simply makes him an unrecognisable and untestable hypothesis which we have no means for understanding. I wish to conclude here with what I began with in my opening - the dichotomy. PRO has, in many words, accepted that "All the moral crimes we observe are not conducive to the best possible world". They hold that, because we don't know God's way and because we don't know whether morality is objective or not, all of human suffering is not actually suffering, but the masterplan of an all loving creature. This, once again, is ad hoc - why not simply accept the conclusion for what it is, that suffering falsifies omnibenevolence. 


Round 3
Ehyeh's avatar
Ehyeh
Pro
#5
RESOLUTION: THBT: All things considered, the problem of evil is not a significant problem for the existence of God.
POSITION: Pro

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Thank you, Bones.

Roadmap: 

  • X. Overview
    • Interpretation of the Burden of proof [ BoP]
    • Contention I: misconstruing definitions
    • Contention II: definitions are fallible
    • Contention III Ignorance of epistemic boundaries 
    • Contention IV:  Ignoring tautology 
    • Contention V:  Ad hoc rescue and ontological burden 
    • Contention VI:  False equivocation with an alien race 
    • Contention VII:   Ignorance of moral values entails ignorance of all properties
    • Crystallization

X. Overview

It appears as though Con has completely given up on proving evil to actually exist—instead, Con [as I expected] has decided to create a purely semantics-based argument and multiple appeals to logical fallacies, such as consistent appeals to the Argumentum ad populum fallacy. Con also claims I've dropped his five contentions. Many of them remain unanswered simply because Con has failed to demonstrate that his version of evil is real and objective. If Con believes I've overlooked these arguments within my analysis, he ought to explain why they still stand. Con has not offered us this, which leads me to presume he knows his arguments have been shown to be fallacious.


Interpretation of the Burden of proof [ BoP]

Con states that I am the maker of the claim. This is evidently a large fabrication. We share a similar ontological burden (refer to round one), although Occam's razor would suggest con possesses the heavier burden than I, since Con is arguing for the existence of something while I am arguing for the lack of existence of something. The default state of a human is a lack of belief in something until given a justifiable reason to believe it. Therefore, Con possesses a heavier burden than me.
 
 
Contention I: misconstruing definitions
It is clear that PRO's attempt at hypothesising a definition wherein "good" is compatible with cruelty falls to both the stipulative definition fallacy and persuasive definition fallacy wherein in proposes an uncommon or altered use, usually to support an argument for some view. It is clear that the most common definition ought to be adopted, and that ambiguous interpretations must be substantiated. 
This was the argument i expected within the first round of arguments. I'm surprised Con has left it so late. To verify Cons first contention is correct or not, we must come to understand the meaning of the word omnibenevolence.  Wikipedia itself has a nice piece where it breaks the words up into what they actually mean. Wikipedia advises: Omnibenevolence (from Latin omni- meaning "all", bene- meaning "good" and volens meaning "willing").
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Kindness is not necessarily contained within goodness, as I demonstrated within my previous arguments. Kindness can be contained within goodness, depending on what one views as good. This subjectivity does not exist within the word "bachelor," as the word "bachelor" does not mean or does not currently contain anything else in it except "an unmarried man." Con, once more, drops this argument.
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Considering my definition of omnibenevolence is more accurate than dictionaries which cite kindness [wrongly] as being part of omnibenevolence. Cons argument then is simply an Argumentum ad populum fallacy (based on what most people view as being goodness), and an appeal to authority. It should also be noted that words such as LOL are contained within many dictionaries. It would be incorrect to assume dictionaries cannot get things wrong. As con has not contended against these arguments (and where he does is with the usage of logical fallacies), they can simply be looked past as irrelevant to the broader discussion until he gives a sound contention on the matter free of logical fallacies.
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Contention II: definitions are fallible

 Con in the past has frequently had debates on the status of trans individuals as being considered women (as have I). Even if we changed the definition of female to include trans women, I am sure Con would not take that definition to be as logically a sound definition from one which does not. Within my own transgender debate, trans women can be considered women within certain dictionary definitions. That once more doesn't prove it to be consistent or of a logically sound constitution. As a result, con should argue that my use of the word is less consistent (which he knows he cannot do). Appealing to popularity and authority is not sufficient. It is very much the case that my definition was the original definition meant to be used for God, and it is also the more consistent one, certainly not the one Con wishes to use.

