So what is the supposed question begged, then?
What is the way that we are?
If you accept the premise then it simply doesn't matter what the way we are is. If we do what we do because of the way we are then we can't make ourselves the way we are because we can't get back behind ourselves.
Neither you nor Strawson has substantiated the reason that "we can't make ourselves the way we are." You're merely positing a "spurious a priori" under the presumption that the manifestation of the self is linear. As of now, at least as far as this discussion is concerned, it is nothing more than a claim. Provide substance to your posit.
A strong sort of moral responsibility is excluded because a strong sort of free will is excluded. In order to have ultimate moral responsibility and Libertarian Free Will we would have to get back behind X but we can't get back behind X. X's nature is irrelevant because the point is that *whatever X is* we would have to get back behind it in order to have such a kind of free will and responsiiblity but we can't.
This is redundant. You merely repeated your argument as the reason for exclusion. Why is a "strong sort" of free will necessary for moral responsibility? Why do we have to get back behind X to assume moral responsibility? Why can't we get back behind X? Why do we have to get behind X in order to have free will? Don't merely assert; substantiate.
The argument itself is clearly substantiated by the fact that an infinite regress happens whereby we can never get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are. You just keep asking an irrelevant question when you're asking me to substantiate what our nature actually is and asking me "What is the way we are?". It's not relevant.
Once again, redundant. You continue to repeat the argument as if the argument itself substantiates the argument.
You would have to substantiate the relevance of that question first but you can't substantiate it because we can't get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are *regardless of what the way we are is*.
A question is an inquiry. It doesn't require substantiation. Its relevance is substantiated because it directly inquires into the content of the premise. I'm not asking you about cotton candy. I'm asking you to elaborate on the nature of the way that we are to explore and either confirm or reject the validity of the third premise.
It has absolutely nothing to do with whatever nature we happen to have and everything to do with the fact that we can't get back behind that nature *whatever it is* to make it.
Why not? And why must we get back behind that nature? Why does an "infinite regress" as you put restrict one's capacity to be responsible for the way one is? At what point does the self, or the "way that we are," begin? And if there's an infinite regression, would that not suggest that the way one is has always been?
We can't be the ultimate *cause o*f our nature, *regardless* of what our nature is, because it leads to an infinite regress where we would never be able to ultimately cause our nature ... and asking "What is our nature?" has no relevance.
Substantiate. (And don't repeat your argument--I know what it is already.)
I'm going to drop the whole Schopenhauer thing because it's not important and you have conceded that it resembles Strawson's position in some ways which is all I thought to begin with anyway.
I never conceded that to you. This is what I stated:
Yes, they can agree on certain points, but that is not the same as resembling a position. Schopenhauer would be a proponent of free will for the reason I mentioned. I don't disagree with all of Strawson's points either, but that doesn't mean that my positions reflects his.
But if you intend to drop the argument, then I have no objections.
Also, we are never going to agree if you think that Schopenhauer is a proponent of free will because that is just absolutely false. It's not a matter of what he 'would be' for the reason you personally think. It's actually the case that he *was* famously well known for being very clearly an *opponent of* free will.
My reasons are no more "personal" than yours. Examine my statement again:
Schopenhauer believed that one could reorient their perspective on the nature of experience, rather than extend the prejudices of culture.
Where did I inject my personal thoughts?
What's more, even if you could muster up an argument for why Schopenahauer was a *compatabilist* ... that would just be yet another red herring. Because that is not the sense of free will that is being argued against.
You're positing this argument against straw men.
So after conceding that Schopenhauer's position resembles Strawson's in some ways you still insist that the two positions don't resemble each other.
Once again, I never conceded that they resembled each other in some ways. Hence, my insistence that two positions don't resemble each other.
You're contradicting yourself.
One cannot contradict oneself. Only arguments contradict. And in order for arguments to contradict, there must be a demonstrable inconsistency. Demonstrate which arguments I've made that contradict.
Both Strawson and Schopenhauer offer similar arguments *against* Libertarian Free Will and *that* is all I mean by the fact that their positions resemble each other. The fact that you accept that they resemble each other in *some* ways is already enough to get to similarity.
What were Schopenhauer's arguments against free will?
You say that Strawson's third premise is especially substantiated but he substantiated that very clearly in the video that you watched. He also made it clear that the argument I gave, and that he started of with in the video, is the 'crude' version. Meaning that, the purpose of that basic argument isn't to substantiate the premises. An argument isn't supposed to substantiate its own premises. To substantiate the premises for an argument you need another argument. Arguments don't substantiate themselves.
He went into detail about how for us to *ultimately* make ourselves the way that we are we would have to get back behind ourselves infinitely ... a regress happens whereby we can never ultimately get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are. He made this all very clear in the video. He substantiated the argument just fine.
No, he doesn't substantiate the argument at all. He merely asserts it. I could just as easily say that interviewer "substantiated" his assertion of different principles applying to immaterial consciousness by mere assertion of his argument.
This isn't an answer to the question and it seems that you just misspoke by saying "no" to the question because you say the opposite below.
"Seem" is not an argument; and "no" was in response to your claim that my citing Schopenhauer's agreement was irrelevant, especially in the context where I was rejecting the "resemblance" of Strawson's and Schopenhauer's position.
I don't agree with you that Schopenhauer believed in Libertarian Free Will (and if your point is that you think that he believed in Compatabilist free will then that's a red herring), I don't agree that Schopenhauer's position doesn't resemble Strawson's (and you conceded that they do partially resemble each other ... and I never claimed that they wholly did) .... and they both do offer similar arguments against Libertarian Free Will. It's pointless for us to argue about how much position A has to resemble position B for them to count as resembling. There was no point in you arguing about Schopenhauer anyway because the topic of the thread is whether free will exists and I was offering an argument against free will. So that is what we should be focussing on.
Again, the only reason I left that part about Schopenhauer in is because I like to give more rather than less context of the source I'm quoting from. Strawson's argument is the only important part. You happen to be wrong about Schopenhauer, as he is famously against Libertarian Free Will, but it's really not important or even relevant to actually addressing Strawson's argument.
Once again, what arguments did Schopenhauer make against free will?
I already dealt with this prior to you saying this. Again, I was just trying to not leave out the context from where I was quoting from. It's a great vice to quote mine so I didn't want to do that. I already explained this. The actual argument that Strawson provided is clearly what needs to be addressed because that's actually an argument against free will that has been offered.
If you don't want to talk about Schopenhauer anymore, that's all well and good. If Schopenhauer's rationalizations were, as you claim, irrelevant particularly to Strawson's argument, then they should not been quoted to begin with.
And you're not merely responding ... you're responding with red herrings!
You're projecting.
