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21 st Century will see a new cold-war between China and USA

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After not so many votes...

It's a tie!
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Round 1
Pro
I hope PRO and CON can come to some broad agreement on definitions for the benefit of the audience:

DEFINITIONS:
21 st Century: period from 2000-2099 (both years inclusive) 
Cold War: a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare.
China: People's Republic of China
USA: United States of America 

NOTE:  PRO hopes PRO and CON can come to some broad agreement that both sides will be strictly dealing in the domains of estimates based on current trends and the probability of those estimates or hypothetical situation coming true. 

BURDEN OF PROOF: Hints of political animosity already exist in the modern world, evident from the attitude of POTUS and Chinese premier Xi Jinping, significantly highlighted in the 2018 Trade dispute. 

1.2018 Trade dispute(definition)is an ongoing economic conflict between China and the United States.
President Donald Trump in 2018 began setting tariffs and other trade barriers on China with the goal of forcing it to make changes to what the U.S. says are "unfair trade practices".

This trade war is here to stay as it does not matter what will the outcome of the upcoming US as both major parties in US agree on it and on the Chinese side the government is totalitarian. 

"As of late November 2019, none of the leading Democratic candidates for president said they would remove the tariffs, including Joe Biden and Elizabeth Warren, both of whom agreed the U.S. had to confront what they see as China's unfair trade policies".

The scale of this trade war between the world's two major economies is at an unprecedented scale and as Chinese GDP and economy nears US GDP and economy, it can be easily concluded that the US administration will try to keep US economy at the number one spot. This depute is to continue as the two economies battle it out for the global dominance. 

2.Already in Motion proxy war : China has continuously threatened it's neighbouring countries with war and continues to seize marine territories and land at will evident from the South China Sea conflict. 
"Since 2013, the People's Republic of China has resorted to island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region.[4] These actions have been met with a wide international condemnation, and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region".

Chinese military and US military have come very close to conflict like situations in South China Sea.

In 2020, the US took a series of measures to contain China, on topics including COVID-19, Hong Kong, Taiwan, high-tech and the military. Recently, US warships have repeatedly trespassed into Chinese territorial waters around the Xisha and Nansha islands, conducted operations in the South China Sea and crossed the Taiwan Straits. In a rare move, it has deployed three aircraft carriers to the region.[1]

On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable.[2]

this attitude is similar for a lot of neighbouring countries who share a border with China:

1. Chinese warplanes entered Taiwanese airspace as recently as Jun9. [3]
2.Chinese soldiers in a conflict killed 20 Indian soldiers , Chinese side have not disclosed any casualties on their side(if any).[4] The conflict was just infantry on infantry but  this has led to deployment of fighter jets very near to the border.  
3. A 2014 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 84% of Vietnamese were concerned that territorial disputes between China and neighbouring countries could lead to a military conflict.[5]

With all the given cases China's bellicose nature is well established beyond doubt. Why is to that bellicose nature can lead to a proxy war will be covered in the next point. 

2.Increase in Chinese Defense Spending: Chinese Defense expenditure is expected to touch upwards of 700 million USD  by the 2030s and the US at 1.3 Trillion. With Goldman Sachs estimating Chinese's economy crossing the US economy by 2027[6]. With the huge increase in defense expenditure by China the region will only destabilize with all countries neighbouring China fearing unilateral aggression by China. Which has already happened in Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Western intervention would become inevitable, as previously seen when Kuwait was invaded by forces of Saddam Hussein. 

3.US's alliance with Japan and South Korea: Both countries are US allies and have a lot of US troops stationed are threatened continuously by North Korea's increased Military tests and continuous threats to launch missile attacks, with the increased missile testing by North Korea the region will only de-stabilize and China has had a crucial rule and even acted as an instigating party in doing so,since China is arguably North Korea's only prominent trading partner. It has and still has a deciding say in North Korea's policies. 


MAIN ARGUMENT: For the three above mentioned reasons , firstly, Chinese increasing economic influence and secondly, Chinese increasingly bellicose nature towards its neighbouring countries, and finally increasing North Korean missile testing a new Cold war between US and China is inevitable. 



Con
(this argument was drafted prior to reading my opponent’s R1. I intend to begin rebuttals in R2)

Thanks to N_s for setting up this debate. The nature of US-China relations will undoubtedly be a prominent feature of global politics for years to come, and the question my opponent has posed to us is of central importance. If the US and China are headed for a New Cold War, we must prepare accordingly. If we are not headed for a New Cold War, we must be careful to not unnecessarily provoke one. Either way, an accurate forecast is critical.

The only authoritative prompt my opponent provides is the following statement: “21 st Century will see a new cold-war between China and USA.”

By taking the Con position, I am opposing my opponent’s forecast about Sino-American relations. In order to articulate my opposition, I will proceed in 4 sections.
  • In Section 1, I outline BoP and important definitions
  • In Section 2, I describe the fundamental elements of the US-USSR Cold War
  • In Section 3, I explain that the US-China relationship is unlikely to reflect the US-USSR Cold War to a great enough degree to merit characterization as a New Cold War
  • In Section 4, I conclude by summarizing my arguments

Section 1: BoP and Definition
BoP
I propose that the burden of proof ought to reside with my opponent. As he is the instigator and claim-maker, his role should be to convince voters of the following statement: “21 st Century will see a new cold-war between China and USA.”

My role, meanwhile, is merely to prevent Pro from convincing voters of that statement. To do this, I could advance my own claims about the nature of future US-China relations, or I could simply content myself with undermining Pro’s case. I intend to do both.

Definition
“New Cold War” - Being clear about what this means is critical. Since my opponent called this cold war “new,” it is reasonable to assume he is alluding to the US-USSR Cold War. Thus, we ought to expect this so-called New Cold War would bear great similarities to the Old Cold War, or else calling it a Cold War wouldn’t make much sense. In other words, for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified.

Section 2
With this definition in place, it’s clear that we must first understand the core characteristics of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union in order to determine if US-Sino relations will justify the moniker of “New Cold War.”

Historian Odd Arne Westad describes the Cold War this way:

“At its peak, the Cold War was a global system of countries centered on the United States and the Soviet Union. It did not determine everything that was going on in the world of international affairs, but it influenced most things. At its core was an ideological contest between capitalism and socialism that had been going on throughout the twentieth century, with each side fervently dedicated to its system of economics and governance. It was a bipolar system of total victory or total defeat, in which neither of the main protagonists could envisage a lasting compromise with the other. The Cold War was intense, categorical, and highly dangerous: strategic nuclear weapons systems were intended to destroy the superpower opponent, even at a cost of devastating half the world.”

For our purposes, the important elements of this definition can be understood as follows:
  1. Ideological contest
  2. Nuclear deterrence/MAD
  3. Bipolarity
  4. Enmity
Points #1-3 are likely obvious to readers and merit little explanation. It is common knowledge that the Cold War was principally a contest between ideologically opposed and nuclear-armed superpowers. What may briefly require explanation, however, is “enmity.”

The meaning of enmity is best understood by contrasting it with rivalry. According to Alexander Wendt’s theories of international anarchy, relations between states in an anarchic system can be characterized as enmity, rivalry, or friendship. Under enmity, relations between states “are characterized by threatening each other with violent actions in an unlimited manner,” while under rivalry, “the posturing of rivals is one of competition which includes the use of violence for maximization of interests, however in a limited and calculated manner.”

Of course, the relationship between the US and Soviet Union cannot be described perfectly as one of enmity, since violence most certainly was not employed in an unlimited manner. However, the degree of hostility between the two superpowers (Westad says the two could not imagine “lasting compromise”) makes the term enmity useful for our purposes, so long as we think of enmity as a state of intense hostility.

Here is another way to conceptualize these terms as they describe degrees of hostility between states:

Enmity (total hostility) --------- Rivalry (moderated hostility) --------- Friendship (no hostility)

In this debate, I will be arguing that US-China relations are likely to be much closer to the middle portion of this spectrum - the rivalry region - than US-Soviet Cold War relations were.

Additionally, I will argue that while US-Soviet relations were characterized by global bipolarity, US-China relations will evolve amidst global multipolarity. For these reasons, the revival of the term “Cold War” is not justified when forecasting Sino-American relations.

Section 3: Why “Cold War” Doesn’t Apply
I will be arguing that 2 of the 4 key characteristics of the US-USSR Cold War are unlikely to apply to future US-China relations. These key characteristics are Bipolarity and Enmity.

Bipolarity
As my quote from Odd Arne Westad made clear, the Cold War was a generally bipolar affair. It was one superpower versus the other - the free world and the communist world engaged in a decades-long struggle for dominance. However, it appears US-China relations will be conducted amidst a multipolar international system, rather than a bipolar one. I will offer three strands of evidence to support this: quotations from experts, multipolarity as measured by economic power, and multipolarity as measured by military power.

