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THBT: Trans-people are, and ought to be treated, as the gender they identify as

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Waiting for the contender's fourth argument.

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Trans - "used to describe someone who feels that they are not the same gender (= sex) as the physical body they were born with:" [A]
Gender - " the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female" [B]
Treat - "to behave toward someone or deal with something in a particular way:" [C]
Identify - "to recognize a problem, need, fact, etc. and to show that it exists:" [D]

[A] - https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/trans
[B] - https://dictionary.apa.org/gender
[C] - https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/treat?q=treated
[D] - https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/identify

General Rules:
1. No new arguments in the last round
2. Sources should be posted in the debate rounds, hyperlinked or otherwise
3. Burden of Proof is shared

Round 1
Pro
RESOLUTION: Trans-people are, and ought to be treated as, the gender they identify as
POSITION: Pro



OPENING STATEMENT:
Throughout history, there have been tales of the oppressed, tales of those who are pushed down, held down, until they are "no more" as far as society is concerned. The people whose identities are no more than a blockage in the road of their goals of power. Trans-individuals are one of the primary targets of this dehumanization, though western society is mostly responsible for such oppression - we find accounts of it throughout the globe. Regardless, that oppression is not the primary topic of today's debate, no, instead we find something which propagates such oppression, or at the very least forms of it. That is, to deny the empirical, biological, psychological, and neurological truth that trans-individuals are the gender they identify as, and ought to be treated as such. 

Perhaps the voters, and most assuredly my opponent, don't buy that claim, that's perfectly acceptable and even understandable - most people aren't trans-gender - most people's internal neurological chemistry which constructed their gender-matched with the one that appeared to dictate their genitalia, and humans have a bad case of assuming that other people's experience of the world matches their own. That is not the case - historically speaking - every time an identity came to light that was not heteronormative or cis-gendered, the general society would push against it. Masses of individuals believed that people weren't "actually homosexual" - some people even still believe this - some people believe that it would be impossible for individuals to not feel romantic or sexual urges, yet science has backed both of these conclusions. 

Today I hope to do much the same for the case of the trans-individual, to definitively prove that this internal sense of gender is not just something that we should tolerate, but something that we should accept as we accept our own internal identification of our gender. To accept as we accept our own internal sense of sexuality. To accept as we accept our own mind. To some, this would be an extreme case of arrogance, but it is not from some sort of misplaced pride that I present the following case, it is from research, from studies which corroborate one another, which build atop of one another. From the analysis of mostly accepted ethics, the fact that these people are as they identify is more than enough to place an obligation upon any individual who calls themselves "moral" to treat them as such.



DEFINITIONS:
  • Trans - "adj. having or relating to a gender identity that differs from the culturally determined gender roles for one’s birth sex (i.e., the biological sex one was born with) or for one’s sex as surgically assigned at birth:" [A]
  • Gender - "n. the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female" [B]
  • Treat - "to behave toward someone or deal with something in a particular way:" [C]
  • Identify - "to recognize a problem, need, fact, etc. and to show that it exists:" [D]
If my opponent contests the definitions taken from the Cambridge Dictionary and the American Psychological Association's Dictionary of Psychology (colloquially called the APA), then they must both provide properly topical counter definitions and arguments for their superiority of usage within the debate. 



INTERPRETATION (OF THE RESOLUTION).
Using the above-provided definition the proper interpretation of such the resolution could be represented thusly:
  • People whose gender identity differs from the culturally determined gender roles for one's birth sex (or sex's which is assigned at birth) are, and ought to have people behave towards them as, the gender which they recognize, and shows it to exist. 
Though the definitions are shortened slightly, that is purely for a more assessable of reading the interpreted resolution - essentially:
  1. We are specifically discussing people whose internal sense of gender identity does not match the one assigned at birth
  2. That these people are the gender that they identify as, not just that they think such a thing to be true, but that they are
  3. That these people are owed an obligation for the general population to behave towards them as the gender they identify with