Contention III Ignorance of epistemic boundaries 

I've been intending to form some sort of answer to the Machuhassen trilemma. Con claims we ought to view kindness as part of goodness because "it is unquestionable and axiomatic." (1) Its not unquestionable. (2) Its also not axiomatic. For it to be axiomatic, it must be analytic and/or a priori. Cons view on evil is neither as proven through my round two, where I demonstrated that con must know his morality to be objective a posteriori (through sense experience), therefore it cannot be said to be axiomatic.

Con then states: Through the Munchhausen trilemma, all knowledge is found to rest ultimately on unsatisfactory proofs, namely circular (mere repetition of the stipulation in question can be used to justify any proposition), regressive (resulting in an infinite regress) and/or axiomatic (asserts X is because it just is) presuppositions. PRO attempts to cite the "unmarried bachelor" as a tautological and objective truth to contrast it from the "subjective" notion stipulated by CON, however,  from the trilemma, it is clear they too presuppose the veracity of an axiomatic argument. What is the proof that "unmarried" is a necessary requisite for being a "bachelor" - PRO must argue the fallacy of ipse dixit, Latin for "he said it himself", in order to justify this. 
Con appears to assume my views, claiming " what is the proof an unmarried man is a prerequisite for a bachelor?" As long as "bachelor" continues to mean "unmarried man", all bachelors will be unmarried through the law of non-contradiction. Languages are not private, they are public. Definitions can change. If the definition of bachelor were to change, not all bachelors would be unmarried men. As long as this is the public usage of bachelor we use, however, all bachelors will remain unmarried men. If Con wishes to deny the veracity of the law of non-contradiction as objective, he ought to also deny his own existence as objective. As Con himself comes to know, he exists through it being contradictory to say he doesn't. 
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I can deny Cons's logical usage without having any consistency issues with other views I have-this is not the case with Con, unless he wants to say he doesn't exist. Evidently then, my proofs are far stronger than the cons'—far more consistent and logical. There's much more I could say about the Machussen trillema, although I will leave it for a separate debate.

On top of it being oddly bad faith, PRO's attempt at utilising the epistemic boundaries of human dialect cuts their own thesis. 
As already demonstrated, there are no issues of consistency within my argument. If con wishes to continue this argument, he will eventually fall into Reductio ad absurdum, and ought to deny his own existence if he wishes to die on this hill.

Contention IV:  Ignoring tautology 

PRO begins by asserting that "CON must prove even sadism and cruelty to be an objective evil to begin with". Such incredulity is easily nullified by virtue of tautology - that by definition, cruelty and sadism is, in most instances, conducive to evil.

Con defeats his own argument within his first sentence by saying: "in most cases" this alone debunks this entire section of his. He admits God can indeed do these actions and it be justified  with the right conditions.

"Such incredulity is easily nullified by virtue of tautology - that by definition, cruelty and sadism is, in most instances, conducive to evil."
Con is rehashing the same unjustified stuff he has said from previous arguments. Con completly ignored my biggest hitting syllogism:

P1: the unreal cannot interact with the real.
P2: something unreal can only affect you if you falsely think its real.
C1: Evil can only exist in so far as you falsely believe in it.


This syllogism states that the unreal cannot interact with the real. If God is the creator of all which is real - and if he is conducive of the ultimate and all of reality. How can evil be a burden onto him unless you prove it objective? Through Con saying "in Most cases conducive of evil" he opens himself up to cruelty and sadism not being conducive of evil at all in the right circumstances. As such i no longer need to comment on this argument - as he debunks it himself.