Expert quotations - 

Westad: “Bipolarity is gone. If there is any direction in international politics today, it is toward multipolarity. The United States is getting less powerful in international affairs. China is getting more powerful. Europe is stagnant. Russia is a dissatisfied scavenger on the fringes of the current order. But other big countries such as India and Brazil are growing increasingly influential within their regions.”

Dr. Cynthia Roberts: “The BRICS are at a turbulent crossroads as renewed great power competition intersects with countervailing tendencies in the emerging multipolar arena. Their success depends [sic] avoiding the external costs and domestic pathologies generated by great power friction. Emerging multipolarity provides opportunities for manoeuvre...”

James P. Micciche: “Over the past decade, the global balance of power has shifted to a multipolar construct in which revisionist actors such as China and Russia attempt to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the U.S.-led liberal order.”

Economic power -

Currently, three countries account for approximately 43% of global GDP (PPP): China, the United States, and India. It is also worth noting that if we counted the European Union as its own country, we could expand that figure to nearly 60% of global GDP held by four countries. As you can see here, US share of global GDP has been dropping and is forecasted to continue to drop. Furthermore, it is estimated that by 2030, the BRICS will account for over 50% of global GDP.

In short, there’s not just one or two economic powerhouses. Trends indicate economic multipolarity will only grow over time.

Military power - 

Global Firepower’s PowerIndex rankings place the United States, China, and Russia in the top three positions, with each relatively close to the others in terms of strength rating. As reported by Newsweek, these findings have been durable over the past decade. In fact, the United States, China, Russia, and India have all occupied the top four positions for the past decade. Meanwhile, countries like the UK, Japan, and France have featured in the top ten.

Thus, multiple strands of evidence indicate US-China relations will be conducted amid a multipolar backdrop, not a bipolar one as in the US-Soviet Cold War. Expert quotations, economic indicators, and military strength rankings all point to a world composed of multiple great powers, rather than just two superpowers. This is one of two reasons why using the term “New Cold War” is not warranted. I now turn to my second reason.

Enmity
As I established in section 2, there was a great deal of enmity between the United States and Soviet Union. Westad’s comment that the two sides could not “envisage a lasting compromise” is key. The Soviet and American systems were antithetical to one another and they were locked in a struggle to the death.

Certainly, there are reasons for the United States and China to clash. I’m sure my opponent will do a good job of identifying all of the present and potential sources of conflict between America and China. For my part, I will focus on reasons we can expect US-China conflict to be of a less serious degree than US-Soviet conflict.

Economic interdependence - 

As Heath and Thompson point out, “China’s economy is also far more integrated with the U.S. economy (and, again, vice versa) than was ever the case in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.” (pg. 114) Because of this, Joseph Nye observes, we can expect an additional reason for the United States and China to restrain their hostile tendencies. Tonnesson similarly predicts that economic interdependence will deter war between the two great powers.

To put it simply: because the US and China are economically interdependent in a way the US and Soviet Union never were, there is an additional motivation for moderation and cooperation in the US-Sino relationship that the US-Soviet relationship lacked.

Combating climate change - 

CSIS has called China “a strategic partner” for the US in the fight against climate change. Given that the two countries are the greatest emitters of greenhouse gases, it should not be surprising the US and China have taken a cooperative leadership stance by jointly labeled climate change “one of the greatest threats facing humanity,” requiring the US and China “to work constructively together for the common good.” Both the United States and China can expect to suffer from climate change, thus, we can expect the two countries to cooperate in combating this transnational issue throughout the century.

In sum, we can expect the US-China relationship to be more one of rivalry than the US-Soviet relationship, which was closer to enmity. Whereas the Cold War featured an enduring and zero-sum struggle for global dominance, we can reasonably assume the United States and China will be forced to moderate their hostility in order to cooperate on certain important shared objectives, such as protecting their economic well-being and combating climate change. Basically, the US and China will be competitors and partners. Thus, the term “New Cold War” is not warranted.

Section 4: Conclusion
In this opening argument, I have described the core characteristics of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. I have also contrasted the US-Soviet relationship with the US-Sino relationship, finding that the two will be too different to justify revival of the term “Cold War.”

Because the Cold War was characterized by bipolarity and enmity, while this new relationship between the US and China will be characterized by multipolarity and rivalry, it would be misleading to call this new era of simultaneous competition and partnership a New Cold War.
Round 2
Pro
Definition has been contested so PRO will start will address by starting from the definitions section : 

DEFINITIONS: 
Definition offered by PRO,
Cold War: a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare.
Definition offered by CON,
Definition
“New Cold War” - Being clear about what this means is critical. Since my opponent called this cold war “new,” it is reasonable to assume he is alluding to the US-USSR Cold War. Thus, we ought to expect this so-called New Cold War would bear great similarities to the Old Cold War, or else calling it a Cold War wouldn’t make much sense. In other words, for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified.
CONTENTION: 
PRO is fine by the above definition given by PRO because it covers the cold war period of the world in a broad sense, just like we can cover car by describing it as a 4-wheeler typically with 4 wheels powered by an engine to cover a small number of people, but if we have compare the cars or say aeroplanes from what they began as and what they are now, there are hardly any similarities apart from the broad definition. PRO has objection to usage of the term" highly similar" in this definition. The objection has been explained in the analogy mentioned above, if CON wants to contest definition further, please intimate by doing so in R2. PRO feels the definition given by PRO is sufficient enough for the debate. 


SOME ASPECTS OF COLD WAR DEFINED BY CON ARE OBJECTIONABLE: 

It was a bipolar system of total victory or total defeat, in which neither of the main protagonists could envisage a lasting compromise with the other. The Cold War was intense, categorical, and highly dangerous: strategic nuclear weapons systems were intended to destroy the superpower opponent, even at a cost of devastating half the world.”

CON used this pretext to make this argument: 


Bipolarity
As my quote from Odd Arne Westad made clear, the Cold War was a generally bipolar affair. It was one superpower versus the other - the free world and the communist world engaged in a decades-long struggle for dominance. However, it appears US-China relations will be conducted amidst a multipolar international system, rather than a bipolar one. I will offer three strands of evidence to support this: quotations from experts, multipolarity as measured by economic power, and multipolarity as measured by military power.


COUNTER: Cold war was bipolar agreed, but PRO disagrees with the Argument made by CON on the pretext of this fact. Only Cold war was bi-polar not the entire world. Yes the world was divided in two fractions NATO and Warsaw Pact , and it was clear that the victor would emerge as a global dominating fractions, but other countries and their own seperate interests always existed. 


PROOF: Non Aligned Movement

Never was the world during the cold war years a bi-polar system and thus using the political affairs and situations of current world which was the same during the Cold war period (strictly speaking only in terms of bipolarity/multipolarity)is ethically wrong.There were countries in 1950s who had recently gained freedom from colonial powers and no intention of getting involved in with any of the superpowers and only wanted to tend to their own affairs. In short those countries valued their sovereignty which would be violated had they sided with either of the sides. Non- aligned movement was active from the beginning of the Cold War and is still active to date, with 120 countries as members and 17 observer countries. Out of 195 countries today 120 are members giving sufficient credence to PRO that the world during cold war was not a bi-polar but multipolar. Also PRO fails to understand how multipolar world would come in the way of a bi-polar contention between China and USA already highlighted in the point of South China Sea.Nevertheless there were  lot of conflicts with either of powers non been directly involved, sufficiently the world was never bipolar. 

1. Wars between Israel and Arab countries. (Independence and 1967)
2.Falklands Wars (1982)
3.Conflicts of India and Pakistan (1949,1965,1971)

Thus all arguments made by CON about economic and military power are now moot since all were based on bipolarity. 

Thus the argument that the cold war was bi- polar fails and so does CON's main argument against "new cold war". CON helpfully makes PRO's point already mentioned in R1, of that of enmity and Ideological contest, PRO will further add Nuclear deterrence to make his point irrefutable. 

Nuclear Deterrence: A major role of cold war to have never been gone to stages of all out warfare but rather been limited to a series of proxy wars like Korean war, Vietnam war, Soviet-Afghan War war only because of the vast nuclear arsenal of both the blocks contesting for world supremacy, with nuclear warheads in range of 30,000 per side, kept breakout of war out of the question. Neither CON nor PRO has contested this point so if can be safely concluded that it is neither side's take that there is a possibility of all out warfare between China and USA. 

Futher Contentions: 

Economic interdependence - 

As Heath and Thompson point out, “China’s economy is also far more integrated with the U.S. economy (and, again, vice versa) than was ever the case in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.” (pg. 114) Because of this, Joseph Nye observes, we can expect an additional reason for the United States and China to restrain their hostile tendencies. Tonnesson similarly predicts that economic interdependence will deter war between the two great powers.

To put it simply: because the US and China are economically interdependent in a way the US and Soviet Union never were, there is an additional motivation for moderation and cooperation in the US-Sino relationship that the US-Soviet relationship lacked.
CONTENTION: PRO has already covered in the 2018 trade dispute in R1. Still would further state that  trade deficit of 350 billion in favour of China has USA still worried and the situation would only worse and interdependence of economies will decrease. 