OBSERVATIONS (OF THE RESOLUTION & DEFINED TERMS)
  • Psychological traits or properties are inherently emergent properties of neurological properties of one's self - therefore neurological properties apply to gender
  • My BoP is to demonstrate, most reasonably, that generally, trans-people are the gender they identify as, and that they ought to be treated that way 
  • My opponent would have to disprove both claims in order to fully uphold their BoP, as leaving one unrebuked leaves my BoP partially intact 


BRIEF STRUCTURE OF PRO'S CASE:
1. The gender of Trans-individuals
               1a. The neurological evidence of such
               1b. The psychological evidence of such

2. The harm of denying that gender
               2a. The harm on an individual scale
                2b. The moral obligation individually



CONTENTION I - GENDER OF TRANS-INDIVIDUALS
Essentially, this is one of the biggest portions of what I must prove, in order to win this debate - I must fundamentally demonstrate that the gender identity which trans-individuals have is the gender that they are. First, I will cross-reference the definition as provided above:

  • "the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female"
Therefore the argument proceeds as follows: The gender that trans-individuals identify as theirs (their gender-identity) is in line with the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being the gender they identify as. Before I can demonstrate that individuals are the gender they identify as psychologically, I must demonstrate that they are such on a neurological level. Fundamentally, consciousness is the emergent property of the process of neurons firing, of the brain functioning, therefore the fact of neurological evidence would greatly enhance the arguments thusly.

1a. the neurological evidence: First, I will provide the studies which demonstrate my claim neurologically, then I will provide the summarized case of such - this is to ensure the voter's proper interpretation of such studies, I expect my opponent to contest my sources and the grammatical integrity of the interpretation taken; therefore, I will take the appropriate caution as to avoid misinterpretation. 

Overall, on the topic of the debate, my source (1) concludes:
"Our data reveal a sex-atypical INAH3 volume and neuron number in transsexual male-to-female people to be in the female range, while the values of a female-to-male subject were in the male range. Differences in adult testosterone levels can only partly explain the observed differences in the INAH3 subdivision of transsexual people while estrogen levels do not seem to have an influence. In male-to-female subjects the number of neurons in the INAH3 does not seem to be related to sexual orientation, nor to the onset time of transsexuality, but rather to atypical early female-biased gender." (1)
So, generally, the study reports that trans-gender males have similar brain structure to cis-males, and trans-women with cis-women, though the latter part does discuss how hormones play a role in regards to testosterone partially, such is not concluded about estrogen, nor even the total difference - in other words - while hormones are a part of the separation, this is not fully the case and is not the case in women with estrogen.

Furthermore, the study is generally discussing the structure and shape of the brain, specifically the correlative similarity between trans-individuals and cis-individuals who identify the same as the trans-individual - and while the neurological differences which align with the most extreme of the gender spectrum (male and female) is widely disputed, there is enough evidence, that in this case - they are indeed comparable:
"...The first structural difference in the human hypothalamus was reported by our group in the sexually dimorphic nucleus of the preoptic area (SDN-POA) that we found to be 2.5 times larger in men than in women and to contain 2.2 times as many cells ... also called the intermediate nucleus ... The latter authors described four interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH1-4) and found a larger volume in men compared to women for INAH3 (2.8 times) and for INAH2 (2 times) subdivisions. The fact that they could not find a sex difference in INAH1 as found by us ....could be fully explained by the strong age effect on the sex differences of this nucleus..." (1)
Firstly, the case of the weight of the brain:
"A significant sex difference was found for brain wieght... Male brain weight was higher than female brain weight (P < 0.001). Male-to-female transsexual persons had a brain weight ....in between that of the males ... and females...(Tables 1 and 2), that was almost significantly different from the male group, ...but not different from the females ...." (1)
Then, the case for the separation of the INAH3:
"The INAH3 subdivision in males was significantly (1.9 times) larger than in females... The INAH3 volume values fully agree with the previously reported data (Table 4). Comparing the male-to-female transsexual group to the male group revealed a significant difference in the INAH3 subdivision.... , while no difference was found when the male-to-female group was compared to the female group ....(Figs 5 and 8)." (1)
Next, the case for neuronic density:
"The male group had a higher total number of neurons ... and a higher density of neurons ... than the female group (Fig. 6 and 7). Male-to-female transsexual people had a lower number of neurons compared to control males... while no significant difference was found in neuronal density .... They did not differ from the female control group with regard to the number of neurons .... or neuronal density .... (Figs 6 and 7)." (1)
To summarize the findings of this study, neurological testing revealed that trans-individuals are more similar (in some cases significantly) from brain weight, separation of necrotic subdivisions, and neuronic density to individuals of that gender who identify with the gender they were assigned at birth (cis-gendered people). As previously mentioned though, testosterone could have caused the effect, not gender identity: however, the biological causes of trans-individuals puts heavy doubt on that rhetoric:
"Hormones that trigger the development of sex and gender in the womb may not function adequately. For example, anatomical sex from the genitals may be male, while the gender identity that comes from the brain could be female. This may result from the excess female hormones from the mother’s system or by the foetus’s insensitivity to the hormones.....In CAH a female foetus has adrenal glands (small caps of glands over the kidneys) that produce high level of male hormones. This enlarges the female genitals and the female baby may be confused with a male at birth." (2)
In other words, the cause of gender identity not aligning with the perceived gender of trans-individuals is excessive exposure to hormones during gestation or the formation of gender identity. Therefore, it is valid to conclude that individuals who have a gender identity that contradicts their perceived anatomical gender have higher levels of the hormone usually associated with their gender identity. 

