Roughly speaking, the three moral axioms are (i) Live and let live, (ii) Tell the truth to those who have a right to know it, and (iii) Respect the environment. These are subject to three requirements, namely, utility, reasonableness, and beauty.
Disagreement doesn’t mean subjective,
An individual's moral intuition is NOT empirically demonstrable (and or logically-necessary).
It’s necessary if the goal is to get to heaven and if you’re a logical person than it should be.
Tarik is correct. Derek Parfit, an Oxford scholar whom is widely considered one of the most important and influential moral philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. , in 2011 produced a massive work on ethics titled On What Matters. This two-volume work covers a lot of ground, but one of its main claims is that morality is objective, and we can and do know moral truths but not because moral judgments describe some fact. Indeed, moral judgments do not describe anything in the external world, nor do they refer to our own feelings. There are no mystical moral or normative entities. Nonetheless, moral judgments express objective truths. Parfit’s solution? Ethics is analogous to mathematics. There are mathematical truths even though, on Parfit’s view, there are no such things as an ideal equation 2 + 2 = 4 existing somewhere in Plato’s heaven. Similarly, we have objectively valid moral reasons for not inflicting pain gratuitously even though there are no mystical moral entities to which we make reference when we declare, “Inflicting pain gratuitously is morally wrong.” To quote Parfit, “Like numbers and logical truths … normative properties and truths have no ontological status” (On What Matters, vol. 2, p. 487).
15 days later
However, some theorists claim we can know many more moral propositions a priori, in particular, propositions that are not so closely tied to the meaning or reference of moral terms. Others go farther, claiming that most or all moral claims can be known a priori, or even that moral claims can be known only a priori.