Combating climate change - 

CSIS has called China “a strategic partner” for the US in the fight against climate change. Given that the two countries are the greatest emitters of greenhouse gases, it should not be surprising the US and China have taken a cooperative leadership stance by jointly labeled climate change “one of the greatest threats facing humanity,” requiring the US and China “to work constructively together for the common good.” Both the United States and China can expect to suffer from climate change, thus, we can expect the two countries to cooperate in combating this transnational issue throughout the century.

In sum, we can expect the US-China relationship to be more one of rivalry than the US-Soviet relationship, which was closer to enmity. Whereas the Cold War featured an enduring and zero-sum struggle for global dominance, we can reasonably assume the United States and China will be forced to moderate their hostility in order to cooperate on certain important shared objectives, such as protecting their economic well-being and combating climate change. Basically, the US and China will be competitors and partners. Thus, the term “New Cold War” is not warranted.
CONTENTION: This point is of no significance to this debate, had either side any contention of keeping Climate change in mind ; the West( Canada and USA) would not be struggling with a garbage problem and a agreement would have been realized by now. 

Explanation: For decades China used to recycle electronic and other forms of waste of the West and re-integrate the raw materials in it's production plants , but recently after Chinese refusal to continue this work a lot of electronic and other wastes are just been stockpiled in the West with those countries having no or little means of economically recycling the waste and since no other country can match the production capacity of China, this waste is just been stockpiled. PRO has clearly demonstrated that neither China nor USA cares about Climate Change( in context of global dominance only). More than evident from the withdrawal of USA from Paris Climate Change Accord. 

All arguments presented in the BOP mentioned by PRO in R1 are carried forward, PRO look forward to rebuttals of CON from R2. 

Summary: The context of bipolarity that CON has based his argument on has been refuted and disproved by PRO. PRO further states that the South China conflict, 2018 trade dispute, North Korean aggression, and  increase in Chinese defense expenditure will some main factors in the launch of a New Cold War in the 21 st century. 
Con
Unfortunately, it appears this debate will turn on how "New Cold War" ought to be defined. This could have been avoided if Pro had provided definitions in the debate description. Of course, I share a significant part of the blame too, since I should have asked him to provide a definition before I accepted the challenge.

In my view, the debate turns on three key questions at this point:

  1. How ought we define "New Cold War"? That is, what standard should forecasted US-Sino relations have to meet to qualify as a New Cold War?
  2. Was the world of the Cold War a bipolar system?
  3. Will enmity or rivalry more accurately describe US-Sino relations?
Question 1 relates to our definition clash. In addressing this question, I will demonstrate why we ought to prefer my definition of New Cold War over my opponent's definition.

Questions 2 and 3 are a key follow-up to my provided definition. Pro has contested the idea that the US-USSR Cold War was a bipolar affair. If he's right, my contention that US-Sino relations will differ from US-Soviet relations on bipolarity/multipolarity grounds fails. Therefore, I need to defend against this idea. Similarly, Pro pushed back against my arguments for why US-Sino relations will be better characterized by rivalry than enmity. I need to defend against this, too.

Assuming I can defend myself on these key points, my R1 argument will remain intact.

Defining "New Cold War"
My opponent and I have offered two competing definitions of New Cold War. I believe this is a critical element of the debate, and could easily decide the winner.

Here is my opponent's definition: "a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare"

Here is my definition: "for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified."

For the sake of brevity, we can condense these two definitions into simple phrases. My opponent's proposed standard is Hostility Short of War, whereas my proposed standard is Highly Similar. I believe my standard ought to be preferred, for two reasons, which I will now present.

#1: The Purpose of Classification is Precision
Ultimately, this is a debate over how to classify US-Sino relations. But why should we give a damn about classification at all? As is the case with language in general, the purpose of classification is to precisely convey information. The clearer and more precise a classification is, the more valuable it is. For example, if someone asks you how hot it is outside, and you simply reply "hot," that would be less precise and useful than if you said "90 degrees!" As a classification becomes more precise, it becomes better at serving its purpose: conveying information.

On the metric of precision, Pro's standard is inferior to my standard. Pro defines New Cold War as political hostility short of open war. This is a horrendously imprecise definition, as the US and China both have many relationships with other countries that could fall under this definition. A few examples that should be uncontroversial:
  • US and Iran
  • US and North Korea
  • US and Russia
  • China and South Korea
  • China and India
  • China and Taiwan
I'm sure we could go on and on. The point is, Hostility Short of War is not a good definition, because it fails to describe the phenomenon in precise terms.

Meanwhile, my "Highly Similar" standard does require precision. Under my definition, for US-China relations to be considered a "New Cold War," said relations should be very similar to relations between the US and Soviet Union during the 20th century Cold War. If said relations were not very similar, revival of the term would be misleading and unjustified. Obviously, the two relationships do not need to be identical. As I made clear in my R1, I simply think they should share core attributes in order to merit revival of the term Cold War.

My definition of New Cold War is narrow and precise, whereas my opponent's is broad and vague. As such, we ought to prefer my classification standard.

#2: The Importance of Terminology with Respect to US-Sino Relations
Not only do classifications in general require specificity, but how we define US-Sino relations most definitely demands specificity. As Melvyn Leffler states with regard to reviving the phrase "Cold War": "However tempting the analogy might be as China’s influence and military strength grow, invoking it now is profoundly wrong." If we allow ourselves to think we're headed into a Cold War, we just might create one that would threaten to undermine important areas of cooperation between the US and China, including "halting climate change, fighting terrorists, and combating pandemics."

The words we use to describe US-China relations can have a self-fulfilling effect. If we convince ourselves a Cold War is coming, we are likely to adopt hostile policies that will provoke increasingly hostile relations. This would be unwise, as "the potential gains from greater tensions with China are not proportional to the risks. The risks, in fact, are much greater because the economic costs of a falling-out with China are so much greater than they were with the Soviet Union in the 1940s." The words we choose to describe US-Sino relations will help shape those relations. Thus, we need to be precise and careful with the words we choose. There is a real risk of screwing things up by lazily invoking a Cold War analogy that is inaccurate.

For the above reasons, I believe voters ought to prefer my standard for "New Cold War."

The Polarity of the Cold War
In my R1, I argued the Cold War world was bipolar while the modern world is multipolar, thus differentiating US-Soviet relations from US-Sino relations. Pro countered by claiming that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rendered the Cold War world multipolar, thus removing any difference from US-Soviet and US-Sino relations. Pro's argument, which is tantamount to calling NAM a pole, is overstated. In my view, NAM was not strong enough, focused enough, or centralized enough to be dubbed a pole. Thus, the Cold War world is left with only two poles, the US and Soviet Union.

Firstly, what is a pole in international relations? Scholars have debated this endlessly, but I think a simple definition will suffice for us laymen: A pole is a major center of power in international relations. The three key words here are power, major, and center. All states wield some power, but not all states wield major power. A group of states together may wield major power, but if they don't wield it in a sufficiently coordinated way, their power can hardly be considered a center of power.

Obviously, the US and Soviet Union were poles during the Cold War. But was NAM?

The Nuclear Threat Initiative describes NAM thus:
Created in 1961, NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers.”
NAM also expected the following of its member states:
  • The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
  • If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
  • If it has conceded military bases to a Foreign Power the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.
In other words, NAM wanted to provide a third way for its members. Rather than join the Cold War between capitalism and communism, NAM wanted to remain non-aligned. How successful was NAM at achieving non-alignment? Max Fisher, writing for the Altantic, says NAM "was rarely what it claimed to be even during the Cold War," given that "a number of members took sides in the proxy conflict." I concur, and would like to offer a few salient examples.

North Korea
Cuba
  • Joined NAM in 1961
  • Literally hosted Soviet nuclear weapons as part of the Cold War's most serious crisis
Pakistan
  • Joined NAM in 1979
  • Was instrumental in CIA support for Mujaheddin resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (source, 92-93)
  • Was a member of SEATO, a US instrument of containment policy
Saudi Arabia
  • Joined NAM in 1961
  • Wikipedia notes the US and Saudis "allied in opposition to Communism, in support of stable oil prices, stability in the oil fields and oil shipping of the Persian Gulf, and stability in the economies of Western countries where Saudis have invested. In particular the two countries were allies against the Soviets in Afghanistan."
I could go on, but I think my point has been made. Members of NAM might have liked to claim they were part of a third way, or an alternative to the Cold War, but in reality, quite a few NAM members were clearly partaking in the East-West global conflict. As such, NAM can hardly be considered a major center of power in international relations. If it lacks the coordination and authority to prevent its members from blatantly violating its stated principles, it's not much a force to be reckoned with. As such, NAM poses no obstacle to scholars like Aleksandër Moisiu, Odd Arne Westad, or Goedele De Keersmaeker from viewing the Cold War world as bipolar.