Giving more credence to my previous studies conclusions is a unique study that comes to the same conclusion:
"It is well established that biology plays a major role. In fact, in the last few years research has focused mainly on neuroanatomy and sexual dimorphism of the brain, exploring the influence and shaping role of several genes and sex hormones [4]. In particular, the sexual dimorphic brain is considered the anatomical substrate of psychosexual development, on which genes and gonadal hormones may have a shaping effect [11]. Growing evidence shows that prenatal and pubertal sex hormones permanently affect human behaviour and heritability studies have demonstrated a role of genetic components. Indeed, cismen and ciswomen present anatomical differences in the total brain volume, as well as in several sex-dimorphic structures. In particular, the total brain volume is bigger in cismen, and in transgender men similar volumes to the assigned gender at birth were found [12,13,14,15].

However, the total intracranial volume in transwomen resulted to be in between male and female controls [12]. Furthermore, sex differences have been observed in cortical thickness that is higher in ciswomen compared to cismen in several regions [16,17]. Studies conducted on transgender individuals reported signs of feminisation in cortical thickness of transwomen, while no sign of masculinisation was found in transmen [18,19]. Another sexual dimorphic area seems to be represented by the amygdala and the hippocampus. Indeed, the amygdala is larger in cismen and with a higher density of androgen than oestrogen receptors, whereas portions of the hippocampus are larger in women, with a higher density of oestrogen than androgen receptors (AR) [20,21]." (2)
In other words, where women are found to be different from men neurologically - trans-women are similarly different, and where men aren't affected by a neurological region - transmen are similarly unaffected.  This gender identity is not just formed through neurological conditions however, it is at least, most likely, that further biological properties can practically differentiate male and female brains - which leads to the psychological evidence for of gender-affirming trans-identities:
"the popular explanation that there is a female and a male brain on the base of gender behavioural differences is not supported by a strong empirical background [11], as, for example, men and women share more similarities than differences [38,39,40,41,42,43]. Furthermore, a great variability in behavioural and psychological aspects is shown between genders" (2)
In other words, while we can look at the neurological evidence in order to analyze and corroborate the evidence - giving credence to the idea that gender identity is formed partially through neurological processes - the bulk of the evidence will be in the psychological study of trans-men and women. 

1b. the psychological evidence: There are countless way's one could confirm the gender of one who identified contrary to the traditional binary, but I believe some of the most telling evidence to be the case of gender dysphoria. Generally speaking, most would agree that if your brain and mind react in an extremely negative way to some position, such as causing depression, suicidal thoughts, etc, that thing is something that is "not right" with the individual: such as the insistence that a trans-individual is the gender that society assigns them, and not the gender they identify as. If gender identity was simply speculation, then would find few to no examples of such consistent negative reaction to it being denied. 

