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@RationalMadman
Lol you beat me to it, I've been thinking about doing an AMAM. Ask me almost anything.
Anyways, If you were the last man on earth, And you could choose between these animal companions, dogs or cats?
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@Theweakeredge
I just googled the word and read the first thing that popped up and it brought those questions to mind. I'm not familiar with soft Utilitarianism, So how do you define it?
Cite link: https://www.econlib.org/archives/2010/01/soft_rule-utili.html#:~:text=A%20soft%20rule%2Dutilitarian%20might,I%20will%20not%20do%20it.%E2%80%9D
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@Theweakeredge
"massive wall of text." - Have you seen my response? It's as concise as the point can possibly be. You're acting like the long form response was our last interaction.
As to the question, when you look up soft Utilitarianism it says, "A soft rule-utilitarian might refrain from donating to help the people suffering in a distant country. A hard utilitarian would make the donation. A soft rule-utilitarian says, “Even if a lot of people donate to the distant sufferers, that will not benefit me, so I will not do it.”"
I understand that hard Utilitarianism and egoism are fundamentally different, but this description of soft Utilitarianism is defined indistinguishably from egoism.
As to the question, when you look up soft Utilitarianism it says, "A soft rule-utilitarian might refrain from donating to help the people suffering in a distant country. A hard utilitarian would make the donation. A soft rule-utilitarian says, “Even if a lot of people donate to the distant sufferers, that will not benefit me, so I will not do it.”"
I understand that hard Utilitarianism and egoism are fundamentally different, but this description of soft Utilitarianism is defined indistinguishably from egoism.
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@Theweakeredge
Also, as of now, it's you who didn't respond to my criticism of your egregious misuse of the word ought. It's difficult to select a single point to contend with about your "ethics" because everything you said was fractally wrong to the foundation.
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@Theweakeredge
Your arrogance is astounding, seeing as you make a consistent habit of not answering simple, direct questions.
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@Theweakeredge
Soft-Utilitarianism
What does this mean? And how does it differ from egoism?
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@Timid8967
Yes, they are the same god of Abraham.
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@janesix
Nature and nurture coalesce into our desires.
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@Theweakeredge
Again, saying "one ought to do x" is different from saying "one is morally permitted, but not obligated to do x." They are mutually exclusive. If you redefine "ought" to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated" then you are contradicting your second principle. Therefore, you're either using the word wrong, or you're contradicting yourself. If you redefine the word to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated" then you are contradicting yourself.
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@Theweakeredge
"Ought to", is an auxiliary verb, meaning obligation or duty. You are using the word ought to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated." That's a fundamentally different meaning, and therefore you should use the correct language. You're just redefining the term to mean something it doesn't mean.
To be specific, when you say "one ought to do what is good" you don't mean "one is obligated to do what is good." You do mean, "one is morally permitted, but not obligated, to do good."
But you contradict that interpretation of the definition with your second premise, which is a literal reformulation of your first premise. The second premise being: "one is morally obligated to prevent negative well-being."
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@Theweakeredge
Deja Vu. I wonder if this group will stick around.
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@Theweakeredge
"Let me ask you a question, is every moment you aren't donating to a child whose starving an example of moral ineptitude?"
No, giving to the needy is an imperfect moral duty, and therefore cannot be completed in a single action.
"whenever someone is kicked, you know that that typically hurts...well-being is generalized, but it is in no way vague."
So negative well-being is pain? Are you affirming a hedonistic hypothesis of well-being based morality where pain is the bad and pleasure is the good?
“1b Again no - there is a difference between taking food from starving people and not giving them any - you can continue to make things inordinately black and white, but you'd be mistake ethically speaking.”
It’s only a difference if you 1) aren’t actually capable of giving them food, or 2) not responsible for them eating (i.e. if they were your kids, then there is no difference).
“
The last example is drastically different, you don't have all the facts of the operation - and the "bomb thing" is completely different situation - just because well-being doesn't lead to black-and-white situations does not make it "not valid standard for morals", furthermore -you changed quite a lot of that scenario, but regarldess, the fact that you don't like the outcome doesn't make it a bad standard, just that you don't understand nuance.Again, refraining from something and doing something morally wrong are two different things - according to practicality - there are different situations with different answers. accept that not everything is black and white, or get out of ethics. ”
You’ve just dodged the questions: “which of the three options/when do numbers start to matter?” Claiming that we don’t know all the facts of the operation or that the bomb dilemma is “completely different”: 1) doesn’t answer the question(s), 2) Implies that numbers do start to matter to you at some point, by virtue of it being “completely different”, and 3) contradicts your claim that you don’t need all the information to make a decision. So I’d like a direct answer please. Also, this accusation of a black and white fallacy is unfounded, as I presented three possible answers. I allowed for “morally permitted, but not obligated” as an option. You answered C, morally prohibited in the original example, which would indicate you’d probably answer C in the new example, unless numbers start to matter, then perhaps your answer would change to B, morally permitted but not obligated.