Enmity or Rivalry?
In my R1, I argued that US-Soviet relations were closer to enmity than we can expect US-Sino relations to be. Instead, I argued that US-China relations will more closely resemble rivalry - that is to say, hostility moderated by the necessity for cooperation on key issues. Pro did not explicitly respond to this contention, but by attacking my points about economic interdependence and climate change, he effectively attempted to negate the possibility that the United States and China will find it necessary to cooperate on important issues.

Defending Economic Interdependence
Pro says the following about my interdependence point:
PRO has already covered in the 2018 trade dispute in R1. Still would further state that  trade deficit of 350 billion in favour of China has USA still worried and the situation would only worse and interdependence of economies will decrease. 
It is valid to point out current trade disputes between the US and China. However, I think my opponent is trying to stretch this observation farther than it can really go. Pro argues in his R1 that "This trade war is here to stay as... both major parties in US agree on it." It is true that economic hawkishness is in vogue in US politics, but that does not mean trade wars are necessarily a permanent feature of US-China relations from here on out. It simply means that the US is motivated to limit what it views as unfair trade practices on China's part. It is quite possible that the trade disputes will calm down as the US and China eventually reach a negotiated solution.

More importantly, trade disputes can't undo the fundamental fact of economic interdependence. Because US-China economic interdependence is so deep, decoupling would be "like carrying out a difficult surgical operation," write Farrell and Newman. They call the Chinese economy "not a discrete organism that can easily be separated from the global economy but rather a Siamese twin, connected by nervous tissue, common organs, and a shared circulatory system." Thus, they conclude:
it will be impossible to fully separate the U.S. and Chinese economies—and still more so to cut the U.S. economy adrift from the world. Every U.S. action toward China—offensive or defensive—will therefore continue to produce a Chinese reaction that is felt by the United States. 
To put it simply: US-China economic interdependence is fundamentally unchangeable - our economies are simply too deeply interwoven to be extricated from one another. This mutual dependence will create mutual incentives for moderation of hostilities in the future (a point I also made, with some sources as support, in R1).

Defending Mutual Interest in Combating Climate Change
To my surprise, my opponent claimed in his R2 that climate change "is of no significance to this debate." I had hoped that the United States' and China's mutual interest in mitigating the worst effects of global climate change would have been obvious and uncontroversial, but apparently not. To argue that the two have no interest in combating climate change, my opponent offered two points:
  • China stopped recycling the West's junk, and the West just let the stuff pile up (I should note my opponent did not provide a source for this)
  • The US pulled out of the Paris Accords
Both points are weak. China has clearly been a leader in the fight against climate change, and may further strengthen that leadership position. Climate change poses a serious long-term threat to China, including the possibility of widespread glacier melting, massive loss of biodiversity, and an increase in destructive natural disasters. Unsurprisingly, Xi Jinping has called the Paris Accords "a milestone in the history of climate governance," one that must be upheld.

Speaking of the Paris Accords, the fact that Trump pulled us out doesn't mean the US won't have a significant strategic interest in cooperating with China on climate change in the future. American interests outlast whoever is in office, and a political consensus around climate change is growing in the US. Contrary to popular perceptions, former Secretary of State Jim Baker, himself a Republican, notes that Republican Congressional leadership has "started to signal that the era of climate denialism is over. Representative Kevin McCarthy of California, the House minority leader, has warned that the GOP ignores the climate issue at its own peril, and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate majority leader, recently emphasized that the Republican Party needs climate solutions of its own." This phenomenon is not limited to political elites, either. The Pew Research Center has found strong public opinion majorities in support of strong action on climate change. For example: "Two-thirds of U.S. adults say the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of global climate change."

My point here is that both countries have a clear and well-articulated interest in combating climate change. I have presented evidence, supported by sources, both in R1 and this round, to substantiate this claim. It's my hope that we can stop debating the obvious and just accept that US-China relations will continue to feature a common interest in combating climate change.

Conclusion
I have written a lot this round, and I'm grateful to those voters who have stuck with us up to this point. I have done the following:
  • Defended my definition of "New Cold War" as compared to Pro's definition
  • Defended my contention that the Cold War was bipolar whereas US-Sino relations will take place in a multipolar world
  • Defended my contention that US-Chinese economic interdependence is unlikely to go away, and thus constitutes a significant difference between US-Soviet and US-Sino relations
  • Defended my contention that the US and China have a significant shared interest in combating climate change, which will serve as a source of moderation on the overall hostility level of the relationship
In so doing, I have upheld the argument I presented in R1:
  • To use the term "New Cold War," US-Sino relations ought to be highly similar to US-Soviet relations
  • US-Sino relations will not be highly similar to US-Soviet relations, because 1) the United States and China will compete in a multipolar, rather than bipolar world 2) Due to several areas of mutual interest and cooperation, US-Sino relations will be closer to rivalry (moderated hostility) than to enmity (extreme hostility), thus distinguishing US-Sino relations from US-Soviet relations yet again
  • As such, revival of the term "Cold War" is not appropriate in the context of 21st century relations between the United States and China

Round 3
Pro
thanks, there has been a conflict on definitions,
Original definition given by PRO:
 a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare.
Definition given by CON:
“New Cold War” - Being clear about what this means is critical. Since my opponent called this cold war “new,” it is reasonable to assume he is alluding to the US-USSR Cold War. Thus, we ought to expect this so-called New Cold War would bear great similarities to the Old Cold War, or else calling it a Cold War wouldn’t make much sense. In other words, for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified.
PRO's contention:PRO is fine by the above definition given by PRO because it covers the cold war period of the world in a broad sense, just like we can cover car by describing it as a 4-wheeler typically with 4 wheels powered by an engine to cover a small number of people, but if we have compare the cars or say aeroplanes from what they began as and what they are now, there are hardly any similarities apart from the broad definition. PRO has objection to usage of the term" highly similar" in this definition. The objection has been explained in the analogy mentioned above, if CON wants to contest definition further, please intimate by doing so in R2. PRO feels the definition given by PRO is sufficient enough for the debate. 

CON's contention:
Ultimately, this is a debate over how to classify US-Sino relations. But why should we give a damn about classification at all? As is the case with language in general, the purpose of classification is to precisely convey information. The clearer and more precise a classification is, the more valuable it is. For example, if someone asks you how hot it is outside, and you simply reply "hot," that would be less precise and useful than if you said "90 degrees!" As a classification becomes more precise, it becomes better at serving its purpose: conveying information.

On the metric of precision, Pro's standard is inferior to my standard. Pro defines New Cold War as political hostility short of open war. This is a horrendously imprecise definition, as the US and China both have many relationships with other countries that could fall under this definition. A few examples that should be uncontroversial:
  • US and Iran
  • US and North Korea
  • US and Russia
  • China and South Korea
  • China and India
  • China and Taiwan
I'm sure we could go on and on. The point is, Hostility Short of War is not a good definition, because it fails to describe the phenomenon in precise terms.

Meanwhile, my "Highly Similar" standard does require precision. Under my definition, for US-China relations to be considered a "New Cold War," said relations should be very similar to relations between the US and Soviet Union during the 20th century Cold War. If said relations were not very similar, revival of the term would be misleading and unjustified. Obviously, the two relationships do not need to be identical. As I made clear in my R1, I simply think they should share core attributes in order to merit revival of the term Cold War.

My definition of New Cold War is narrow and precise, whereas my opponent's is broad and vague. As such, we ought to prefer my classification standard.
Explanation: PRO feels PRO and CON are not far of on agreement on definitions some terminology, definitions apart in arguments PRO and CON seem to be contesting between 
PRO: advocating for change and progression in the world and how the cold war and the new proposed cold war will  be similar, so as to justify the revival of the term but also to accomodate the changes in the world technology and politics. (already explained with the car and aeroplane analogy)
CON:advocating against high similarities between cold war and Us-Sino relations so as to justify the the revival of the term. 

The solution will be easy, if voters feel PRO's side to be accurate they will vote for PRO otherwise for CON. Thus essentially merit of arguments over a terminology fight. To win the debate PRO must safistactorily advocate for his side, CON must do the same for his sake.[both mentioned above]

PRO feels this stand to be enough for debate's sake and addressal of the definitions dilemma for both's sides sake and both PRO and CON can then focus on arguments rather than definitions . If the explanation is to CON's satisfaction he can drop the contentions on defintions dilemma, if he further wishes to contest he can let PRO know in R3.

ARGUMENTS: 
1.R1:CON states bipolarity as a reason to justify revival of cold war terminology.
R2: PRO states because of NAM the world was never bi-polar. 
R2 contention:states NAM was not centralized to co-ordinate and termed as a pole.
R3: CON has indulged in self contradiction. 

Self- contradiction
CON's own definition:Created in 1961, NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers.
then CON states:In my view, NAM was not strong enough, focused enough, or centralized enough to be dubbed a pole.

Why would an organization be centralized and focused if their original goal was that member nations cater to their own self interest without giving in their sovereignty to the great powers. Centralization is detrimental to sovereignty of  a state as it encourages other country poking their nose in the internal affairs of a country. NATO and Warsaw pact were centralized, the great powers often interfered in the affairs of the member nations. CON is contradicting his own definition.