Gender Dsyphoria is defined as,  from another study which references the DSMM, and I quote:
"(A)ccording to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders are defined as a "marked incongruence between their experienced or expressed gender and the one they were assigned at birth." People who experience this turmoil cannot correlate to their gender expression when identifying themselves within the traditional, rigid societal binary male or female roles, which may cause cultural stigmatization. This can further result in relationship difficulties with family, peers, friends and lead to interpersonal conflicts, rejection from society, symptoms of depression and anxiety, substance use disorders, a negative sense of well-being and poor self-esteem, and an increased risk of self-harm and suicidality" (3)
The study further suggests that trans-individuals receive:
"Patients with this condition should be provided with psychiatric support. Hormonal therapy and surgical therapy are also available depending on the individual case and patient needs. This activity describes the evaluation and management of gender dysphoria and reviews the role of the interprofessional team in improving care for those with this condition." (3)
Let's take a look at the facts then: trans-individuals are neurologically more similar to the gender they identify in the very, very minute differences we can find between cis-gender brains, and whenever they are treated as if they are the gender they do not identify with, they react with a "negative sense of well-being and poor self-esteem, and an increased risk of self-harm and suicidality", furthermore - psychologists reccomend that these people are given psychiatrists, and offered hormonal and/or surgical therapy. In other words, professionals in gender, are recommending that individuals with gender dsyphoria's bodies are corrected to match their internal gender identity.

You see, here I am primarily arguing that gender identity is an accurate way of measuring one's gender - as psychologist agree that it is the case - see another case of adapting new ways of sampling gender identity, solely focused on the idea of gender identity:
"The first exploratory factor analysis identified minor potential adjustments, which were refined and retested. Researchers evaluated and cross-validated the hypothesized factor structure and determined that the three factor GQI subscales and the unidimensional Gender Fluidity measure yielded internally consistent and valid scores among transgender individuals seeking clinical treatment and LGB individuals within a community setting. The exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses provide evidence of good reliability, construct validity, and internal consistency of all four subscales." (4)
Regardless of one's prior position regarding gender-identity - the fact that gender dyshproia is met with hormonal and surgical treatment, and not attempting to sway individuals out of what would be "false thoughts" if gender identity was not accurate way of measuring gender- demonstrates that psychologically the way one measures gender is via gender identity. The evidence is clear. 



CONTENTION II - THE HARM OF DENYING THAT GENDER
Breifly, I touched on the effects of gender dysphoria, but I did not explain in-depth all of the harms that this dysphoria -and propagating that dysphoria- causes. Furthermore, I will use an example of sexuality to show what the logical conclusion of denying one's identity is - with things such as conversion therapy, and SOGIECE practices - practices where physicians seek to block, suppress, refuse medical care to trans-or-gender-nonconfirming patients. 

2a. the individual harm of denial: I will simply refer back to the study I cited previously and the harms listed there:
"There is also growing evidence the childhood abuse, neglect, maltreatment, and physical or sexual abuse may be associated with GD. Individuals reporting higher body dissatisfaction and GD have a worse prognosis in terms of mental health. And as mentioned above in epidemiology, individuals with GD are found to have higher rates of depression, suicidal ideations, and substance use. Neuroanatomical links have been found in certain studies. A major one is faulty neuronal development and differentiation in the hypothalamic links. Functional neuroimaging has shown variations in hemispheric ratios and amygdala connectivity according to gender. A few case reports have reported some association of GD to maternal toxoplasma infection, although additional data is needed for further evidence. A genetic association is also identified as one of the causes of GD. Heritability and familiality of GD have been identified: for instance, higher prevalence in monozygotic twins than dizygotic twins. Some alleles (CYP17 and CYP17 T-34C) have also been found to have an association, although it is difficult to say if it is merely association or causation." (3)
To summarize the excerpt, childhood abuse, neglect, maltreatment, and physical/sexual abuse are more likely to happen to people with gender dysphoria, higher rates of depression, suicidal thoughts, and substance abuse - to connect this to people treating them as the gender they don't identify being harmful - is the fact that a lot of the more extreme correlations of trans-individuals is they rate at which they are neglected by general society:
"Children or adolescents who experience this turmoil cannot correlate to their gender expression when identifying themselves within traditional societal binary male or female roles, which may cause cultural stigmatization. This can further lead to relationship conflicts with family, peers, friends in various aspects of their daily lives and lead to rejection from society, interpersonal conflicts, symptoms of depression and anxiety, substance use disorders, a negative sense of well-being and poor self-esteem, and increased risk of self-harm and suicidality." (3)
Here, we see a direct correlation to denying one's gender identity and an increase in depression:
"One study looked at Native Americans and found that those who outsiders perceived as belonging to a different racial group experienced higher rates of depression and suicidality than those who were recognized for who they really were. Another study focused on multiracial individuals and found that those who were forced to report a single racial identity on a demographic form experienced lower self-esteem than those who were allowed to select multiple racial identities. And a study of transgender people found that the more frequently their gender identity was denied, the more stress and depression they experienced." (5)
Again, the evidence is clear - trans-individuals are greatly harmed by having their gender identity denied. This is not a disputable fact, furthermore, the correlation is backed up by similar studies which anyalize the same sort of effect in different populations, cementing the fact I aimed to establish.

