I genuinely apologize for forfeiting my turn for rebuttal. If you would like to read what I had drafted, here it is (Though I understand this does not count.):
Firstly, I would wish to thank my opponent for their cordiality and their well-crafted arguments. And, secondly, I would like to discuss their sock. This sock of theirs indeed may seem as genuine as anything else — and indeed I assume it is — for, they may feel the cotton and see its woven nature, indeed they may, though I am not sure they should, smell it. But are these things not as subjective as anything else? As I may see, feel, and smell, the very sock in the very place but perceive it ever so slightly differently, it is therefore not possible to absolutely define.
I would like to remark on my opponent’s claim that, “The problem of location is disproportionately burdensome on the claim of nonexistence than it is on existence.” This I believe somewhat mischaracterizes my argument, though I may agree with its point, as I am not attempting to prove or disprove the existence of any god or deity, rather I am attempting to argue that the very thing is impossible to do definitively. Next, I should like to agree with my opponent’s remark that my “entire argument is predicated on proving the truth of their argument.” And indeed, I should like to agree further that this is somewhat disingenuous when I am claiming, essentially, that nothing is completely provable. I, myself, almost pointed this out in my first argument, but I thought it not very wise to say your argument is unprovable within itself. But I would like to also remark that every argument using reason rather than evidence is unprovable, and this debate of ours, which attempts to reason if something can be empirically proven, is subject to the same fate and therefore relies on probability and the superiority of arguments to decide its outcome.
True belief, as my opponent defines knowledge, is, I believe, still as subjective as anything else. For, if one were to say the stars above are shining and indeed they were and this could be measured and proven, from our vantage point, would not one who was closer and saw the star had long since died out and now was nonexistent be also right? Another example is time dilation between two individuals of different speeds, both measure their time with the same devices and yet will receive different results when checked. Is one more correct than the other? I will say again, truths themselves are often subjective.
Next, I should like to present a quote from my opponent: “While a hundred percent confidence is technically impossible in Bayesian probability, you can reach sufficiently far into the repeating decimals of 99999999 that there is no practical difference.” This to me states my point beautifully, as this is what underlines the entire argument — no matter how close to certain you are to having empirical proof of something it is still technically impossible for that thing to ever have full probability of being proven beyond a doubt.
As to my opponent’s claims on proving a declared or found deity’s existence: If omnipotence is to be proven, would not one have to ensure that said deity is capable of literally everything? This would require every known and unknown thing in the universe to be done and therefore is impossible to prove, as this would be infinite. Likewise, if capable of unlimited power, this deity would also have to have the power to be without it, which turns into a paradox and again is not provable. Omniscience is subject to the same paradoxical and infinite status. As to proving a deity created the universe, this, as my opponent writes, “seems impossible” and I would say is impossible. To summarize, to prove any deity’s required attributes is, to my knowledge, impossible and paradoxical.
I genuinely apologize for forfeiting my turn for rebuttal. If you would like to read what I had drafted, here it is (Though I understand this does not count.):
Firstly, I would wish to thank my opponent for their cordiality and their well-crafted arguments. And, secondly, I would like to discuss their sock. This sock of theirs indeed may seem as genuine as anything else — and indeed I assume it is — for, they may feel the cotton and see its woven nature, indeed they may, though I am not sure they should, smell it. But are these things not as subjective as anything else? As I may see, feel, and smell, the very sock in the very place but perceive it ever so slightly differently, it is therefore not possible to absolutely define.
I would like to remark on my opponent’s claim that, “The problem of location is disproportionately burdensome on the claim of nonexistence than it is on existence.” This I believe somewhat mischaracterizes my argument, though I may agree with its point, as I am not attempting to prove or disprove the existence of any god or deity, rather I am attempting to argue that the very thing is impossible to do definitively. Next, I should like to agree with my opponent’s remark that my “entire argument is predicated on proving the truth of their argument.” And indeed, I should like to agree further that this is somewhat disingenuous when I am claiming, essentially, that nothing is completely provable. I, myself, almost pointed this out in my first argument, but I thought it not very wise to say your argument is unprovable within itself. But I would like to also remark that every argument using reason rather than evidence is unprovable, and this debate of ours, which attempts to reason if something can be empirically proven, is subject to the same fate and therefore relies on probability and the superiority of arguments to decide its outcome.
True belief, as my opponent defines knowledge, is, I believe, still as subjective as anything else. For, if one were to say the stars above are shining and indeed they were and this could be measured and proven, from our vantage point, would not one who was closer and saw the star had long since died out and now was nonexistent be also right? Another example is time dilation between two individuals of different speeds, both measure their time with the same devices and yet will receive different results when checked. Is one more correct than the other? I will say again, truths themselves are often subjective.
Next, I should like to present a quote from my opponent: “While a hundred percent confidence is technically impossible in Bayesian probability, you can reach sufficiently far into the repeating decimals of 99999999 that there is no practical difference.” This to me states my point beautifully, as this is what underlines the entire argument — no matter how close to certain you are to having empirical proof of something it is still technically impossible for that thing to ever have full probability of being proven beyond a doubt.
As to my opponent’s claims on proving a declared or found deity’s existence: If omnipotence is to be proven, would not one have to ensure that said deity is capable of literally everything? This would require every known and unknown thing in the universe to be done and therefore is impossible to prove, as this would be infinite. Likewise, if capable of unlimited power, this deity would also have to have the power to be without it, which turns into a paradox and again is not provable. Omniscience is subject to the same paradoxical and infinite status. As to proving a deity created the universe, this, as my opponent writes, “seems impossible” and I would say is impossible. To summarize, to prove any deity’s required attributes is, to my knowledge, impossible and paradoxical.