CON's arguments are tantamount to saying in a boxing max of 2 opponents , NAM's needs to be a third person able to match the original 2 opponents to be called a pole. 
In reality, NAM was the ideology that can be elucidated as, the boxers fight , die , or scratch each other the third person does not want to be associated with their fight in any way whatsoever. PRO has already mentioned several major conflicts that had nothing to do with great powers rendering the world multipolar. 
1. Wars between Israel and Arab countries. (Independence and 1967)
2.Falklands Wars (1982)
3.Conflicts of India and Pakistan (1949,1965,1971)
PRO will use the India-Pakistan war 1971, that let alone other members only one member state was capable of wielding major power. 
More than 1.5 million troops took part in the war, with India fielding more than 1 million troops alone, this war saw aircraft carrier action, dog fights, naval warfare and saw no direct involvement of great powers

NAM stood for a means for nations to say collectively NO to great powers. Every coin has two sides, naming a few examples already mentioned as bad examples is not the way to define a movement. Exceptions are not examples
North Korea: rough nation
Cuba: in December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan's civil war. At the time, Afghanistan was also an active member of the Nonaligned Movement. At the United Nations, Nonaligned members voted 56 to 9, with 26 abstaining, to condemn the Soviet Union. Cuba in fact was deeply in debt financially and politically to Moscow and voted against the resolution. It lost its reputation as nonaligned in the Cold War. Castro, instead of becoming a high-profile spokesman for the Movement, remained quiet and inactive, and in 1983 leadership passed to India, which had abstained on the UN vote.
Pakistan: Joined NAM after its alliance with US did not help in its two humiliating defeats  to India in 1965 and 1971. Also can be categorized as a rough nation with unstable government susceptible to coups.
Saudi Arabia: Redundant answer still, at the time, Afghanistan was also an active member of the Nonaligned Movement. At the United Nations, Nonaligned members voted 56 to 9, with 26 abstaining, to condemn the Soviet Union.

Instead of portraying the collective achievement of NAM , CON has resorted to knit-picking and trying to find rotten spots. To substantiate, CON must decisively prove that NAM as an organization sided with a major power. 
Wikipedia's take:  the movement still maintained cohesion throughout the Cold War, even despite several conflicts between members which also threatened the movement.

NAM fulfilled its objectives: 
  • Helped member nations have their own say without interference from USA or USSR.
  • Helped ward off interference of great powers in internal matters of a country. 
  • Provided a third way, and helped members act in their own self interest rather than that of USA or USSR.
All arguments made by CON for bipolarity have been refuted. 

2.Economic factor: 
CON contests 2018 trade dispute by stating :
More importantly, trade disputes can't undo the fundamental fact of economic interdependence. Because US-China economic interdependence is so deep, decoupling would be "like carrying out a difficult surgical operation," write Farrell and Newman. They call the Chinese economy "not a discrete organism that can easily be separated from the global economy but rather a Siamese twin, connected by nervous tissue, common organs, and a shared circulatory system." Thus, they conclude:
it will be impossible to fully separate the U.S. and Chinese economies—and still more so to cut the U.S. economy adrift from the world. Every U.S. action toward China—offensive or defensive—will therefore continue to produce a Chinese reaction that is felt by the United States. 

CON has not directly refuted points stated by CON about the leaderships and their dispositions on the 2018 trade dispute rather provided with an opinion on the topic. Farell and Newman have no relevance to the topic neither can be considered as  a credible source. Firstly because they dont hold an official office in US government and secondly they dont hold an official office in the Chinese government. When the governments are under talk, what a firm or any source has to say about it is irrelevant, for other countries, if any intimation has to be done about the topic the external affairs office of that government should have done it by  had they felt the need to do it, any other source has no credence as it is not official. When we are talking about countries, firms are not reliable sources. Neither does anyone care about what they have to say, will the US government ask Goldman Sachs about their economic policy?

Further Contention:
To put it simply: US-China economic interdependence is fundamentally unchangeable - our economies are simply too deeply interwoven to be extricated from one another. This mutual dependence will create mutual incentives for moderation of hostilities in the future (a point I also made, with some sources as support, in R1).
This so called interdependence has not stopped the South China Sea conflict to worsen, CON has been mute on the point. 
PRO's point in R1
Chinese military and US military have come very close to conflict like situations in South China Sea.

In 2020, the US took a series of measures to contain China, on topics including COVID-19, Hong Kong, Taiwan, high-tech and the military. Recently, US warships have repeatedly trespassed into Chinese territorial waters around the Xisha and Nansha islands, conducted operations in the South China Sea and crossed the Taiwan Straits. In a rare move, it has deployed three aircraft carriers to the region.[1]

On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable.[2]

How does CON explain a 100 percent increase in sorties and three aircraft carriers in the sensitive region? To top it increase in US navy's presence. US's navy does not have such presence in Indian Ocean does not even bother to enter, if not a military drills with India and Japan. This is a striking similarity to the Pacific Ocean region situation during the Cold War. 

3. CON has been mute about projected increase in Chinese defense expenditure yet again a  striking similarity between Cold war and the proposed new Cold war. 
PRO's argument in R1
Chinese Defense expenditure is expected to touch upwards of 700 million USD  by the 2030s and the US at 1.3 Trillion. With Goldman Sachs estimating Chinese's economy crossing the US economy by 2027[6]. With the huge increase in defense expenditure by China the region will only destabilize with all countries neighbouring China fearing unilateral aggression by China. Which has already happened in Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Western intervention would become inevitable, as previously seen when Kuwait was invaded by forces of Saddam Hussein. 
4. CON has been mute about the interest of US allies in the region, both of whom are actively threatened by China and its puppet North Korea, US has to go to war if needed , such are the terms of US presence in South Korea and Japan. CON has not addressed the point how active Chinese and North Korean testing of weaponry has raised concerned in these two countries. 

5. PRO will maintain climate change is irrelevant to the topic 
China stopped recycling the West's junk, and the West just let the stuff pile up
By PRO's own definition since governments are involved, other sources hold little or no credence. Here are some sources with people holding offices or having private contracts of recycling waste from US agencies. 
NOTE: all of the reports have first hand accounts of people associated with this work in US.

Speaking of the Paris Accords, the fact that Trump pulled us out doesn't mean the US won't have a significant strategic interest in cooperating with China on climate change in the future. American interests outlast whoever is in office, and a political consensus around climate change is growing in the US. Contrary to popular perceptions, former Secretary of State Jim Baker, himself a Republican, notes that Republican Congressional leadership has "started to signal that the era of climate denialism is over. Representative Kevin McCarthy of California, the House minority leader, has warned that the GOP ignores the climate issue at its own peril, and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate majority leader, recently emphasized that the Republican Party needs climate solutions of its own." This phenomenon is not limited to political elites, either. The Pew Research Center has found strong public opinion majorities in support of strong action on climate change. For example: "Two-thirds of U.S. adults say the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of global climate change."

CONTENTION: Again irrelevant, why will anyone viewing it from a global perspective take into credence anything other than the what  President of the USA does . Is is not correct that he is the leader of the nation just like Prime Minister of India is leader of my nation. President/Prime ministers denote the official stand of a country when it comes to international accounts. Whatever politicians of the country say are internal politics of the country, cannot be held into account when bringing a country into question. Official stand of USA is out of Paris Climate Change accord, that cannot change until US government position on the matter changes. 

CONCLUSION: Striking resemblances between cold war and US-China relations have been stated in forms of Military conflict, Economic Conflict,Rise in military expenditure, use of proxy nations to fuel conflict(North Korea) and lastly Nuclear Deterrence(covered in R2). Arguments of bipolarity and climate change have been refuted, successfully. 

Con
In this round, I proceed as follows: I begin by addressing some miscellaneous points (the "Re:" sections). I then address two main points: the Cold War's polarity and reasons why US-China relationship will best be characterized as rivalry rather than enmity. By the end of the round, I believe all my arguments will be in good standing. I will have maintained the superiority of my "New Cold War" definition and I will have maintained my case for why US-China relations will not be similar enough to US-Soviet relations to justify revival of the phrase.

Side note: to my pleasant surprise, this morning I found another article, this one recently published in the Washington Post, that argues against reviving the term Cold War. Many of the points I make are echoed in the article. If anyone is interested in reading, here it is.

Re: Definition
My opponent has tried to defuse the definition dispute by claiming our competing standards are in fact similar enough that we should instead focus on other matters. Unfortunately, I must disagree. Our proposed standards for what constitutes a "New Cold War" are very different. Pro has argued that any hostilities short of open war should be considered a New Cold War, whereas I have suggested a New Cold War ought to be highly similar to the previous one. I have already offered two reasons why voters ought to prefer my definition over Pro's, and I have seen no attempt by Pro to rebuttal those reasons. Thus, I have nothing more to say on this subject, for now at least.

Re: "Self-Contradiction"
According to my opponent, I engaged in "self-contradiction" when discussing NAM.
CON's own definition:Created in 1961, NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers.
then CON states:In my view, NAM was not strong enough, focused enough, or centralized enough to be dubbed a pole.