2bthe obligation of individuals: Their is a simple fact that pervays throughout all of society, all of living organims with setience even, and that is we all have moral obligations to one another. Regardless if you believe that humans have no actual value, or that people don't have rights to not be bullied (debatable at best), the mere fact that you, subconsciously or otherwise, avoid death - and to not avoid death is considered a problem to be corrected (where the thought of wanting to be dead is a "bad" to one's mental health - notice again how that differs from people with gender identity - whose identity are affirmed) - means that you have a desire to live. 

In order for that desire to recpricated, you must respect that others have a desire to live, and allow them to live. To put it syllogistically:
P1: You desire to live
P2: Others desire to live
Con: Allowing one another to live fulfills both desires

If one were to not allow another to live, or would not respect that desire, then they would have no reason to respect your desire to live. Therefore, fundamentally speaking, you have an obligation to not kill other people - though that obligation is through an evolutionary imperative - it is an obligation nonetheless. Furthermore, taking this argument to it's logical conclusion, you - as in any person - have a subconscious desire to have more pleasure, to have more well-being as it were: and similarly, the only way to have that desire effectively recriprocated is by allowing others this same desire and fulfillment of such desire. 

However, you can skip all of this work, IF you agree that one ought to value human well-being, THEN you necessarily ought to not do what would decrease it - such as denying the gender of trans-individuals. The simple fact is that there is a very low bar of obligation, and even without the inherent desire to avoid pain, to simply not do something to purposely lower well--being. One could argue that things like discipline and working out "lower well-being" this is only true in the short term, ultimately the would usually raise well being. 



CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, neurologically and psychologically it is true that gender identity is an accurate way of measuring one's own gender. Furthermore, that denying this gender to someone is harmful, and that one ought not do what harms someone unnecessarily, especially because of the fact that these people are people - to deny the existence of trans-people is to fundamentally cause the oppression that I spoke of previously. In other words - I have fulfilled my dual BoP.



SOURCES:
Con
Preface: I am compelled to clarify the exclusions of this debate. We ARE NOT arguing over "civil rights;" we ARE NOT arguing over the notion of "equality"; we ARE NOT arguing over treating transgenders "better" or "worse"; we ARE NOT arguing over treating transgenders with "respect" or a lack thereof; we ARE NOT even arguing over whether or not they are the "sex" with which they were born. The focus of this debate centers on the proposition argued by my opponent: "Trans-people are, and ought to be treated, as the gender they identify as."

I will proceed with my contentions:

Now my opponent sought to contrast sex and gender by describing gender as:

Gender - "n. the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female" [B]
and gender identity as:

one’s self-identification as male or female. Although the dominant approach in psychology for many years had been to regard gender identity as residing in individuals, the important influence of societal structures, cultural expectations, and personal interactions in its development is now recognized as well. Significant evidence now exists to support the conceptualization of gender identity as influenced by both environmental and biological factors.
My opponent then proceeds to cite irrelevant data as to the correlative characteristics of the brain, particularly the iNAH volume in the hypothalamic region of a 42 participant sample:

