== Rebuttals ==
Con originally asserts that there are two types of probability conditional and unconditional. However, now he states there are three types of probability, conditional, unconditional and subjective. Con's argument is equivocating. Morever, he originally states that God's existence is not unconditionally possible, but now concedes that it is unconditionally possible.
More importantly, he sates that the claim 'God is likely to exist' uses subjective probability which isn't mathematical, but is presupposed by beliefs and assumptions and is therefore illogical. This is inherently incorrect as propositions are deemed 'likely' without mathematical proof very often. I admit that there is no mathematical proof that deems God's likeliness, insofar as a theorem -- however this does not mean it cannot be proven to be likely. For instance, take the Law of Parisomony that deems a theory a priori 'most likely', if it has less ontological commitments than the other competing theory.  An ontological commitment is not mathematical but metaphysical, and thus shows that a proposition needn't be contingent upon mathematical proof to be deemed likely.
Con is unjustly equating unconditional probability with likelihood. Anything that can dichotomously 'happen' or 'not happen' will have an unconditional probability of 50%. I can either be an astronaut or not be an astronaut, and thus my unconditional probility is 50%. However, if I were to have a degree in social studies my likelihood of being an astronaut is clearly not 50%. Moreover, clearly someone who has a degree in astrophysics is far 'more likely' to become an astronaut than someone who has no degree at all. This further demonstrates that likelihood is not necessarily contingent upon mathematical proof and that it does not equate unconditional probability.
Even if we were to accept these premises from Con, it would mean that nothing can be likely or unlikely. Replace 'God's existence' with anything, and from Con's logic, it is impossible to prove it. Hence, from this logic, we shouldn't make predictions about anything; the weather, the stock market etc. Therefore, Con's contention is clearly unsound.
Here, Con incorportates the coin analogy into his syllogism:
P1: The probability of "Heads" is 50%. The probability of "Tails" is 50%.
P2: The coin is tossed, but we are not shown if it landed on "Heads" or "Tails".
C: The only logical conclusion can be that we don't know if it's heads or tails.
This is unsound for the reasons the first syllogism is unsound; this would only apply to unconditional probabilities. As I have demonstrated, unconditional probabilities and likelihood aren't equatable, and thus the replacement of 'God's existence' with the coin analogy is sophistry. For example, are coin flips 'truly' a 50/50 chance - outside of unconditional probability? Theoretically, I could construct a machine that strikes a coin of a specific mass, from a specific height, with a specific force which would entail that the coin lands specfically each time. Would this scenario dictate that the actual outcome of the coin flip is 50% heads and 50% tails? No. Hence, it is not relevant.
Subsequently, Con states that my arguments do not constitue as 'proof'. As I aforementioned, the arguments I have provided; the Modal Ontological Argument and the Argument of Idealism; both act as proofs for God's existence as I have explained proof is contingent upon either: deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning.
A deductive argument is one that has a definitive conclusion and must always be true. For example mathematical principles e.g 2+2 = 4 is an example of deduction as the proposition is necessarily true in every possible world. 
An inductive argument is one where the conclusion is merely likely -- this is is primarily used in science, as even though the conclusion is not definitely true there is evidence which proves the conclusion is likely. 
An abductive argument is a likely conclusion based from an incomplete set of observations. An example of this is a medical diagnosis; what is the most likely diagonsis from the set of symptoms. 
Hence, it is clearly evident that a proposition can be likely from a set of proof.
Therefore, both of Con's syllogisms are unsound and fail to negate the resolution.
Con's Final Question
I'm not sure if Pro and I are debating the same thing. Are we debating that it is probable that God exists (50%) or that it is likely that God exists (over 50%)? Because I agree with the first claim and disagree with the second one.
As I have shown, God's unconditional probability does not equate likelihood, and thus invalidates this. I have shown that by Con's logic nothing can be proven to be likely without mathematical proof (therefore deductive proof). However, this would refute almost all scientific observation which doesn't necessarily rely on deductive proof but rather inductive proof which doesn't necessarily have definitive axioms.
== Aff ==
Modal Ontological Argument
Here, Con's contention would be valid for any other being apart from 'God'. This is because I assert that God is a being with all 'positive' properties deemed by "Godels positivity operator'. Here, this argument uses Gode's defined operator 'Pos' . This provides the ordering of individual by means of positive attributes, much like the way that predicates provide truth-functional assignment when applied to variables and constants.Hence, Pos(p) is true provided that the predicate 'p', is in fact, a postive attribute.
Here, I assert that God contains a positive attribute and is inherently the epitome of that attribute, and therefore must exist.
P1: 'Greatness' is a positive attribute
P2: God by definition, is the greatest
P3: Existing necessarily is greater than existing contingently
P4: If P2, then God must exist necessarily
C: God exists necessarily.
I argue 'greatness' is inherently positive as there is no logical circumstance where greatness can be considered a negative property. Moreover, this is to be considered a positive property from the philosophical sense of pure attribution, which states that we are to understand that a predicate attributes some quality to an individual, and that the quality contains no element of privation .
God has been defined to be the creator of the universe i.e all matter, energy and space-time. All that is observable is the universe; all that has been, is, or will be is limited within the universe. Hence, it is inherently true that this would mean that God is the 'greatest' as it would have more agency, volition and power than anything we have observed or can perceive in this universe, as 'greatness' is defined as "of ability, quality, or eminence considerably above average" 
Here, I assert that existing in all possible worlds is greater than existing in at least one possible world. This is intutively true, as being impossible in one possible world implies that the entity is logically constrained, hence it logically entails that something would be greater if it were not constrained.
This makes logical sense, a God that is not constrained is cogently greater than a God that is constrained.
Logically follows from the premises.
Hence, God ought to exist necessarily, entailing that God exists in the actual world.
"My opponent has misunderstood Descartes' idea. Descartes meant only
this: "I think, therefore I exist". He only said that because he can
think about if he exists or not, he must exist"
I completely agree with Con and what it proves - that "he must exist". I am unsure how this invalidates the argument for idealism. Let me elaborate. That which must exist is the mind. Under metaphysical solipsism, Decartes' assertion is a priori, meaning the proposition "I exist" is metaphysically concluded without means external to the self. This means the statement is a priori and not a posteriori viz. Decartes did not conclude this from any scientific or physical observation, but did from mental observation. This ultimately proves that the 'I' in the proposition 'I exist' refers to the mind and not the physical aspects of Decartes. Hence, I am unsure why Con asserts this invalidates Idealism, as this unequivocally proves my point.
I have shown that both of Con's syllogisms are unsound as Con falsely equates uncondtional probability with likelihood. Moreover, I have supported the Ontological Argument by showing that God must necessarily exist due to His positive properties. Lastly, I posited that Con's contention with the argument for Idealism, was not a contention and actually fulfilled the crucial premise's veracity.
The resolution is affirmed.
Over to Con.