Why would an organization be centralized and focused if their original goal was that member nations cater to their own self interest without giving in their sovereignty to the great powers.
I presume my opponent is trying to say that NAM, as I have defined it, simply cannot be expected to be centralized, thus, how can I complain about its lack of centralization? I'm not sure my opponent is correct here, but frankly, this is beside the point. If my opponent agrees that NAM isn't sufficiently centralized to control its members very well, Pro cannot claim NAM constituted a third pole during the Cold War. The real question is: was NAM sufficiently influential and organized to constitute a third pole? I will address this question later in the round.

Re: South China Sea and Defense Expenditures
My opponent said I've been "mute" on the subject of the South China Sea and Rising Defense Expenditures, as if these were devastating facts that I simply had no way of addressing. To be clear, I do not dispute the fact that the US and China are experiencing rising tensions in the South China Sea, nor do I dispute the fact of rising defense spending. I don't dispute these facts because they don't hurt my case at all. As I said in R1:
Certainly, there are reasons for the United States and China to clash. I’m sure my opponent will do a good job of identifying all of the present and potential sources of conflict between America and China. For my part, I will focus on reasons we can expect US-China conflict to be of a less serious degree than US-Soviet conflict.
Part of my argument is that US-Soviet relations were much closer to enmity than US-Sino relations will be. US-Sino relations will be more accurately characterized as rivalry because there will be sources of competition (e.g. South China Sea) and sources of cooperation (e.g. economic interdependence and climate change).

Continuing Dispute over Polarity of Cold War
Pro has continued to dispute the bipolarity of the Cold War. This dispute takes two forms: NAM and wars that supposedly didn't involve the superpowers. I will address each in this section.

NAM: Am I Nit-Picking?
My opponent accuses me of nit-picking, of using exceptions as examples. To reiterate, I have argued that NAM was not powerful enough/coordinated enough to constitute a third pole. As evidence of this, I used both expert sources and my own examples of NAM states taking part in the East-West Cold War. In the case of the latter, my opponent says I have identified exceptions to the rule, rather than examples of the rule. So, the question stands, how effective was NAM at building a non-aligned bloc - a true third Cold War pole?

In answering this question, we are faced with the limitations of the debate format. I do not have the time or space to conduct a thorough review of the behavior of all NAM states during the Cold War. For this reason, I will limit myself to offering three points in my defense on this subject:
1) In R2, I cited multiple expert sources that either a) directly criticized NAM's efficacy as an organizer of a neutral Cold War bloc, or b) indirectly discounted NAM by stating authoritatively that the Cold War was bipolar
2) I have offered four examples to illustrate NAM's non-pole status (North Korea, Cuba, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia)
3) My opponent hasn't provided any affirmative evidence in his favor. That is to say, he has not provided evidence that NAM acted as a third bloc - a third pole in the Cold War. He has merely accused me of nit-picking. This is particularly damaging for Pro's case because the burden of proof rests with him.

For these reasons, I believe voters ought to conclude - at least for now - that the Cold War is best understood as bipolar. NAM was not influential enough to consider it a third pole during the Cold War.

Wars that Supposedly Didn't Involve the Superpowers
Pro argues that since some wars occurred that didn't involve the US or Soviet Union, the Cold War was by definition multipolar. I am going to address each of his examples individually, but I should first point out that even if some wars were fought that didn't involve the superpowers in some way, that doesn't mean the Cold War wasn't bipolar. Bipolarity does not mean there are only two actors in the system. Bipolarity simply means there are only two predominantly powerful actors in the system. Thus, bipolarity doesn't preclude minor wars being fought outside the sphere of superpower competition. Nor does it preclude smaller states from having their own interests independent of superpower competition.

Anyway, on to the examples.

  • Arab-Israel Wars - My opponent does not go into any detail to justify his claim that these wars were free from superpower influence. However, it is quite plain that the US and Soviet Union were always involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, the US and Soviets armed their proxies in the region and even went to the brink of nuclear war (October DEFCON 3 alert) to defend their interests in the region.
  • Falklands War - I found no evidence of superpower involvement in this conflict, but it could hardly be considered a "major conflict," as my opponent described his examples. Military operations lasted about 10 weeks and less than 1,000 people died. As I stated in the previous paragraph, minor wars can happen between non-superpowers in a bipolar system. The superpowers aren't the only actors in the system, they are just the most important ones.
  • Indo-Pak Wars - It's quite easy to demonstrate that the US and Soviet Union were involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1971 war, the US attempted to preserve its nascent rapprochement with China by going easy on Pakistan ("The Tilt," as it was known).
In summation: most of my opponent's examples actually support my point that the US and Soviet Union were the world's two superpowers. Furthermore, even if one can identify a minor war that did not concern the superpowers, that doesn't disprove the fact of bipolarity.

"That is Irrelevant" - Economic Interdependence and Climate Change
Multiple times throughout this debate, Pro has tried to defend against my arguments by declaring my sources irrelevant in some way or other. To my understanding, this typically revolves around that source's non-governmental nature. For example, when I cited an expert opinion on US-China economic interdependence, he said that analysis was irrelevant because the analysts didn't hold government office.

Similarly, my opponent tried to disqualify statements from former SecState Jim Baker, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell with respect to climate change. To my understanding, Pro's logic is that only the position of the President can be taken as the country's position. There is some truth to this, but this tactic doesn't get one very far in this particular debate.

This debate calls on us to forecast US-Sino relations for the 21st century. Obviously, President Trump won't be President for the majority of the 21st century. Indeed, we can't know who the Presidents of the US or China will be for the majority of the century. Thus, my opponent's implicit standard - that we can't rely on any source but the highest elected officials - is simply untenable. If we're going to forecast future relations between the United States and China, we need to assess fundamental elements of that relationship. This requires us to analyze each country's enduring interests, the nature of their economic interdependence, and more. To do these things, we should turn to experts - both inside and outside the government.

Thus, if I turn to an article written by economists that says US-China economic interdependence is an immutable fact, that should be considered a legitimate source. If I turn to quotes from US political elites and data from the Pew Research Center to show that the US will care about climate change for the foreseeable future, that should be considered legitimate.

Assuming voters agree with me, then my contentions about climate change and economic interdependence should still stand, since all my opponent did to refute these points was to claim my sources were invalid. If this is the case, the basic structure of my argument should still stand as well.

Conclusion
In my view, the following contentions still stand:
  1. My "Highly Similar" standard ought to be the one we apply to the definition of "New Cold War"
  2. US-China relations will not be highly similar to US-Soviet relations, because 1) US-China relations will best be characterized by rivalry whereas US-Soviet relations were much closer to enmity, and 2) US-Soviet relations were conducted in a bipolar world while US-China relations will be conducted in a multipolar world
  3. Thus, use of the term "New Cold War" is not justified in forecasting US-Sino relations
Round 4
Pro
Definitions Dilemma: Since CON has refused to make peace on the subject, PRO will refute will full force. PRO has no problem with his definition being called "horrendously imprecise definition" because, precision is not desirable,accuracy is. Precision only means how close or conforming the scenarios are without any regard to closeness of the actual scenario and the factual or correct scenario, whereas accuracy means how close is the to the actual thing( Basic 11 th standard physics) .To elucidate with CON's own example, temp outside is = 95F 
CON states 5 times  -56,56,56,56,56 (these are precise not accurate) 
PRO states -93,94,95,96,97(these are accurate not precise) 
Here is a source to back it up.

accuracy >precision. 
Here are further sources stating similar definition to PRO, 

PRO's definition: a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare.

Encyclopaedia Britannica :The Cold War was waged on political, economic, and propaganda fronts and had only limited recourse to weapons.
Dictionary.com :intense economic, political, military, and ideological rivalry between nations, short of military conflict; sustained hostile political policies and an atmosphere of strain between opposed countries.
Cambridge dictionarystate of extreme unfriendliness existing between countriesespecially countries with opposing political systems, that expresses itself not through fighting but through political pressure and threats
The Sun :A cold war is a state of conflict between two nations that does not involve direct military action.
The conflict is primarily pursued through economic and political actions, including propaganda, espionage and proxy wars, where countries at war rely on others to fight their battles.
Merriam Webster:a condition of rivalry, mistrust, and often open hostility short of violence especially between power groups (such as labor and management).

Hereby PRO claims his definition is more accurate, since CON claims precision PRO doesnot mind it at all since accuracy> precision

PRO will go on to prove further similarities of his case: 

BIPOLARITY ISSUE: 

I presume my opponent is trying to say that NAM, as I have defined it, simply cannot be expected to be centralized, thus, how can I complain about its lack of centralization? I'm not sure my opponent is correct here, but frankly, this is beside the point. If my opponent agrees that NAM isn't sufficiently centralized to control its members very well, Pro cannot claim NAM constituted a third pole during the Cold War. The real question is: was NAM sufficiently influential and organized to constitute a third pole? I will address this question later in the round.

