Fallaneze

Logic is logically verifiable 

Not literally "unable" but unwilling due to emotional distress.

"Logical" and "rational" is not functionally equivalent to "verifiable." Verifiable implies empirical methods while both logic and rationality are abstract 

5 stages of grief. Step 1: denial.

At least one person has chosen not to believe some piece of bad news despite evidence that it was clearly true.

Yes, we can have definitions of things that aren't real. We can have something that is defined by its physical characteristic while it doesn't actually exist. Why is that a problem?

It's not as if people interpret evidence that suggests something the same way. Some people have rational interpretations and some have irrational interpretations. 

If moral realism is based on "rational thought" and "rational thought" is independently verifiable, then you've conceded that morality has an objective basis. 

Of course mythical is not a physical characteristic. But saying "a mythical exists" tells us nothing about what is being referred to. A yeti is also a mythical creature that's large and hairy and resembles a bear. Both of these mythical creatures are defined according to their physical characteristics.

"Rational thought is independently verifiable."

You've just allowed an avenue for moral realism.

How does that change anything about a unicorn being defined according to its physical characteristics?

Unicorn:

"a mythical, usually white animal generally depicted with the body and head of a horse with long flowing mane and tail and a single often spiraled horn in the middle of the forehead."

If we were looking for a unicorn we would use empirical methods to do so. 

So you were pointing out the logical fallaciousness of your counter-argument?

In response you said:

"But unicorns can only be seen by 'true believers.'  No True Scotsman. ..."

I never once said or implied that unicorns can only be seen by "true believers." You then proceeded to attack the bizarre claim you created 

Post #320, the first two sentences.

You are bizarrely creating claims I didn't make and then attacking them.

Arguments against determinism:

- Appearance of free will

- Determinism is not rationally coherent

- mental causation 

Someone is 'compelled' to believe something based on the amount of evidence it has going for it. Our final conclusion on the matter isn't necessarily beyond our control. 

It's impossible to convince someone that free will doesn't exist if free will doesn't exist. All human actions follow from prior events and ultimately can be understood in terms of the movement of molecules.

Free will is prima facie true. Determinism is not.

Question and answer key below:

Can mindless forces act rationally? (No)

Are my beliefs determined by mindlessness forces? (Yes)

Is determinism a rational belief? (Therefore, No)

Is consciousness soul stuff?

Randomness refers to the unknown timing of an event whereas cause refers to an explanation as to how the event occurred. 

Holding the position that determinism is true cannot be rational because the mindless forces that installed that position in your brain are not rational.

Randomly determined does not mean non-causually determined.

Free will is compatible with cause and effect (i.e. mental causation). So both positions, determinism and free will, have no default assumptions, other than determinism having things not be the way they seem.

Mental causation is compatible with free will so we're not arguing whether cause and effect is violated, we're arguing about whether people have free will. The impossibility of proving a negative has been debunked all over the internet. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim or the person who is arguing against the status quo. Anyone who takes a philosophical viewpoint on anything requires rational justification of that position.

By comparing it with reality 

The person who claims that there is no free will had this position installed in them by mindless forces beyond their control. Mindless forces are not rational. Therefore, their position is not rational. 

At the least, free will is prima facie true. The burden of proof would fall on the person who believes it doesnt exist.

Mental causation.

"The phenomenon of mental causation, as may be apparent, is thoroughly commonplace and ubiquitous. But this is not the only reason why it is significant. It is absolutely fundamental to our concept of actions performed intentionally (as opposed to involuntarily), which, in turn, is central to those of agency, free will, and moral responsibility. An action, as philosophers use the term, is not a mere bodily motion like involuntarily blinking one's eyes. It is something one does intentionally, as when one winks to grab someone's attention. The distinction between a mere bodily movement and an action hinges on the possibility of mental causation, since actions have mental states, such as intentions, as direct causes. This distinction, in turn, is critical for gauging moral responsibility, since we attribute or withhold judgments of moral responsibility depending upon whether the agent acted intentionally."

Free will doesn't mean that there's no cause and effect. It means that you have the ability to have chosen otherwise. This is compatible with mental causation but not determinism.