In order for you to be consistent, you will have to define well-being in a way that permits a clear, transparent discussion about it, which you have so far failed to do beyond some allusions to negative well-being being bad/pain.
It’s not difficult to justify the fact that “5>1”, or that “1,000,000>1”. You can claim that's me being ignorant, but that just completely misses the point and dodges the question.
"eh - not necessarily - in normative ethics perhaps, but whenever we're discussing pragmatics, especially ought used causally it means different things. If you were confused by my usage just ask - I meant ought in the framework of what you should do - in regard to a position that you can do, do the opposite of, and not do"
I agree with coal that the language you use matters. What is this distinction between normative ethics and pragmatics? What does that even mean? Pragmatics is typically Machiavellianism. Ethical relativism is within the domain of normative ethics, and more fundamentally, so is Consequentialism, which is what you've been advocating for. So in the only domain we are talking about, "ought" implies a moral obligation.
The statement "one is morally permitted, but not obligated to do x" is fundamentally different from the statement: "one ought to do x".
You have consistently argued that one ought to do what is good, and also that one is morally prohibited from causing negative wellbeing. The (positive/negative)well being of 5 is greater than the (positive/negative)well being of 1, with all other variables accounted for. It logically follows from your model that one would be morally obligated to prevent the most negative well-being in that situation, which necessarily entails harvesting the organs of the healthy man. But you said C, morally prohibited. Therefore you contradicted your second principle concerning moral obligation and negative well being.
"In summary, yes, most ethics people use the word ought and obligation interchangeably, I don't and i have a damned good reason for not"
And you're using the language wrong. It leads to confusion to change the meaning of a well-accepted word in an established field just to suit your purposes. What you mean is morally permitted but not obligated, but it violates your moral intuitions so hard to think that harvesting a man's organs could ever be morally permitted or obligated and you violate your own standard of morality, once I can actually get you to answer the questions. And it should violate your intuitions, and I agree that the answer is C. I would even say the answer is C in the bomb example, but you can't answer the question honestly without admitting that you're using the language wrong by virtue of answering B, or by answering C, you would clearly contradict yourself since ((wellbeingx1,000,000)>(wellbeingx1)).
"every moral interaction relies on unknown information, the difference is that I admit it"
Consequentialist moral judgements rely on the unknowables of consequences. Virtue ethics and deontology do not require such appeal to unknowables to make moral decisions. Not even theological voluntarism incorporates this same adherence to a fundamentally shifty foundation.
"Second part, nope, its completely dependent on what the best outcome of moral good is in that situation - the mnoral actor themselves has nothing to do with it, aside from what they rule as the most moral good.."
You're just affirming what I already showed, that the "good" that constitutes the good consequences that you use to qualify moral action, namely wellbeing, is equally as arbitrary as any other opinion on what morality is.
"...if you're tryna to say that the fact that a moral actor can be wrong makes it invalid, you have never actually used normative ethics in reality. ""Your entire problem is that I don't agree with YOUR theories of ethics, guess what bud - that's how ethics work - they are necessarily relative and dependent on the situation, if you think that you CAN EVER have a black and white moral system then you are, as I said, ignorant or dishonest"
Thought I'd group the straw men together. I don't think you know what you mean when you say "normative ethics." Normative ethical theories are not constrained to consequentialism.
"Finally.... no - the justification is that we value neccessarily, the bit that makes us obligated to use it as it as a standard is that unless you value other's well-being, they have no reason to value yours"
This justification for the proposed obligation to prevent negative-wellbeing doesn't apply to mass murderers, or anybody who doesn't value their own wellbeing. Again, your opinion of what is moral, isn't necessarily what is moral. Your whole paradigm of reasoning about morality is fundamentally flawed.
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@Benjamin
The fact that no argument for god doesn't have serious flaws.
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@fauxlaw
Yes, in the example, you are assuming that the full cost necessary for the labor involved in painting the walls, including capital expenditure is covered by the $100. It's the act of painting the actual wall that changes the value of the house.
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@fauxlaw
The only way to generate novel value is through labor. If I have $100, and I pay you to paint my wall, that value is transferred to my house, via your labor. The surplus value that has been created through you painting my house is the profit derision, and is therefore what makes the investment worthwhile.
