Thanks to Patmos for the debate. I will defend my case, refute his, and conclude with voting issues.
== Overview ==
First, do not allow Patmos to make any new arguments or arguments against dropped points in his next posting. Not only is making such arguments against the rules of the debate, but it would be unfair to me, as I would have no chance to respond.
Second, Pro continues to problematically shift the goalposts. First, it is unfair to me because (a) it prevents me from developing and sustaining an argumentative narrative against his points and (b) it invalidates my argumentative wins to the extent that each time I convincingly refute an argument of Pro's, Pro can just offer some totally new point an emerge unscathed. Pro's advocacy becomes so slippery that it evades any response. Second, it destabilizes Pro's advocacy because (a) his advocacy becomes unclear and (b) his advocacy becomes incoherent, to the extent that his positions contradict. He cannot simply pretend that he did not make his original arguments. Anywhere Pro shifts the goalposts, Pro's arguments should be rejected.
Third, recall that if even one of the 4 O's is not true of God, God as defined does not exist and Con wins.
== Con's Case ==
I. To Pass Over in Silence
If I am a blind man and was never told about color, I could not imagine it or think of it. Only because I am told about it (and thus given reference) can I think about it at all. So, Pro's counter-example is non-responsive to my argument.
II. The Four O's
A. God Cannot be Omniscient
First, Pro shifts the goalposts. His original argument was that god was not like the doctor. Now, Pro's argument is about non-propositional knowledge. This goalpost shifting is especially troublesome this late in the debate. Because this round is or summary and rebuttal, I have even fewer characters to devote to responding to late arguments. Also, this is my one and only chance to respond to Pro's argument, but he'll get two rounds (3&4) to talk about it, which is unfairly skewed.
Second, Pro still refers to non-propositional information as "knowledge" (e.g. "if non-propositional knowledge is defined into omniscience"). This is crucial, because per my definition of omniscience, which Pro dropped, omniscience means "possessed of universal or complete knowledge." Since Pro concedes that non-propositional information is knowledge, god must know non-propositional knowledge or god is not possessed of complete knowledge. By conceding that god cannot know non-propositional knowledge, Pro has conceded that god is not omniscient.
Third, the realization that "I am in the hospital" may be a realization, but it can also be expressed as a proposition. Propositional knowledge is knowing-that, and it is the case that I know that I am in the hospital. Therefore, Pro's objection does not apply to my original argument.
Finally, if god lacks knowledge of what it is like to be a sinner, how can god justly pass judgement upon us? We take as fundamental the importance of empathy--the ability to put oneself in the shoes of the Other--in coming to understand (and thus fairly and comprehensively evaluate) the character and deeds of others. If god cannot know what it is like to be a sinner, god lacks the necessary qualities to judge us, which would constitute a defect in god. Plus, if god cannot empathize with us, he is not omnipotent either (it's something he cannot do).
B. God Cannot be Omniscient and Omnipresent
Pro says that "to be omnipresent and atemporal really means that you're nowhere." Omnipresence means, per the definition Pro dropped, "present in all places at all times." Extend my definition of omnipresence because it (a) was dropped and (b) comes from a credible dictionary. God cannot be present in all places if god is nowhere; that is a contradiction in terms. Pro says that god is omnipresent because god "can view and influence everywhere." But "viewing" is not the same as being "present." I can "view" Earth without being "present" on Earth. For god to be "present," god must be temporally located everywhere. By conceding that god cannot be present everywhere, Pro has conceded that god is not omnipresent. Also, Pro, by focusing on physical locality, drops my argument that god must be submerged in the timeline.
C. God Cannot be Omnipotent
First, Pro essentially admits that he shifted the goalposts. Cross-apply my overview and reject Pro's argument.
Second, Pro's reply is not actually responsive to my argument about bags. Pro writes: "You haven't lifted the rock per se but you have raised the position of the rock." However, that moving the bag is not the exact same thing as moving the rock does not refute the fact that "if there is a rock so heavy that god cannot lift it, placing it in/on a plane will merely make the plane unliftable." Extend my argument.
Third, Pro does not offer a response to my two-part paradox, namely: "can god create a plane which is (a) too heavy for it to lift and (b) cannot be placed on/in another plane." My two-part paradox overcomes the root of Pro's counter-paradox (namely, the use of planes). Pro says that he could offer something about superposition or another paradox as a rebuttal, but, in fact, he offers neither, and so Pro has no substantive response to my point. Extend my argument as dropped.
D. God Cannot be Omnibenevolent
First, Pro claims that omnibenevolence allows for evil if that evil is for the greater good. Yet, perfect goodness is incompatible with any evil, since allowing any evil would be an imperfection in goodness. Pro also disputes that free will would exist in a perfectly moral world. Sure, there are some choices we could not make (like murder), but there are many choices we could make (like whether to be a painter or a philosopher). In such a world, the limited loss of free will is offset by the massive gains in morality.
Second, there is an important distinction Pro's missing. Pro's rebuttal that "evil = net good" is moot because Pro cannot show that it is always the case; on that we agree. My original argument that "any evil = no omnibenevolence" is not moot, because it may nonetheless be the case that any evil negates god's omnibenevolence. So, Pro is only agreeing to the mootness of his argument, not to the mootness of mine.
Third, on objective morals, Pro's thinking is, in principle, wrong, because he ignores nuances in motivation. For instance, I argue that "sadistic infanticide" is objectively immoral. None of the cultures Pro has put forward engaged in sadistic infanticide, as the chief object of their infanticide was not sexual gratification via torture and murder. The Aztecs and Mayans, for instance, appeared to believe that the infanticides were necessary to placate the gods, and was thus for the greater good.
== Pro's Case ==
I. Cosmological Argument
Pro says that because god had the power to define every property of the universe, god is omnipotent. That doesn't follow because (a) a super-powerful, non-omnipotent being could have done the same and (b) creation does not imply ongoing control. Pro also says that parents don't design children, but designer children are only a short time away technologically. Soon, parents will be able to design and create their children, but that does not mean they will be able to know their children's thoughts and feelings or know every scar or anatomical change their kids might pick up during the course of their lives. Creation does not imply perfect knowledge. And remember: Pro said he cannot demonstrate omnibenevolence. Thus, Pro cannot demonstrate god's omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence.
B. The Argument
First, Pro has not demonstrated that my counter-syllogism is metaphysically impossible. Thus, per inductive reasoning, it is equally valid to and cancels out Pro's syllogism. Second, Pro chooses to talk a lot about quantum events, but drops the radioactive decay argument. Extend that radioactive decay is uncaused. This renders the first premise of Pro's syllogism false by showing that events can be uncaused. Third, Pro drops that the "heath death" argument is (a) unwarranted and (b) false. This is key, because the heat death argument was Pro's only remaining one against an infinite past. Extend that the "heat death argument" fails.
II. Teleological Argument
I'm going to skip some numbers.
Second, Pro gives two criteria he says are "believed" to be crucial for life. This doesn't undermine my core point: namely, that because life can exist in a huge range of conditions, it begs the question to assume that life was improbable in this universe.
Third, I did a Ctrl+F search for "quantum information" in Pro's sources and found nothing. With scant explanation in the round, and sources which are not enumerated (such that I cannot know if any/which of his sources support Pro's claim), Pro's claim remains uncorroborated. Any corroboration (or clarification) would come too late for me to respond to. Pro's argument must be dismissed.
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh, these points get dropped without any substantive reply. Extend them.
== Voting Issues ==
1. Pro does not meet his burden