Contention V:  Ad hoc rescue and ontological burden 

PRO then argues that it is impossible for humans to know whether God views [acts] as evil in the way [CON] does, however, this is clearly a case of ad hoc rescue, wherein instead of accepting a conclusion for what it is, PRO instead prevaricates and posits speculation to savour their thesis.
This isn't the case at all, i claimed we can know what God views as good within my round one (based on what exists). Based on the arguments can has presented thus far to the existence of evil, i am admittedly unconvinced. I have explained why through a number of robust syllogism and through the conscious deliberation of explaining to con his overbeared ontological and epistemic commitments which upon scrutiny are absurd. There is a higher chance of Con walking through his walls than Con proving evil to exist in this debate. To chalk my argument up to simply be stating it without reason is dishonest of Con.

PRO's worldview posits: 
  • POE finds that God is incompatible with the existence of gratuitous evil, defined in a manner which avoids the stipulative definition fallacy. 
  • PRO (speculatively) postulates that perhaps God's conception of evil is different to ours. 
    • Therefore, the God hypothesis is unharmed and he still exists. 
My definition is (1) more consistent and (2) historically accurate. If con disagrees with these two statements, he must prove why he's correct, as I have done.

  • PRO (speculatively) postulates that perhaps God's conception of evil is different to ours. 
Con is wrong in this assertion. I never claimed God has a different conception of evil than us. I was claiming that you to prove that is not the case. I have been arguing since the very first round that evil does not exist. Therefore, it's as much of a problem as the existence of an invisible dragon.

Contention VI:  False equivocation with an alien race 

PRO questions why it is the case values such as "murder is wrong" are objective, and postulates that their could possibly be a world wherein aliens enjoy killing and dying for a queen. Ignoring the fact that this was quite literally Britain in the 16th century, PRO conflates "objectively true" with "universally true for all beings". Consider, for example, a vaccine for humans. Clearly, these have beneficial effects for humans, that is, objectively, it is the case that they are, more often than not, beneficial for human beings. However, this is not to say that it is beneficial to all living beings. Much is the same for the case of murder - even if it were the case that some tribe truly views murder as moral, we could discard it as an individual creates moral values. Furthermore, one could still argue that the tribe is objectively wrong, and that their way of life is immoral, thus avoiding the entire problem. 
Con says a lot of stuff here, while once more, not proving morality to be objective. All he actually says, relevant to the resolution, is that one can argue for murder being objectively bad. Even if morality were a universal subjective, it would still be subjective and thus inapplicable to God if he simply disagrees. Con has to bridge the is/ought gap. 

Contention VII:   Ignorance of moral values entails ignorance of all properties


PRO argues that we cannot know whether God's morality and that it is ultimately foreign to us.

This is not correct at all, but is another strawman. As stated in my round one A3 argument:

P1: An Omni God is the creator of all that which exists and is real.
P2: That which is good is that which ought to be real.
P3: That which is evil is that which ought not to be real.
C1: An infinite God is all that which is real, therefore all that which he creates is the real and that which is good.

We can know what is good for God without it being foreign. Con never attacked this syllogism. In fact, all of my cases were rather untouched by Con. All he does is sidestep my argument with whataboutisms.


"cruelty is not benevolent" can be questioned, we could extend such skepticism to attributes such as "omnipotence". We could postulate that God's notion "omnipotence" is far different from our understanding of power - his measure of potency is not through the ability to actualise things, but rather the ability to not actualise things (impotence in our language).
I've already explained why cruelty is not necessarily against omnibenevolence. I don't believe I need to reiterate it again. If you believe we have a wrong perception of the definition of omnipotence, you ought to analytically dissect it and prove it inconsistent, as I did with your definitions and logic. I will not make your argument for you.


Crystallization

  • Con possesses the heavier burden of proof, as demonstrated within my opening.
  • Con never proved evil is real, therefore he failed to fulfil his burden of proof showing evil to be a problem at all. My syllogisms demonstrating this go completely unresponded too by Con. 
  • Pro fulfilled his burden of proof completely, Con never disproved my argument to the realness of good nor proved evil to exist, therefore i won on both fronts.
  • Con within the last round was littered with all sorts of logical fallacies from strawmen, appeals to authority, and ad populum fallacies. 
  • Cons argument to the existence of evil is about as real as russells teapot.