Capital expenditure is calculated as a part of socially necessary labor value in the labor theory of value.
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@fauxlaw
That is incorrect. Marx built on the labor theory of value, and he included the cumulative labor value instilled in a product, which includes the capital investment. That instilled value goes into calculating the amount of necessary labor to match the market value of a product, and he derived profit from the surplus labor value.
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@fauxlaw
Marx's theory was that profit is derived from the surplus value of the necessary labor required to make a product. Look up "Robert Paul Wolff 'marx'", he has some good lectures, and shows the algebraic proofs of the theory.
Funnily enough however, we don't even know who cut Marx's firewood.
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@Theweakeredge
.
" I said that you ought to do what is good, not that you are obligated to do so - you are indeed obligated to not do what is bad, but you are not necessarily obligated to do what is good. There is a distinction, and you have not considered it. "
This statement ignores basic ethics. That is, that an ought is a moral obligation that one has the ability to actually do:
"Ought implies can, in ethics, the principle according to which an agent has a moral obligation to perform a certain action only if it is possible for him or her to perform it. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/ought-implies-can)"
"As an auxiliary verb expressing duty or moral obligation (the main modern use, attested from late 12c.), it represents the past subjunctive.(https://www.etymonline.com/word/ought)"
I asked,
"Do you believe that rational beings ought to act morally?"
You said,
"yes."
If one ought to act morally, then one is obligated to act morally by definition. That means that if you define moral action as actions that bring about well-being, then any action that is in one's power to bring about well-being is morally obligatory. Therefore, your proposed third option is incoherent. You're literally saying, one is obligated to do what is good, but not obligated to do what is good, by misusing the language.
Further, by virtue of your claim of the obligation imposed by the second premise, your first premise is rendered null. Being morally obligated to prevent negative well-being is equal to being morally obligated to cause positive well-being (not doing what is bad=doing what is good), if there is a forced choice between doing and not doing, like in the original example.
Therefore, either your argument is incoherent, or it is exactly what I said.
If one is morally obligated to bring about well-being, then it only follows that it should be the most well-being possible, whatever the context.
In the original example, you claimed that the doctor is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs from the one, for the sake of the well being of the five. But because you only have enough time to do one or the other, these are the only two options: to harvest the healthy organs, or don't harvest the healthy organs. Both options represent a moral choice. You claim that one is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs on the grounds that it would produce negative well being for the healthy man. But that choice will result, with certainty, in the suffering and deaths of the five dying people, who you, as their surgeon, are responsible for. This example clearly shows that well-being is not sufficient as a standard of morality.
To avoid this problem, you claimed that numbers don't matter.
So, Let me ask you a different question.
Suppose a man has planted a nuclear bomb in a city of a million people. You know for certainty that he will tell you where it is in time to stop it only if you torture the information out of him. If you do not torture him, then a million people will certainly die.
Are you:
A) Morally obligated to torture the man
B) Morally permitted, but not obligated, to torture the man
C) Morally prohibited from torturing the man
…?
At what point do numbers start to matter?
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"The well-being loss by the five could be less than the well-being gained by the one, the well-being of the five could be quantitatively similar and not be more than one instance of well-being - you are completely stripping any analysis that isn't surface level from it, and then claiming that the standard is "arbitrary" because the answer isn't what you want it to be. "
It's an arbitrary standard for the following reasons:
First, you touch upon the need to quantify well-being in making moral judgements. The very fact that this isn't actually possible to do accurately in the real world, since the consequences of a given action can rarely be accurately quantified, already makes this an impractical standard. The vast majority of moral judgements will be made on incomplete information. This limitation means that in order to discuss the philosophical assumptions of your theory, we have to account for the otherwise unknowable variables by means of thought experiments. These aren't always going to be probable or realistic in the literal sense, but they bring the core concepts into light. It's not every day that a trolley goes haywire on a track towards some people, yet that's a common thought experiment in moral philosophy.
Secondly, the idea of well-being as the standard of moral good, means that all moral decisions are completely context-dependent. This makes all morality both relative to the situation, and determined by the arbitrary whims of the moral actor.
Thirdly, the exact specifications of what exactly constitutes well-being are vague and ill-defined. It isn't clear what all elements would even be involved in calculating well-being.
You've also selected well-being as a standard for moral good with the justification that we have no option except to value our well being. But the body compels one to urinate under threat of death. Does this mean that urination should be the standard of morality?
Therefore, your standard is totally arbitrary.