1. CON admits to Self-Contradiction, VOTERS must take note of it, nextly PRO is note presuming NAM to be a third but the existence of many other unaligned and meaningful poles less in magnitude but still noticeable. An analogy might help, gravitational fields of Jupiter and Saturn would be the greatest 2 among the planets of the Solar system, does not mean gravitational field of other planets do not exist. If scientist try sending a probe into space with putting only Jupiters and Saturn gravitional fields into account, the probe will definitely crash. Every planet's gravitational field needs to be accounted for Same as for polarity every nation's sphere of influence needs to be accounted for.

I have already stated my opponent has knit-picked some rotten spots, and demonstrated how NAM as a body was against the actions of those rotten spots. 
Afghanistan was also an active member of the Nonaligned Movement. At the United Nations, Nonaligned members voted 56 to 9, with 26 abstaining, to condemn the Soviet Union.

1) In R2, I cited multiple expert sources that either a) directly criticized NAM's efficacy as an organizer of a neutral Cold War bloc, or b) indirectly discounted NAM by stating authoritatively that the Cold War was bipolar
Only by CON's standards have I seen people with zero ground or field level understanding of scenarios writing about distant lands having never visited or surveyed them being deemed experts, here is expert CON relies on :
Max Fisher is an American journalist and columnist based in Washington, D.C. in the field of political science and social science. He writes for The Washington PostThe New York Times, and Vox.
Has he visited any NAM country himself? 
Does he hold a P.hd in given field that anyone should give him any credence? 
Has he formally interviewed any person of the era, collected data or cited studies to back his arguments up ? If he has not done he is no different from PRO or CON in this debate.
Here is the article CON has used : It cites NAM's present day irrelevanve as Cold war is over, it is devoid of facts and figures , journalist has given his personal opinion only. If we start taking every political science graduate or jounalist opinion as credence it will be the end of the world as we know it. PRO is not exaggerating. 
VOTERS can see the article themselves and decide. PRO feels this evidence enough to win source points. 

3) My opponent hasn't provided any affirmative evidence in his favor. That is to say, he has not provided evidence that NAM acted as a third bloc - a third pole in the Cold War. He has merely accused me of nit-picking. This is particularly damaging for Pro's case because the burden of proof rests with him.
Actually PRO did provide affirmative evidence it was in form of a rebuttal: Afghanistan was also an active member of the Nonaligned Movement. At the United Nations, Nonaligned members voted 56 to 9, with 26 abstaining, to condemn the Soviet Union. 

Voters must take note of this Statement by CON 
 Bipolarity does not mean there are only two actors in the system. Bipolarity simply means there are only two predominantly powerful actors in the system. Thus, bipolarity doesn't preclude minor wars being fought outside the sphere of superpower competition. Nor does it preclude smaller states from having their own interests independent of superpower competition.
 
CON has resorted to shifting goalposts ,
1.PRO specifically mentioned Arab-Israel Wars of Independence and 1967 not war of 1973, same as citing korean war as an example of vietnam conflict. Independence and 1967 were major wars, fought on large scale, with the 1967 war having more than 800,000 total troops, if CON states such a war as minor we might have to appeal to oxford to change the definition of minor itself. There have been only allegations of US involvement these allegations are not conclusively proved and mostly termed as conspiracy theories. 

2.Regarding Falklands War, there are two ways to look at war , a war can only be called small in true sense if it involved small number of troops having minor skirmish like warfare. Here troops were less true , but weapons were massive, surbmarine warfare, Aircraft carriers, dog fights, destroyers. How can a war with such massive weaponry called small. 

3.Indo-Pak Wars - It's quite easy to demonstrate that the US and Soviet Union were involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1971 war, the US attempted to preserve its nascent rapprochement with China by going easy on Pakistan ("The Tilt," as it was known).
PRO will like to talk about this war specifically since PRO feels only this war is enough to convince the voters that the Cold war had more than one poles,Firstly India's solely deployed more than 1 million troops alone , with more than 1.5 million troops. 
  • There was no direct involvement of great powers on ground level. 
  • It led to formation of Bangladesh. 
  • It is almost of the same intensity in terms of fighting, even more than Vietnam War in Naval warfare. 
After the war, the United States accepted the new balance of power and recognised India as a dominant player in South Asia; the US immediately engaged in strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries in the successive years. It was one of the biggest war in the Cold war period but did not involve great powers like Yom-kippum war of 1973. 


The Economic and climate change issue: 

Similarly, my opponent tried to disqualify statements from former SecState Jim Baker, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell with respect to climate change. To my understanding, Pro's logic is that only the position of the President can be taken as the country's position. There is some truth to this, but this tactic doesn't get one very far in this particular debate.
That is not what PRO meant, internal politics of a country cannot be held into account for the country's position is all PRO states. If we want to indulge in speculation even PRO can cite articles by news media both for and against the topic. The topic is not whether PRO or CON wants  the cold war to happen obviously a cold war will not be benificial for anyone but one cannot simply ignore the symptoms and the directions the two governments are taking. Even PRO or any media publication will  not want an all out war with China but that has not deterred the Indian Government from placing fighter jets and advance attack helicopters in Ladakh to counter China. Similarly what any American or any American publication feels is irrelevant to the topic. Only US or Chinese government's actions can be taken into account. 

The stand PRO is taking that it is indicated by US and Chinese government's actions that an allout Cold war is coming. It is common that Cold War will hurt the world but the world cannot ignore the image this article has, an article circulated by the US navy in South China Sea.

The climate change point has also been refuted successfully by PRO on grounds of Paris Climate Change accord, and waste build up in the west. How much waste are we talking about not tonnes, but metric tonnes , not on one spot but all across the USA, every city ,every state. Such waste buildup for 2 whole years shows the little regard of USA and China has in terms of climate change. This is the third year running with no resolution to the garbage problem. 

Conclusion: The arguments provided strongly support PRO's stance namely South China sea conflict, US allies in the east (South korea and Japan), North Korean missile testing , 2018 trade dispute will lead to a new cold war .






Con
My thanks to any voter who's had the patience to make it this far.

As I have in previous rounds, I'll begin with miscellaneous quote-and-replies. After that, I'll proceed on to the more important contentions that must be addressed.

Misc. Quote-and-Reply
CON admits to Self-Contradiction, VOTERS must take note of it
Actually, I said the matter of self-contradiction was irrelevant next to the substance of my point about NAM. While we're telling voters what to take note of, I'd like to point out that Pro did not rebuttal my reasons for saying that the supposed self-contradiction was irrelevant. Since he did not rebuttal that justification, I don't see how he can instruct voters to care about the issue.

The Definition Dispute
Rather than address the substance of my points in favor of my proposed definition, Pro seems to have resorted to playing word games. By appealing to the "( Basic 11 th standard physics)" definition of precise, he has argued that my definition may not necessarily be accurate.

Let's cut through the word games. I was clearly using "precise" in the colloquial sense. That is to say, I used "precise" to describe a definition that accurately and specifically describes a phenomenon. The crucial difference between my proposed definition and Pro's is specificity. As I pointed out in R2, his definition of Cold War is so broad that it can apply to numerous bilateral relations the United States and China have with other countries. I argued that since definitions are supposed to convey information, his definition was weaker than mine, since it said less about US-China relations.

If we must insist on using accurate and precise according to "( Basic 11 th standard physics)," I would say my opponent's proposed definition could be accurate but could not be precise, whereas my definition could be both accurate and precise.

I'd also like to point out that in addition to playing word games with precision and accuracy, my opponent did not address my second point about the dangers of mis-analogy in shaping policy. I will re-state that part of my argument in its entirety here:
Not only do classifications in general require specificity, but how we define US-Sino relations most definitely demands specificity. As Melvyn Leffler states with regard to reviving the phrase "Cold War": "However tempting the analogy might be as China’s influence and military strength grow, invoking it now is profoundly wrong." If we allow ourselves to think we're headed into a Cold War, we just might create one that would threaten to undermine important areas of cooperation between the US and China, including "halting climate change, fighting terrorists, and combating pandemics."

The words we use to describe US-China relations can have a self-fulfilling effect. If we convince ourselves a Cold War is coming, we are likely to adopt hostile policies that will provoke increasingly hostile relations. This would be unwise, as "the potential gains from greater tensions with China are not proportional to the risks. The risks, in fact, are much greater because the economic costs of a falling-out with China are so much greater than they were with the Soviet Union in the 1940s." The words we choose to describe US-Sino relations will help shape those relations. Thus, we need to be precise and careful with the words we choose. There is a real risk of screwing things up by lazily invoking a Cold War analogy that is inaccurate.
Because Pro tried to win the definition dispute with an appeal to semantics, and because that appeal has been rejected here, I believe voters are justified in concluding my proposed definition of Cold War should be considered valid for this debate. To reiterate, this means we would define "New Cold War" as follows:
for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified."

Who Deserves Points for Sources?
In his final round, my opponent made a case for why I deserve to lose points for sources. It's never my preference to openly panhandle for sources points, but I need to defend myself.

