Instigator / Pro
39
1634
rating
13
debates
80.77%
won
Topic
#1581

Conservative Nuclear Arsenals are Preferable to Total Nuclear Weapons Abolition

Status
Finished

The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.

Winner & statistics
Better arguments
18
0
Better sources
12
10
Better legibility
6
5
Better conduct
3
5

After 6 votes and with 19 points ahead, the winner is...

Jeff_Goldblum
Parameters
Publication date
Last updated date
Type
Standard
Number of rounds
3
Time for argument
One week
Max argument characters
6,000
Voting period
Two weeks
Point system
Multiple criterions
Voting system
Open
Contender / Con
20
1499
rating
2
debates
50.0%
won
Description

Full resolution: In a near-future, hypothetical anarchic interstate system in which total nuclear weapons abolition is possible, we ought to prefer nuclear states maintaining conservative nuclear arsenals.

Burden and Objectives:
-Pro must affirm the resolution.
-Con must negate the resolution.
-Thus, the burden of proof rests with Pro.

Definitions:
"Near future" - For the purpose of this debate, "near future" really just means that in the hypothetical anarchic interstate system, weapons technologies are the same as today. This prevents either myself or my opponent from desperately inventing some potential weapon that upends the spirit of the debate.

"Anarchic Interstate System" - A system of international relations in which there is no central governing power (i.e. no world government). Today's international system is anarchic. The United Nations does not count as a central governing power, because any of the great powers can prevent binding UN resolutions.

"Total nuclear weapons abolition" - Disarmament of every nuclear weapon on the planet. Total disarmament. "Nuclear Zero," as some call it.

"Conservative nuclear arsenals" - For the purposes of this debate, conservative nuclear arsenals means 1) Nuclear states reduce their arsenal size and capabilities down to the level of bare-minimum 2nd-strike capability. 2) Nuclear states adopt No First Use policies. 3) Nuclear states maintain their nuclear arsenals by keeping nuclear warheads separated from delivery vehicles under normal conditions. Only during extreme crises would the nuclear warheads be coupled with delivery vehicles, thus rendering them ready to fire.

"2nd-strike capability" - The ability to suffer a massive nuclear 1st strike from an enemy and still retain enough nuclear weapons to retaliate with a destructive 2nd strike. This is generally considered the bare-minimum for nuclear deterrence. If you possess 2nd-strike capability, it would be suicidal for an enemy to launch a nuclear first strike.

"No First Use policies" - A declaratory policy on the part of a nuclear state, in which the state promises it will never use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, UNLESS they have suffered biological/chemical attacks or a major conventional attack on the homeland.

Round Structure:
R1 Introductory arguments
R2 Response to R1 arguments
R3 Response to R2 arguments and closing remarks (no wholly new arguments may be introduced in this round)

Criterion Pro Tie Con Points
Better arguments ✔ ✗ ✗ 3 points
Better sources ✗ ✔ ✗ 2 points
Better spelling and grammar ✗ ✔ ✗ 1 point
Better conduct ✗ ✗ ✔ 1 point
Reason:Concession

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@Lucy

Thanks for a great debate. I just want to remind you that, per the round structure I laid out in the debate description, R3 is only to be used for rebuttals to R2 arguments and providing closing remarks. I am pointing this out because an opponent in another debate of mine recently ran afoul of these ground rules.

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@Lucy

Kroenig's book is a really good read, but I think it also represents that stereotypical notion of the out-of-touch academic who places too much faith in pure logic and theoretical models. I've been poring over transcripts from the Cuban Missile Crisis and 1973 October Crisis, and to put it simply, I don't think his proposed model is represented in reality very well.

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@Jeff_Goldblum

Kroenig came to my school and debated one of my professors a few years ago. I watched that and read one of his articles while doing a certificate program in international security. I remembered him during this debate, crazy coincidence he's a central figure for your thesis.

A couple points I want to get across after posting my R2:

1) One of my sources is a Foreign Affairs article. If anyone does not have access and would like it, feel free to ask for a copy of the article from me. I will be happy to provide.
2) I did not mention it in the text of my R2, but I am actually writing my thesis - to a large extent - on Matthew Kroenig's book, "The Logic of American Nuclear Superiority." I have a bone to pick with his conclusions, but I did not think my opinions on the matter were important enough to justify taking up precious characters. But if anyone wants to chat about Kroenig, I'm down.
3) I can't stress enough that I think it's vital readers/judges understand the definition of "conservative nuclear arsenals" as listed in the debate description. I use the term a lot but I don't take up characters to continually re-state its meaning within the context of the debate. Same goes for abolition, I guess, but that's a lot more clear.

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@GeneralGrant

The debate description makes clear we're considering this question within the context of an anarchic interstate system that could accommodate nuclear abolition.

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@Lucy
@Jeff_Goldblum

My question is would these conservative amount of nuclear arsenals be respected by China and Russia? I think this debate is mute point because while the US would abide by these numbers or even got rid of all their arsenal, everyone knows that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea would not.

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@Jeff_Goldblum

Had to keep you on your toes :)
I had a different R1 but scrapped it. Wanted to get into the game theory weeds this round, but it didn't fit my structure

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@Lucy

You had me thinking I had a win via forfeit coming my way.

But I think we've got a live one here. I'm glad you submitted your argument.