The hypothalamic region of 42 brains was obtained from the Netherlands Brain Bank (NBB), with informed consent for a brain autopsy and the use of the tissue and the clinical data for research purposes. We selected 25 brains from control patients (14 males and 11 females) without an endocrine, neurological or psychiatric disease. The control male and female patients were matched for sex, age (range males: 25–81 years, females: 21–82 years) post-mortem delay and fixation time (Table 1). Possible confounding factors such as post-mortem delay, fixation time and hour of death for the male, female, transsexual and castrated groups did not differ in Kruskal–Wallis and Mardia–Watson–Wheeler tests [P > 0.109; P > 0.08; Chi-square (df3) = 3.68; P > 0.2981, respectively]. A systematic neuropathological investigation of all the subjects was performed (cf. Van de Nes et al., 1998) by Dr W. Kamphorst (Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands).
Before I explain the irrelevance, it would first behoove us to understand the functions and responsibilities of the hypothalamus:

The hypothalamus is responsible for:

  • releasing hormones
  • regulating body temperature
  • maintaining daily physiological cycles
  • controlling appetite
  • managing of sexual behavior
  • regulating emotional responses

Anatomy and function

The hypothalamus has three main regions. Each one contains different nuclei. These are clusters of neurons that perform vital functions, such as releasing hormones.
Anterior region

This area is also called the supraoptic region. Its major nuclei include the supraoptic and paraventricular nuclei. There are several other smaller nuclei in the anterior region as well.
The nuclei in the anterior region are largely involved in the secretion of various hormones. Many of these hormones interact with the nearby pituitary gland to produce additional hormones.

Some of the most important hormones produced in the anterior region include:

  • Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). CRH is involved in the body’s response to both physical and emotional stress. It signals the pituitary gland to produce a hormone called adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). ACTH triggers the production of cortisol, an important stress hormone.

  • Thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH). TRH production stimulates the pituitary gland to produce thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH). TSH plays an important role in the function of many body parts, such as the heart, gastrointestinal tract, and muscles.

  • Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH). GnRH production causes the pituitary gland to produce important reproductive hormones, such as follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) and luteinizing hormone (LH).

  • Oxytocin. This hormone controls many important behaviors and emotions, such as sexual arousal, trust, recognition, and maternal behavior. It’s also involved in some functions of the reproductive system, such as childbirth and lactation.

  • Vasopressin. Also called antidiuretic hormone (ADH), this hormone regulates water levels in the body. When vasopressin is released, it signals the kidneys to absorb water.

  • Somatostatin. Somatostatin works to stop the pituitary gland from releasing certain hormones, including growth hormones and thyroid-stimulating hormones.
The anterior region of the hypothalamus also helps regulate body temperature through sweat. It also maintains circadian rhythms. These are physical and behavioral changes that occur on a daily cycle. For example, being awake during the day and sleeping at nighttime is a circadian rhythm related to the presence or absence of light.

Middle region
This area is also called the tuberal region. Its major nuclei are the ventromedial and arcuate nuclei.

The ventromedial nucleus helps control appetite, while the arcuate nucleus is involved in releasing growth hormone-releasing hormone (GHRH). GHRH stimulates the pituitary gland to produce growth hormone. This is responsible for the growth and development of the body.

Posterior region

This area is also called the mammillary region. The posterior hypothalamic nucleus and mammillary nuclei are its main nuclei.

The posterior hypothalamic nucleus helps regulate body temperature by causing shivering and blocking sweat production.

The role of the mammillary nuclei is less clear. Doctors believe it’s involved in memory function.
You'll notice that something's missing: identity. Where in its description is the hypothalamus listed as responsible for one's identity, much less one's "gendered" identity?  Where does it state that the hypothalamus is responsible for self-identification?

Now I wish to offer two definitions to this debate's purview:

self identification:

1. the attribution of certain characteristics or qualities to oneself. (Oxford Languages.)

2. n. the act of construing one’s identity in particular terms, usually as a member of a particular group or category (e.g., “I am Hispanic,” “I am a lesbian,” “I am a father”) or as a person with particular traits or attributes (e.g., “I am intelligent,” “I am unlucky,” “I am fat”). (APA) [I do not want to exclude the descriptions my opponent incorporated in his citation.]

