Resolved: God is the best explanation for morality

Consider the following principles and values which are foundational to the very possibility of rational discourse, all of which the moral anti-realists must deny:

1. It is good to believe the truth and avoid falsehood.
2. We ought to think rationally.
3. We ought to argue from an honest perspective.

4. We ought not misrepresent your opponent's arguments.

5. You must not commit logical fallacies. 

If relativism or nihilism about value entails such conclusions, then it can be rightly rejected as absurd. Given the ubiquity and centrality of rational discourse in everyday life, we have every reason to suppose that there are such things as objective moral facts.

Thanks to David for this debate, looking forward to a good discussion.

I want to begin by addressing Pro's syllogism offered in the prior round with the aim of avoiding any confusion. While I think his arguments stay on track with regards to the scope of this debate, his stated conclusion from premises one and two "therefore God exists" veers off track. The resolution in this debate is that God "best explains" morality, so that is what I will focus on. Even though God must exist in order to affirm the resolution, proving his existence is a conversation for another day, so that is not what I will be addressing here.

With that, I will not challenge the logical structure of Pro's argument. Instead, I will focus my case on two points: that objective moral values do not exist, and that even if they somehow do, God is not only not the best explanation but is, in fact, an insufficient one.

Objective Moral Values Do Not Exist

Part 1: Clarifying Definitions

To understand why this is the case, we need to begin with an in depth understanding of what these terms mean in the first place.

The first word I’ll single out here is “values.” I’ve always found it odd that proponents of this argument use a term that is, by definition, subjective. But I think a minor tweak is all that’s necessary to correct this, so I will disregard it for now and focus on the more central terms at play here.

Exist: This is another term I find semantically problematic. To exist is to “have being” according to most dictionaries. I don’t think that’s what Pro is arguing, although he can make that case if he wishes. When it is said that objective morality exists, what’s really being said is that moral judgments are objective in the same way that 2+2=4 is objective. That is, you cannot point to any of these in reality, only to representations of them as ideas.

So with that, I offer a more clarifying way to phrase this contention: “moral judgments are objectively determinable.”

The first of the two major terms here is “moral,” which is a product of morality. Morality is merely an assessment we make with regard to actions and intentions. If someone steals, we assess that as immoral absent any further context. The question is: why? Regardless of your position on God, the answer is the same: because it violates our moral standard. In other words, we begin with a standard for what morality constitutes, and then assess whether actions or intentions match up to that standard. If they do, we call that moral. If they do not, we call that immoral.

Objective is the final word to address here. What does it mean to be objective? I would offer the following: objectivity requires an assessment measured against that which either itself exists or can be manifested in reality.

For example, 2+2=4 is objective because we can empirically invoke its manifestation. One way to do so would be to put two cups on one side of the table and two cups on the other, then put them together and count how many cups we have. There is no argument or opinion involved. Reality will determine how many cups it adds up to; all we can do is observe and note.

A perhaps more analogous example is “the earth is round.” This example might seem a bit more nuanced to determine because we’d have to define “round” (since all those geometry geeks love to remind us the Earth is an oblate spheroid). But once the definition is settled, the assessment is again determined by reality itself, we simply match the Earth (which is empirical) to the definition.

Part 2: Why Moral Judgments Are Not Objectively Determinable

I will actually grant that they are, with one massive caveat - They are objectively determinable if we are beginning with an agreed upon moral standard. If we are not, then the question of whether an act is moral depends entirely on what we’re using for our standard of morality. That will always be subjective.

Pro will likely disagree. He will likely claim God is the only standard applicable. But that would be nothing more than an opinion, there is no grounding in reality necessitating that position. I can turn to Allah, or Zeus, or any other conception of a god, or I can turn to my own intuitions to create a moral standard. Pro will have no case as to how this does not qualify as a moral system under any reasonable definition of the term.

And herein lies the problem. If Pro is merely defining morality as that which is in accordance with God’s will, then he’s putting the cart before the horse. The resolution of this debate - that God “best explains” morality, already grants that the burden is on him to show God is the answer here, not merely define his position into victory.

My personal position on morality is that, while it is unquestionably subjective, if we are to function in this society with other people, we have to begin with a set of common values we generally share - such as a desire to live, a desire to remain healthy, a desire to enjoy personal freedom, and to have something to strive for. These basic values do not require a God for explanation, and yet from them we can easily see how things like empathy, compassion (resulting in a desire for the reduction of harm), and a desire for fairness are essential. With those as our foundation, our common understanding of basic moral “facts” is easily explainable.

