Resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.
All stages have been completed. The voting points distribution and the result are presented below.
With 5 votes and 2 points ahead, the winner is ...
- Publication date
- Last update date
- Time for argument
- Three days
- Voting system
- Open voting
- Voting period
- One month
- Point system
- Winner selection
- Rating mode
- Characters per argument
R1 - Con waives, pro posts case
R2 - Con case + rebuttals, pro rebuttals
R3 - Con rebuttals, pro conclusion
R4 - con conclusion, pro waives
(David L. Thompson, Body and the Unity of Action, 2011)
A perceived object ... is experienced ... as a unity. It is given as one integrated thing that has other sides than the side currently perceived –otherwise it would be only a two dimensional appearance, a facade. In experiencing it as real, I perceive it as more than what appears from my current perspective ... the unity of the thing is paralleled by the unity of the perceiving body – the "lived body" or "body-subject." ... The seeing from different perspectives, the tasting, the hearing, etc. must all be done by the one, unified experiencing body. I must be one body for the cup to be experienced as one, real thing. ... I am not currently seeing the cup from the other side; it is the potential for the body to look at it from other sides that constitutes the cup with the meaning "real object," as opposed to a mere appearance. ... the lived body is not itself an object perceived. It is on the side of the perceiving. ...
Stephen K. White. As the World Turns: Ontology and Politics in Judith Butler. Polity, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 155-177
ontologies emerge from the conjunction of two insights: acceptance of the idea that … fundamental conceptualizations of self, ... are contestable, and awareness that such conceptualizations are nevertheless unavoidable for any sort of reflective ethical and political life. ... ontologies do not proceed by categorical positings of, ... human nature or telos, ... Rather, they offer figurations of human being in terms of certain existential realities, ... These figurations are accounts of what it is to be a certain sort of creature: one entangled with language; conscious that it will die; possessing, despite its entanglement and limitedness, the capacity for radical novelty; and, finally, giving definition to itself against some ultimate background or "source" that evokes awe, wonder, or reverence. ...
And this precludes the AC because the way we construct the individual is a prerequisite to having moral obligations. Butler:
Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler [Maxine Elliot Professor of rhetoric at Berkley] University press.
before we can speak about a self who is capable of choice, we must first consider how that self is formed. ... the sphere in which the subject is said to emerge is ‘‘ontological’’ in the sense that the phenomenal world of persons and things becomes available only after a self has been formed ... To describe this scene is to take leave of the descriptive field in which a ‘‘self ’’ is formed and bounded in one place and time and considers its ‘‘objects’’ and ‘‘others’’ in their locatedness elsewhere. The possibility of [ethics] … presumes ... the self and its ... world have ... been constituted, ...
L. Wittgenstein [kick ass philosopher]. Some Remarks on Logical Form. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 9, Knowledge,Experience and Realism (1929), pp. 162-171
propositions ... are ... products ... of simpler propositions. ... We must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such. ... They, ... are the kernels of every proposition, ... On plane I figures are drawn, ... ellipses and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures on plane II. ... We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II. ... from these images the exact shapes of the original figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred. We can only gather from them that the original was an ellipse or a rectangle. ... The case of ordinary language is quite analogous. If the facts of reality are the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational forms correspond to the circles and squares in plane II. ...
- Relativity - moral statements are false because there are variations of moral codes relative to distinct cultures. Mackie:
The argument from relativity has as its premise the ... variation in moral codes from one society to another ... and ... the differences in moral beliefs between ... groups ... within a complex community. ...: radical differences between ... moral judgments make it difficult to treat ... [them] as apprehensions of objective truths. ... Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people's ... participation in different ways of life. ... moral heretics and ... reformers, ... have turned against the established rules ... of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can ... be understood as the extension, ... of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. ...
- Queerness - humans do not have the moral faculty to know objective moral truths, therefore our moral statements are false. Mackie 2:
the argument from queerness ... has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be ... qualities ... of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. ... if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else … none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction of conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer, [—] a special sort of intuition is a lame answer ...
what are we conceding? Well, firstly morality is subjective ...
"But we can't help everyone, and aren't needs kinda arbitrary?"
... So, either you admit this resolution is true, or you don't believe in morality to begin ...
...I am obligated morally to do so because I am not an emotionally devoid psychopath, nor a completely self-centred narcissist.
... in no shape or form can you award Con the win as he doesn't exist ...
Notice that the entire Round that he was meant to use for opening arguments he uses only for rebuttals?!
I tether the win condition of Con to admit that emotions and morality rooted in obligation derived from subjective duties and meanings attributed to things ...
... which will then tear apart everything Con has built their case upon ...