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"You seem to think its possible to not value your own well-being, its not, literally, on an evolutionarily level - it is impossible to not value your own well-being. Literally, the fact that you flinch away from pain is proof of that"
This would be simpler to address if we knew the parameters of what constitutes well-being. However, the existence of people who commit suicide is a defeater to this proposal. You could say most people value their well being, but it's not universal. It is completely possible to not value one's own well-being.
The fact the people value something, doesn't make it morally valuable. While I agree that well-being has a place in ethics, I disagree that it is a standard.
It's also possible to value ones well-being less than the well-being of another. The fact that people value sacrifice gives it as much justification for a standard of ethics as you've provided for well-being.
Finally, how do you avoid egoism? It seems you've paved the way for it.
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@Theweakeredge
First of all, I have been nothing but respectful to you, so you need to cool it. It is extremely rude to accuse me of being dishonest when I have read, and taken the time to comprehend and understand your position. Through that understanding, I see flaws in your reasoning.
Secondly, it's you who isn't getting it, but there is a lot there, so I will have to make a thorough response when I get home. Thank you for your patience.
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@RationalMadman
Wow man, that's super nice, glad I commented first lol
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@Theweakeredge
That conflicts with your claim that we ought to do that which brings about the good. You claimed, through the example of working out, that if the calculus equals out to more good than the negative of that good, then the action is moral. You agreed that we ought to act morally, and that the moral action brings about the most good. You define good as well being. Therefore, when forced to choose between the well being of one or the well being of five, it would logically follow from your own admissions, that the well being of the five should take precedence. However, you are making an arbitrary exception in the case of the organ transplant scenario, on the grounds that the act of harming an individual in order to gain a greater aggregate of well being for the five, is morally prohibited. And herein lies your contradiction. You aren't justifying why the well being of the one shouldn't be infringed to promote the well being of the five, you're just making a random exception to your own logic.
The point I'm driving at is that defining the good as wellbeing is arbitrary, because well-being isn't inherently good. You haven't adequately justified why well-being should be a first principle of morality, other than stating that people value their well being. But ones valuing of well being, doesn't make that well being morally valuable. Furthermore, not all people consider their well being to be important, so if ones intuitions reject your premise that people value their well being, then your whole ethic collapses under the weight of it's arbitrary premises.
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@Theweakeredge
I generalized it specifically so you can't say it's too unrealistic, and you're not answering the question.
If there is any situation where the well being of one, could be taken or diminished, in order to increase the well being of five, it seems that under your model, it would be morally obligatory to infringe on that one person's well being in order to increase the well being of the five. You said yourself with the example of working out, that something's it is justified to diminish well being if it increases it more in the end, after doing the cost-benefit analysis . The point im making is that cost benefit analysis is inadequate to make moral decisions, and can easily lead to immoral decisions, if that is how one determines morality.
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@Theweakeredge
So if presented with a choice between the good of five and the good of one, which should take precedence, assuming those are the only two options?
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@RationalMadman
Haha, male, but don't worry you won't offend me.
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@Theweakeredge
And do you consider a moral action to be one that beings about the good, as you define it?
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@RationalMadman
Lol sure why not
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@Timid8967
Science is inductive and can never deal in epistemic certainty.
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@coal
You are unnecessarily splitting hairs. In the OP, I do not assume that consent is a first principle of morality, I'm questioning the validity of that claim.
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@coal
I am not making a positive claim, or a negative claim in the OP. I'm simply questioning the validity of assuming consent is a valid principle upon which to reason about morality.
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@Theweakeredge
Do you believe that rational beings ought to act morally?
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@coal
Consent-
-noun
permission for something to happen or agreement to do something.
-verb
give permission for something to happen.
-A first principle is a basic proposition or assumption that cannot be deduced from any other proposition or assumption
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@Theweakeredge
Thank you.
In reference to both answers, so you would not consider it morally obligatory to perform actions that generate the most good, as you define the good? But you would consider it morally obligatory to not commit actions against that good?
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@fauxlaw
I don't have a problem with authority, I have a problem with fallacies in your reasoning.
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@Theweakeredge
Could you please answer the questions directly? I'd like the clarification.
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@Theweakeredge
The bane of divine command theory. Replace "command" with "will" and it becomes the bane of all Theological Voluntarism.
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@fauxlaw
I'm not following you anymore. I'm just trying to point out that your logic is a fallacy. An appeal to legality is an appeal to authority because legality is not automatically moral by virtue of being law, even if that law is agreed upon by the majority because that would be an ad populum.
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@fauxlaw
Oh, ye of little faith. In this instance, they are right. Why doubt? Appreciate that they are right. Appreciate that morality and legality can intersect for our good. If they don't wee have the means to stand and oppose. Individuals start revolutions when necessary, and, yes, that can go both ways.