In addition, I'll submit these definitions of identity:

1. the characteristics determining who or what a person or thing is. (Oxford Languages)

2. an individual’s sense of self defined by (a) a set of physical, psychological, and interpersonal characteristics that is not wholly shared with any other person and (b) a range of affiliations (e.g., ethnicity) and social roles. Identity involves a sense of continuity, or the feeling that one is the same person today that one was yesterday or last year (despite physical or other changes). Such a sense is derived from one’s body sensations; one’s body image; and the feeling that one’s memories, goals, values, expectations, and beliefs belong to the self. Also called personal identity. (APA) [Take note of the parts I've emboldened.]

My opponent attempted a false equivalence (or to be more cautious, a yet to be substantiated equivalence.) He would have you believe that physical brain = mind = identity. That is, if he can demonstrate that one's physical brain is male/female, the mind must therefore be male/female. And if the mind is male/female, then one's identity, conscious or subconscious, must therefore be male/female. *Note that my opponent's neurological citations coincide with his submitted definitions and distinction of "sex," not "gender."

Now if my opponent stands by his affirmation of the proposition that "Trans-people are, and ought to be treated, as the gender they identify as," then that begs a few questions doesn't it?


1. First, and foremost: what is a "gendered" identity? I'm not talking about that which goes into formulating identity. I mean: what is it? For example, what is a male's identity? And how is it distinguishable from a female's identity? What are the distinct "body sensations, body images, and feelings that one's memories, goals, values, expectations, and beliefs [belonging] to the self that are DISTINCTLY MALE OR FEMALE?"

2. If my opponent is going to suggest that trans-people ought to be treated as the gender to which they identify, then how does he prescribe "cisgenders," and others who aren't trans, "treat" trans-people in accordance to their identified gender? How does one treat another as a "male" or a "female," or a "non-cis male," or "non-cis female," or "non-binary"? If one trans-individual informs a cis-gendered individual on his/her/zhim/zer sense of gendered identity, does one then apply that to every other trans-individual? And if this identification is subject to an individual's "sense" of it, then can one truly treat another, trans or not, in accordance to one's gender?

My opponent concluded that he satisfied his dual B.O.P., but in actuality, he hasn't even begun to meet his onus. In light of that, I propose my counterargument which negates my opponent's affirmation:

"Trans-people are individuals like any other, and ought to be treat as such." Again remember the exclusions with which I started my argument.

I don't have any neurological studies to offer; or peer-reviewed psychological studies. My approach is more intuitive. Because what has escaped my opponent is that the subject of identity is essentially abstract. Even my opponent cites a source (APA) which describes identity as characteristics subject to one's "sense" of self that isn't "wholly shared" with another. The notion that a person is an individual who has values, emotions, perspectives that are not just subject to but also dictate said individual's experiences is self-evident (literally!) 

Last, my opponent attempts to conscript essentially everyone in assuming responsibility for the well-being of gender dysphoric trans individuals using "emotional blackmail," i.e. if we don't perceive these gender-dysphoric individuals as part of the yet to be defined and distinguishable group to which they identify, then we are essentially complicit and serve as the catalyst for their suicidal thoughts, substance abuse, childhood abuse, physical/sexual abuse, neglect, bullying, harm, depression, maltreatment, and the like. He employs an ill-constructed syllogism to conflate one's "desire" to live to that of others (that is, the two premises do not logically and necessarily extend to his proposed conclusion.) He also cites an example of multiracial individuals who reported experiencing low self esteem after filling out a demographic form which lacked options for multiple races. Is my opponent willing to equate treating someone according to one's so-called "race" to treating them to their so-called "gender"? If that's the case, I ask my opponent to demonstrate this equivalence by explaining how one ought to be treated in accordance to one's so-called "race"? And in doing so, does this have a reciprocally detrimental effect in that, treating someone in accordance to one's gendered identification inhibits the expression of another's gendered identification? Case in point: if a trans-female wants to be desired as a woman, and I refuse to ask her out on a date because I refuse the prospect of engaging any sexual contact with one who, as far as reproduction is concerned, is male, then isn't my refusal as much an implicit denial of "her" gender as a government form is? And if "she" falls into depression, maltreatment, abuse, etc. given that my refusal to date "her" spurred a gender dysphoria, am I at fault because I shirked my alleged "obligation" to "see her live"? Wouldn't indulging her present conflict with my self-identification?

