Sidewalker

Discuss.

This thread seems to have gone off the rails, away from facts and scientific analysis into emotive outbursts and name calling, lets bring it back rational analysis and look at the science .

Science has studied racism extensively and determined what the root cause is: 

Penis Envy

Scientifically speaking, studies have shown that racists have very small naughty parts, TWS1405's probably looks like a button.

Although the science of brain cell communication is well-understood, the complexity of thought processes is not well-defined. However, exploring the brain may help in understanding the bigger picture.
The brain is primarily composed of neurons, which are cells that generate electrical impulses for communication. It is estimated that the human brain has close to 100 billion neurons.
Neurons release brain chemicals, known as neurotransmitters, which generate these electrical signals in neighboring neurons. The electrical signals propagate like a wave to thousands of neurons, which leads to thought formation.

On a material level, Consciousness represents a supervenient structure that bears properties that its subvenient parts do not exhibit.  Consciousness is not coextensive with brain, it exists independently of material brain as a higher order structure that cannot be decomposed into its parts and their relationships, so it is an ontologically novel entity. It exists independently of the physical materials and properties of its parts and yet, exerts causal influence on events in the world, exerting a causal influence that its constituent components, in sum, cannot exert.  Consequently, it has an ontological status apart from its material components, and it logically follows that it is itself a causal agent as well as an entity that is acted upon by external causes.

Consciousness has causal influence due to its content, not solely because of the physical aspects of its neural correlates. A continuous conscious state includes desires or intentions, it includes the ability to envision a future state and establish a strategy for attaining that state. That makes it more than a purely physical state, it is a conscious state with reference to a future possibility, and no such reference is part of any purely physical state.  The self has the ability to exert the force of consciousness to some effect in the material world; such conscious states can have causal effect to bring about further states for the sake of values and purposes.  Intents, values, and purposes are not reducible to a purely physical state unless one attributes consciousness to the constituent matter itself; consequently they exist as properties of a consciousness which clearly entails a distinct ontological existence apart from its constituent material components.

In  J.J.C Smart’s “Sensations and Brain Processes”, he explores the relationship between the mind and body, specifically delving into the shortcomings of the theory of Dualism. In the work of Paul Churchland, Dualism distinguishes the mind from the body, categorizing consciousness as unable to be investigated by empirical science.

People who oppose dualism usually use a convenient definition of Dualism that suits their purposes, while this allows folks like Smart and Churchland to feel they have made their case, in the end, Dualists don’t believe in the Dualism that they don’t believe in either.
 
Within this school of thought are a variety of sub-theories such Substance Dualism, Popular Dualism, and Property Dualism. Smart however, asserts that “there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be dualists”. 

Yeah, metaphysics is like that, there are no philosophical arguments that compel against Dualism either.  While the Dualism conclusion in not logically coercive, it does provide an intellectually satisfying way of making sense of the experiential reality of human consciousness.
In other words, Smart fails to see the logical reasoning behind Dualism, and instead proposes his Identity Theory of the Mind. Under this school of thought, while there is a slight distinction between mental states and brain processes, there are no non-physical properties. Although the physical properties may be vague or difficult to comprehend, they are still all physical properties.

Simply asserting that there are no non-physical properties isn’t an argument.

In his attack on Churchland’s notion of Dualism, Smart states: “[the idea] that everything should be explicable in terms of physics except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable” .  Smart does not see why sensations should be granted such scientific leniency. His Identity Theory of Mind highlights the failure of Dualists to explain why sensations are not subjected to the same logical scientific expectations.

Smart and Churchland both reject Dualism, I’m not sure how refuting Churchland translates into a refutation of Dualism. 

However, Smart does spend considerable time grappling with the notion of sensations. He uses the example of pain to ultimately highlight the nuances between a mental state and a brain process. An ache is a “report of a brain process”, but it is not the same as the sensation of feeling pain . Thus, his thesis does not state that a sensation can be directly translated into a brain process, but does explain that the two are inextricably correlated. Sensations and mental states can exist, just as by-products of specific brain processes.

The interaction problem is a supposed problem for Dualism, the view of the mind that humans have two parts, an immaterial mind and the body
 
As you said, it’s a “supposed” problem, and it’s always struck me as a “contrived” matter of semantics with no logical basis.
 
I will state it as it follows:
 
1-The mind and body are two separate substances, and have no shared properties
 
It’s typically represented in this way, which is actually a self-refuting statement more about semantics than philosophy.  To start with the premise that mind and body exist as two “substances” obfuscates the issue at best, and in fact, it contends that they share the property of “existing as a substance”. 
 
2-two substances need one shared property to interact
 
The argument just dogmatically states that something we know to occur is metaphysically impossible, which isn’t an argument, it has no logical basis, .  The experiential fact of the matter is that mind and body do interact, the fact that we don’t understand how that occurs certainly doesn’t mean that it is impossible. 
 
3-the mind and body cannot interact
 
However, the mind and body do clearly act. Whether you are a materialistic, Idealist or whatever, you most likely belief that your thoughts cause your actions. You need to drop either one or two. 
 
Two can be supported by the fact it has wide confirmation: a hammer and a nail have the property of being physical, and ideas that interact with each other have the property of being ideas. 
 
Two is widely “asserted”, but it always appears to be presupposed without being established logically, that does not constitute “confirmation”. The attempt to deny the self-evident experiential reality of the interaction between mind and body, and the associated fact that mentally, we are causal agents, is a very extraordinary claim and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The unfounded and completely faith-based belief that the observed facts of the matter are metaphysically impossible doesn’t constitute extraordinary evidence by any stretch of the imagination.