If you are fine with something non-material causing something then I don't see any useful distinction between this and mental causation/free will .

But I don't blame you because chemistry and physics is calling all the shots anyway.

You're avoiding my questions with more questions.

If our positions are installed by mindless forces beyond our control then we're just experiencing the results that play out. Deterministic processes don't make choices or decisions. So when the day comes that physics or chemistry can behave otherwise, then we'll see if free will isn't required for rational decision-making. 

Is a reason a material thing or an abstract, non-material concept?

A rational discussion presupposes free will. If have no hand in determining outcomes, then let's all lie down and sleep and trust that the outcome would've been the same no matter what we think.

That would refute your position if it were since you're the one arguing that deterministic, material processes determine outcomes, not abstract reasons.

No, I did not accept that. But even if I did, even if robots and dogs are considered rational, this does not show that rationality doesn't need to entail the ability to choose between competing outcomes.

Someone who is a pawn of mindless forces like chemistry or physics has no choice in what positions they accept or reject so their positions can't be based on good reasons or bad reasons. I'm sure you'd agree that something mindless, the thing that's causing our positions, has no ability to act according to good reasons.

Here is the claim: rationality must entail the ability to choose between competing outcomes.

Something is not rational if it cannot choose between competing outcomes. What you said about robots and dogs would neither affirm nor disconfirm the claim.

I'm suggesting that choices are not predetermined by material causes, yes. AI is programmed by algorithms. It's not rational at all.

How about you and I just lie down on the floor and trust that the outcome would've been the same had we wanted to continue the discussion. We're as "in control" of ourselves as much as a boulder is in control of itself rolling down hill.

My position is that rationality must entail the ability to choose between competing outcomes. This is why we don't consider robots to be rational.

If determinism is true, rationality isn't possible because rationality entails the ability to choose between competing outcomes. That alone would make each and every statement you make a-rational and you would have no rational basis for any of your arguments or statements.

Well maybe never to exchange her and I'm sure they'd love her more, but they'd be irrational for seeing her as physically more beautiful. 

Imagine a woman being morbidly obese, smelling like rotten cheese, acne all over her face, patchy and stringy hair, deep and raspy voice, a beard under her neck, has only two rotten front teeth, a giant and crooked nose, and ears that stick out of her hair. 

She is just as beautiful as Jessica alba.

A unicorn is defined according to its physical characteristics. Morality is not defined by physical characteristics. Morality is abstract. Empiricism works on tangible things, like unicorns, but not on abstract stuff, like morality.

We don't need to prove moral realism. All we need to do is determine whether it's more rational than moral non-realism since one of the two must be true by law of excluded middle.

Having a moral principle be "axiomatically true" better evidences moral realism than non-realism. 

Moral realism is both intuitive and rational. They needn't be mutually exclusive. 

We would expect greater consensus on facts than on mere opinions. Rationality is not wholly subjective. Therefore, rationality is our independent epistemic standard. 

No, consensus has no effect on facts. If we all agree it's cold, it doesn't change that the temperature is 70. If we all agree it's hot, it doesn't change that temperature is still 70. Our natural reaction to 70 degree weather, however, will not consist of sweating or shivering. Our behavior indicates, but has no hand in determining, the actual temperature. 

All I need to do is point out that there are rational differences between opposite moral conclusions. You aren't irrational for preferring the taste of chocolate ice cream over vanilla or vice versa. You are irrational, however, if you believe that cruelty must be morally good and that compassion must be morally wrong. This shows that morality is embedded in rationality and rationality is not wholly subjective. Since rationality is not wholly subjective, therein lies our independent basis for arriving at the conclusion of the existence of moral facts.

Consensus morality has no effect on whether moral statements are factually true or true only by opinion. If the consensus is aggregate and universal, this is actually a strong indicator of moral facts.

All you'd need is one moral statement that is factually true in order to affirm moral realism.

Is the principle "punishing an innocent person is morally wrong" rationally equivalent to the principle that "punishing innocent people is morally good"?

We needn't know why something seems wrong before it seems wrong