Bones's avatar
Bones
Con
#6
Thank you Ehyeh for the debate, 

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Burden analysis

The burden distribution here need not be overcomplicated, as PRO as attempted to do so. As Wikipedia advises;

PRO, having instigated and created this debate under the set resolution bears the full burden. Such a fact reveals a crucial mis-step in PRO's case - that they have dedicated to merely refute CON's argument as opposed to substantiating their own (recall their arduous contentions which have been left untouched since r1). Such a fact renders a vote for PRO impossible - they have not mounted a positive case and instead assumed their position as the status quo. 

Contention I.     Logical incompatibility 

Recall the initial syllogism proposed in this argument. 

  • P1. If God exists, there would be no gratuitous evils (GE).
  • P2. There are gratuitous evils in the world.
  • C1. God does not exist.
PRO has mounted a semantic case around the definition of evil and employs epistemic limitations  as a defence. They have failed to address the premises in any substantive sense. 

I.     Inherently fallacious. 

Here, on top of the breach of two seperate language fallacies of which is not denied, PRO proposes that whilst the definition of omnibenevolence includes a description of "goodness", it excludes mentions of "kindness", thus concluding that the likes of cruelty are not tautologically excluded from benevolence. There are two glaring problems. 

The first is that we need not a comprehensive moral theory to identify that cruelty is incompatible with infinite benevolence for they are antonyms - it is an entirely fundamental and accepted axiom to hold (just as how we do not need a full account of mathematics to consider simple arithmetics). We as the makers of language have identified this to be case and thus construct our dialectic upon such axiom (this point will be elaborated later). As found in the Munchhausen trilemma, knowledge ultimately comes down to one of three categories, with one being axioms. Voters can cast judgement on whether it is a reasonable position to hold that gratuitous cruelty is that which is incompatible with good. 

The second is that PRO himself commits to burden shifting and opted to task CON with defining "goodness". However, CON can do the same to PRO. It is clear that, without a model of goodness for God to impose his omnibenevolence upon, God's existence would not be possible, hence, PRO must himself define the parameters of goodness in order to allow for God's attributes to be housed. PRO's entire case is a big case of whataboutism, where they speculate some possibilities for God's attributes, instead of positively postulating a mode. This is particularly obvious when they propose that it is possible that God's doctrine of goodness includes maximising cruelty - they postulate it as a possibility but never actually commit to this view (hence committing whataboutism).  As there is no good for God to carry out, for it has not been established by the instigator, PRO has failed to provide even a grounds for God's existence. 

II.     Ignorance of epistemic boundaries 

PRO fundamentally misunderstands the Munchhausen trilemma when they opine -  Con claims we ought to view kindness as part of goodness because "it is unquestionable and axiomatic." (1) Its not unquestionable. (2) Its also not axiomatic. For it to be axiomatic, it must be analytic and/or a priori. PRO's criteria for axioms is entirely unphilosophical and incoherent. Analytical facts presuppose words with definitions (unmarried and bachelor are first assigned definitions and then observed as being analytically connected), and the defining of words itself an act of establishing axioms. Analytic facts only exist when we first establish axioms of relavant words. PRO then shoots himself in the foot when he attempts to outline why "unmarried bachelor" is analytically true - as long as this is the public usage of bachelor we use, however, all bachelors will remain unmarried men. Notice here how PRO agrees that society defines a word and then bases real facts around them. The same applies here for God. We have defined God as being omnibenevolent and axiomatically granted that he is good and loving, and then observed that such a being is incompatible with our reality. Just as how we subjectively define words such as "unmarried" and "bachelor" and apply them in reality by observing the material necessity for "bachelors" to be "unmarried", we have defined God in a certain way which can allow for us to observe his material impossibility. 