I will leave it to Pro to decide whether he’d like me to explain and/or justify my moral system further. Till then, I’ll move on to my second contention.

God Is Insufficient as an Explanation

Pro cites the Euthyphro dilemma and claims to have solved it by stating that morality merely “reflects the moral perfection of God’s nature.” But this answer is just gibberish. God either has the power to rewrite the rules of morality or he does not. If he does not, then he cannot possibly be their author, and by extension, cannot possibly be their explanation. If he can, then morality would, by definition, be subject to his will (i.e., subjective). Either way, Pro’s position falls apart. His answer here is nothing more than an attempt to straddle the middle of a true dichotomy.

Moreover, even if God is the source of morality, that doesn’t change the fact that each individual would still have to decide for themselves whether to align their moral values with him. Anyone who does what God says only to appease him is not acting morally, that’s just self-preservation. To act morally requires pure intentions, not ulterior motives. Those motives can only come from within; thus, we are each individually still our own arbiter of what is moral. That makes our judgments, by definition, subjective.

Direct Rebuttals

Pro asks: “Who are we to say Yemen’s culture is worse than ours?”
Answer: we’re rationally thinking people who value well-being and fairness. Does that make us right? According to us, yes. Pro asks: how does it make sense to praise or condemn anyone if morality is “mere opinion”?

The answer is: because making sense is an assessment of logical validity, which is separate from the truth of the premises. Again, if we begin with values of well-being and fairness (my foundation), then the question answers itself. If we begin with God’s word as our foundation, then perhaps Pro can make sense of it. Either way, our foundation is still subject to each of us, individually.

Pro’s argument on epistemic facts does not work. What he’s calling attention to is ultimately nothing more than a subjective value. The truth is whatever it is, regardless of what we believe or want to be true. That doesn’t mean we have to care about it. In fact, many people don’t. Many people would much rather believe a comfortable lie over an uncomfortable truth. There’s an entire cultural meme dedicated to this concept (red pill vs. blue pill).

Summary

Pro’s case hinges on the idea that objective moral values exist, but they don’t, because the standard each of us uses as our moral foundation will always be up to each of us, i.e., subjective.

Moreover, Pro has failed not only to show how God can be invoked as the best explanation, but that he is a valid explanation at all.

The resolution stands negated.

Thank you, Double_R, for your response.

My opponent begins by casting doubt on the existence of objective moral facts. My opponent states that  begins with a category mistake: Conflating personal values and moral values. My opponent states that values are by definition subjective but ignores what we mean by moral values. Russs Shafer-Landau writes “Moral values are objective if their truth does not depend on the attitudes or beliefs of any individual or group” [1]. For example, the wrongness of unnecessary harm, such as torturing infants for fun, and the value of honesty hold independently of opinion and social groups. My opponent's claim that values are subjective ignores this distinction, reducing moral facts to mere tastes, like preferring coca-cola over pepsi. 

The second category mistake my opponent makes is in his attempt to define existence. In metaphysics when we say something exists we say that it is mind-independent, i.e., that its reality does not depend on an observer. For example, my computer exists whether or not anyone is looking at it or not [2]. In the case of moral realism we are asserting that moral facts and duties are a part of reality and that they exist independently of any human mind and not as a matter of preference. 

Not only does this misrepresent my position but this is a third category mistake. My opponent mistakes epistemic objectivity with moral ontology. By attempting to reframe this as determinable my opponent shifts the debate on how we arrive at moral conclusions rather than the existence of moral facts. This debate is over whether or not moral facts exist not how we arrive at this conclusion. 

Here my opponent again confuses epistemology with ontology. Just because there is a lack of consensus does not mean moral facts do not exist. For example, disagreements on scientific debates does not mean that the science is wrong or that the physical reality does not exist. This debate is not about whether or not we all agree on morality but whether or not these moral facts are mind-independent. Moreover, there is a very big inconsistency in my opponent's reply: My opponent also begs the questions: (1) Why does there need to be an agreed upon standard; and (2) If that agreed upon standard existed, why ought we follow those standards? 

Sorry I have been extremely busy with work and the new website project. I am going to have to waive this round. 

Well, after shutting down the site seems to be back up. No one actually forfeited, there was no access to publish.

I assume no one will read let alone vote on this debate, but if so, please disregard the previous non-rounds.

Thanks to David for the spirited conversation.