I agree that morality and politics intersect often, I don't agree that "legality=morality"
Legislation can be evil, look at the Nazi's and Stalin. The russians under Lenin, and Stalin, did not successfully depose the despots. The Bolsheviks won the civil war to boot.
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@Theweakeredge
"This question is nonsensical..."
This is where i got it from:
Another problem for utilitarianism is that it seems to overlook justice and rights. One common illustration is called Transplant. Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant his organs into the other five. This operation would save all five of their lives, while killing the “donor”. There is no other way to save any of the other five patients (Foot 1966, Thomson 1976; compare related cases in Carritt 1947 and McCloskey 1965).
We need to add that the organ recipients will emerge healthy, the source of the organs will remain secret, the doctor won’t be caught or punished for cutting up the “donor”, and the doctor knows all of this to a high degree of probability (despite the fact that many others will help in the operation). Still, with the right details filled in (no matter how unrealistic), it looks as if cutting up the “donor” will maximize utility, since five lives have more utility than one life (assuming that the five lives do not contribute too much to overpopulation). If so, then classical utilitarianism implies that it would not be morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant and even that it would be morally wrong for the doctor not to perform the transplant. Most people find this result abominable. They take this example to show how bad it can be when utilitarians overlook individual rights, such as the unwilling donor’s right to life.
_____
I'm trying to figure out:
1) Is it morally obligatory to generate the most well-being for the most number of sentient (in this case, self-aware) beings in your model?
2) What is your definition of moral good?
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@Theweakeredge
For the sake of the example, the consequences are 5 sick people dying, or one healthy person dying to save the five sick, albeit against his consent.
I am not however assuming the following:
that 5 people suffering is as bad as one person dying and his sovereignty being abused
If your answer is C, that it is morally prohibited to take the organs of an unconsenting individual to save five sick people, then you have contradicted your own claim that the greatest well being is the greatest moral good.
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@Tarik
Stop attacking a position I don't hold. Im not claiming that consent is a metaphysic of morality. I'm questioning that claim's validity.
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@Theweakeredge
C - you're assuming a lot bud - 1 - that there are no other people with organs , 2 - that the organs in the sleepen' dude are actually matching with the people (given that there are 5 it's practically impossible for all 5 of them to match), etc, etc - you be assuming lots with this question.
For the sake of the example, we are assuming I know for certain that the organs are all matches and that there isn't enough time to get any other organs. Otherwise, you're missing the philosophical point. If your answer is C, then you have defeated your own premise that the greatest well being is the greatest moral good.
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@fauxlaw
That doesn't address the fact that you are appealing to legality as a moral standard, which is an appeal to authority. Just because a consensus of legislators agree this or that thing should be illegal or is immoral, doesn't make them right.
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@Theweakeredge
So the greatest good=the greatest well being? Then suppose I'm a doctor with five patients who need different organ transplants. I notice that there is a healthy guy sleeping in the next room, from whom I could harvest the necessary organs, and then maximize the well being of the five over the one. Am I:
A) morally obligated to harvest the man's organs
A) morally obligated to harvest the man's organs
B) morally allowed, but not obligated to harvest the man's organs
C) morally prohibited from harvesting the man's organs
...?
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@Theweakeredge
Why should we accept well-being as a first principle of morality? Suppose your well-being came into conflict with another's? Or a group of people? How could the calculus lead one to morality?
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@fauxlaw
An appeal to legality is an appeal to authority. Suppose the legal definition of consent allowed for children to consent to adult things. You wouldn't say that because children consented to sexual acts with Michael Jackson, that that isn't morally abhorrent. We can't use the law as a standard of morality, because law is nothing more than the dictations of whoever is in power at the time.
Do you believe that there are implicit contracts, like the social contract?
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@Theweakeredge
I disagree that cost-benefit analysis has anything to with morality. That's the utilitarian standpoint, but I disagree with Utilitarianism almost completely. The only thing I accept, is that people seek pleasure and seek to avoid pain, however, I disagree with the idea that pain and pleasure are our sovereign masters.
Your definition of a right would seemingly apply to civil rights, but not natural rights, since civil rights are granted, and natural rights are inherent. Do you believe that consent is a natural right or a civil right? Do you believe that natural rights exist? And finally, do you believe that there are implicit contracts like the social contract?
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@fauxlaw
You're just assuming consent is a right, and asserting that a violation of that consent is a violation of their rights. But you aren't justifying why 1) consent is a right, or 2) why consent is a moral principle.
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