Here is my paraphrase of Pro's attack: because Max Fisher, writer of one of my sources, is not a PhD-certified expert on the issue of NAM, he is unqualified to give his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, because the article in question was an opinion piece, it is not a valid source.

My defense: Firstly, I'd like to note that Pro has focused only on one source. I presume this is because my other sources weren't criticizable. Indeed, I have quite a few PhD experts saying the Cold War was bipolar (Aleksandër Moisiu, Odd Arne Westad, or Goedele De Keersmaeker). On the subject of economic interdependence, I also have two PhDs to support me (Farrell and Newman). All these individuals' works were hyperlinked in earlier rounds.

Thus, even if we say that Max Fisher wasn't a good source, the balance of my expert sources is quite favorable, and I hardly deserve to lose points for sources on account of one bad egg.

But I wouldn't go so far as to say Fisher is a bad egg. Mr. Fisher has worked with numerous reputable news outlets, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Vox (he is a co-founder, in fact). Furthermore, though he does not have a PhD, he does hold a Master's Degree in International Relations (which I'm willing to bet is more expertise than I or Pro can claim...). The New York Times also notes that "he has reported from five continents on conflict, diplomacy, social change and other topics."

So, does Mr. Fisher have a level of authority when it comes to international relations? Of course! Thus, his word about NAM should be given some weight, even if you don't want to give it as much weight as you would a PhD.

For these reasons, I do not think I should lose points for sources.

Bipolarity
Gravity Analogy
Pro uses the following analogy to try to support his notion that the Cold War was multipolar:
gravitational fields of Jupiter and Saturn would be the greatest 2 among the planets of the Solar system, does not mean gravitational field of other planets do not exist. 
I agree with the statement itself, but my opponent is mistaken to apply it to the Cold War. I will say again: bipolarity doesn't mean there are only two actors in existence. It only means they are the only predominantly important actors in existence. Thus, our Solar System is not a good analogy. If we want to use an analogy where planets=poles, then we need to use a star system that has only 2 planets. In this hypothetical system, there might be moons or asteroids that have their own gravity, but by and large, they are strongly influenced by the 2 planets.

Frankly, though, I don't think we need to introduce analogies to understand bipolarity. Bipolarity means there are only 2 predominantly powerful actors. It does not preclude the existence of other, less influential actors.

NAM and Nit-Picking
In my response to his accusations of nit-picking, Pro merely pointed out a single example in his favor. A vote by the NAM to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I accept that this is an example of NAM showing unity against one of the superpowers, but it is just one example. Pro wants to argue that NAM was influential enough to be considered a third pole, but he hasn't provided credible evidence of this. A single example is not sufficient to establish a trend. Meanwhile, I provided multiple sources that either directly or indirectly provided evidence for NAM's weakness, and I provided examples to illustrate my point that NAM was insufficiently organized to resist the East-West Cold War competition.

For these reasons alone, I believe I am still justified in standing by the claim that NAM was insufficiently influential to be considered a third pole. Thus, the Cold War is properly considered bipolar.

To go a bit further, I will now add another source to support my point. An article written in 1980 and published in the Journal of Academic Affairs, in which the author says the following about NAM:
For nineteen years, while its membership has doubled twice, the NAM has remained an essentially amorphous group, struggling to surmount its own internal differences and quarrels in order to identify and promote consensual concerns. It has met every three years since 1961 at Summit level (except for 1967) to debate and proclaim its views on world issues, and at lower levels in intervening years. It has never voted on any issue, maintaining a chaotic, often divisive process of reaching consensus through lengthy debate and negotiation. Often the consensi reached have been lowest common denominators. Sometimes, particularly on sensitive internecine quarrels, they have not been achievable at all.
Wars that Supposedly Didn't Involve the Superpowers

Israel - My opponent essentially argued my reply on this subject was invalid because my example was the 1973 War and not "Arab-Israel Wars of Independence and 1967." Very well.
  • In the case of 1948, it's fair to say the superpowers weren't overly involved. My opponent tries to spin this as a great power conflict by calling it a major war. This depends on how we define major war. If "a lot" of people died, maybe it's major in that sense. But typically, international relations scholars refer to major wars as wars whose principle combatants are great powers. So, if my opponent had wanted the 1948 war to prove multipolarity, he should have defended the proposition that Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were great powers in the year 1948.
  • With respect to the 1967 war, there is plenty of evidence of superpower involvement. The Johnson Administration tried to offset Soviet arms sales to the Arabs by selling weapons to the Israelis, and the US was involved in trying (and failing) to prevent war from breaking out in the region. It's just not historically accurate to act like the 1967 war was not a part of the bipolar global competition known as the Cold War.
Falklands - My opponent concedes that the war was small in terms of manpower, but because it had big and impressive weapons of war, we shouldn't call it a minor war. Frankly, what we call it is less important than the issue of polarity. The key question is: Does this war's existence prove the Cold War was multipolar? I think the answer is no, unless we consider that the UK or Falklands might have constituted a third pole. Seeing as my opponent offered no evidence as to why we should think this is so, I rest my case on this particular issue.

Indo-Pak - Pro makes a couple arguments here.
  • For one, he supposes that since the fighitng was intense and involved over a million people, it was a major war and thus the Cold War was multipolar. Again, the crucial question is, were any of the principle combatants a third pole in the Cold War? Just because India had a lot of troops doesn't make them a third pole. Iraq had the world's 4th-largest army before the Gulf War, but that didn't stop the US from stomping on Iraq. Sheer numbers aren't everything. International influence and army sizes aren't necessarily synonymous.
  • Pro also tries to argue that India was a great power after the war because "the United States accepted the new balance of power and recognised India as a dominant player in South Asia." However, this claim is not properly substantiated, as the hyperlink takes us to a Wikipedia page explaining what balance of power means. It does not explain that India was "a dominant player" - or, if you prefer, a great power.
In sum, these wars do not prove the Cold War was multipolar. Bipolarity does not preclude against other actors from starting their own wars. It simply means that only two actors are predominantly powerful within the system. None of these wars suggest there were more than 2 predominantly powerful actors during the Cold War.

Climate Change and Economic Interdependence
In his R3, my opponent tried to disqualify my points about climate change and economic interdependence by saying my sources were invalid because they were non-governmental. I replied in R3 with the following:
This debate calls on us to forecast US-Sino relations for the 21st century. Obviously, President Trump won't be President for the majority of the 21st century. Indeed, we can't know who the Presidents of the US or China will be for the majority of the century. Thus, my opponent's implicit standard - that we can't rely on any source but the highest elected officials - is simply untenable. If we're going to forecast future relations between the United States and China, we need to assess fundamental elements of that relationship. This requires us to analyze each country's enduring interests, the nature of their economic interdependence, and more. To do these things, we should turn to experts - both inside and outside the government.
In his last round my opponent said he didn't mean to say non-governmental sources were disqualified, but rather that:
internal politics of a country cannot be held into account for the country's position is all PRO states. If we want to indulge in speculation even PRO can cite articles by news media both for and against the topic. The topic is not whether PRO or CON wants  the cold war to happen obviously a cold war will not be benificial for anyone but one cannot simply ignore the symptoms and the directions the two governments are taking. Even PRO or any media publication will  not want an all out war with China but that has not deterred the Indian Government from placing fighter jets and advance attack helicopters in Ladakh to counter China. Similarly what any American or any American publication feels is irrelevant to the topic. Only US or Chinese government's actions can be taken into account. 
To the extent I understand my opponent, I disagree. Because we are forecasting the future, we will need to analyze long-term trends and interests. Expert sources, even if they're written by people not currently in government, can help us do this.

I have provided a slew of expert sources to support the claim that the United States and China will have a shared interest in economic well-being and combating climate change. My opponent, to my understanding, has not explained why we shouldn't give significant weight to these sources. Thus, I stand by my claim: economic interdependence and a shared interest in mitigating climate change will serve as sources of cooperation in the US-China relationship.

Conclusion
This has been a long debate, and I want to reiterate my gratitude to anyone who has read this whole damn thing. My hat is off to you (even if you vote against me).

I will now close my argument by summarizing my main points.

  • "New Cold War" ought to be defined as a US-China relationship that bears significant resemblance to the US-Soviet relationship
  • US-Sino relations will differ in key ways from the US-Soviet relationship. 1) The former will be conducted in a multipolar world whereas the latter was conducted in a bipolar world. 2) The former will be best characterized as rivalry (because hostility will be moderated by sources of cooperation), while the latter was much closer to enmity (a lack of moderation in hostility).
  • Thus, US-Sino relations should not be dubbed a "New Cold War"
If any voters are still on the fence, I would remind them that in R1 I said the burden of proof should be on my opponent, because he is the claim-maker. At no point in this debate did he dispute that. Pro has the burden of proof to prove that US-China relations should be described as a New Cold War. If, after reading the clash between our two cases, he has not convinced you, he has not fulfilled his burden of proof.

Thank you for reading.