III.     Ignoring tautology 

Here, PRO holds that, as there are instances where cruelty can lead to goodness, CON's entire argument is nullified. This, however, reveals that they have not read CON's r1: a moral act can still possess some wrongmaking, so long as it is outweighed by the rightmaking. Furthermore, their logic here is a painful non-sequitur. Their argument is - 

P1. There are some instances where suffering can lead to goodness. 
C1. Therefore, all suffering leads to goodness. 

Furthermore, they postulate that their syllogism has not been addressed. It already has - recall that PRO completely dropped all their arguments from r1 after CON's rebuttal. Refer to r1. 

I also wish to add that PRO has neglected mentioning the heart of this argument - that we humans define the terms which we operate with. It's lengthy, but extraordinarily crucial to the downfall of PRO's case;

Take, for example the term 1, which we as a society has denoted as carrying a specific unit. How would PRO react if a skeptic came along and asserted "how do you know 1 denotes only a single unit? Have you tested this hypothesis in the depths of the universe? How do you know our observation that 1 denotes a single unit isn't merely a quirk in our universe, and that objectively, 1 denotes a different number of units?". Such a line of reasoning is simply absurd, and it is the one which PRO has adopted. We as a society create language, and we decide what each word denotes, thus, when we earthlings speak terms such as "omnibenevolence", we ought, and in fact can only do so with reference to our language. When we stipulate that God has certain properties, we define them in terms of our understanding, just as how we define "1" in terms of our understanding.

When we posit the hypothesis "God exists in reality", each term is defined in accordance with definitions which we have axiomatically established. We do not critique God's existence on the grounds that we have not confirmed that our definition of "in" is one which is defined in accordance with the entirety of the universe and "every being in the universe". Likewise, when we speak of God, we speak of one which we understand - one with goodmaking properties wherein "good" is synonymous with love, justice and fairness. 

IV.     Ad hoc rescue and ontological burden 

PRO here encapsulates the most critical issue in argument with a single statement. "I was claiming that you [had] to prove that is not the case.". Notice here the burden shift - PRO has posited a logically possible version of God and demanded that his interlocutor disprove it in order for the thesis to be nullified. This is akin to postulating fairies which we define as being undetectable, assuming it's existence as the status quo and demanding active disproof. However, this is contrary to the most fundamental of philosophy - PRO, in proposing an ambiguous notion of God, must at justify why it exists, much less argue that a lack of active disproof constitutes proof.  As Hitchens razor stipulates, "what may be asserted without evidence, may be dismissed without evidence."

V.     False equivocation with an alien race 

PRO states: Con has to bridge the is/ought gap. This has already been refuted on two grounds;

  1. The existence God already presupposes that there is an objective morality 
  2. To define "morality" in an entirely contrary way to that described in dictionaries and moral philosophies implies that PRO must first substantiate such a deviation, to avoid both the stipulate and persuasive definition fallacy. 
Furthermore, this argument is a clear
V.    False equivocation with an alien race

Not much needs to be said here, merely that PRO re-articulates his desire for CON to prove an objective morality. Refer to above. 

VI.    Ignorance of moral values entails ignorance of all properties

PRO charges CON with committing the strawman fallacy, and proposes their syllogism, which contains the following conclusion. 

c1. An infinite God is all that which is real, therefore all that which he creates is the real and that which is good.

This is to say, God is real, and everything he makes is good. From this, we can infer, as I stated that "God's morality is ultimately foreign to us". Again, this employment 

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Conclusion 

Ultimately, PRO has multiple major pitfalls which negate his entire argument. 

  1. PRO proposes a variation of God which is unknown to us, and asks CON to disprove it, ultimately falling prey to Hitchens Razor. 
  2. They fail to justify their deviation to ambiguous definitions (deviation in and of itself is not problematic, but the lack of substantiation is), hence falling to both the stipulative and definitional fallacy. CON's case, however, adopts layman definitions and thus is most intelligible. 
  3. PRO has dedicated their entire debate to deconstructing CON, never once returning to their positive substantiations. Hence, their burden is not met and the resolution is negated. 
Thank you once again to Ehyeh and any prospective voters.