My opponent has offered nothing more than irrelevant citations for which he has yet to employ in service of a distinguishable gendered identity, much less a distinguishable response to it, and emotional blackmail when extended to its logical conclusion results in absurdity. As this debate continues, I will explore the scope of identity and further substantiate its being subject to individuality, as opposed to nebulous group concepts. I extend my contention that my opponent has not satisfied his onus.

I return the floor to my opponent.

Round 2
Pro
RESOLUTION: Trans-people are, and ought to be treated as, the gender they identify as
POSITION: Pro



BRIEF ROADMAP:
My opponent has offered little more than jumbled rebuttals, and thus I will separate my opponent's arguments into topical categories: the discussion regarding the hypothalamus and its function will be thus referred to as: EVIDENCE & FUNCTION, my opponent's arguments regarding gender identity specifically will be labeled as such, and moral theory and obligation will be labeled as such. I will first present counter rebuttals to each category outlined here in order that I listed them.




EVIDENCE & FUNCTION (REBUTTAL I)
  • Inner Guide
    • 1a - Reviewing Con's case
    • 1b - Nonexplicit Function
    • 1c - Derivative Evidence

1A (REVIEWING CON'S CASE)
"You'll notice that something's missing: identity. Where in its description is the hypothalamus listed as responsible for one's identity, much less one's "gendered" identity?  Where does it state that the hypothalamus is responsible for self-identification?" [1]
Prior to this, my opponent cites the precise functions of the hypothalamus, essentially he is arguing that: because it is not the function of the hypothalamus to establish gender identity, it is, therefore, true that the constructive I provided regarding the hypothalamus is not evidence for the validity of gender identity. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 

Before continuing I will cite the same source that Con did regarding the functions of the hypothalamus, underlining the bits that are relevant for 1b:
  • Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). CRH is involved in the body’s response to both physical and emotional stress. It signals the pituitary gland to produce a hormone called adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). ACTH triggers the production of cortisol, an important stress hormone.

  • Thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH). TRH production stimulates the pituitary gland to produce thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH). TSH plays an important role in the function of many body parts, such as the heart, gastrointestinal tract, and muscles.

  • Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH). GnRH production causes the pituitary gland to produce important reproductive hormones, such as follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) and luteinizing hormone (LH).

  • Oxytocin. This hormone controls many important behaviors and emotions, such as sexual arousal, trust, recognition, and maternal behavior. It’s also involved in some functions of the reproductive system, such as childbirth and lactation.

  • Vasopressin. Also called antidiuretic hormone (ADH), this hormone regulates water levels in the body. When vasopressin is released, it signals the kidneys to absorb water.

  • Somatostatin. Somatostatin works to stop the pituitary gland from releasing certain hormones, including growth hormones and thyroid-stimulating hormones.

1B (NONEXPLICIT FUNCTION)
I would like both the voters and my opponent to take notice of two of the six "functions" outlined by my opponent previously:
    • Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH).
    • Oxytocin
    Let's talk about CRH first, essentially it's a hormone that regulates stress:
    "Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) is a 41-amino acid peptide that has a key role in the adjustment of neuroendocrine, autonomic, and behavioral adaptations to stress [1,2]. One major neuroendocrine system involved in mediating the stress response is the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Hypothalamic CRH neurons drive both basal and stress-induced HPA activation." [2]
    Why is that at all relevant to our discussion regarding gender identity? Very simply put - we are discussing the reasons why the functions of the hypothalamus are related to gender identity. From there the connection is quite simple; gender dysphoria, an affiliation that is derived from external and internal stress regarding a conflict of an individual's physiological shape and gender identity [3], is quite clearly related and regulated by CHR - one of the Hypathalmus's primary functions. Given that fact, CRH has to be one of the key hormones in gender identity - as the only way that gender dysphoria can even form is a conflict between gender identity and another characteristic of an individual. Thus, any key formation of gender identity is reliant on CRH regulating stress, which determines if a transgender individual develops gender identity. 

    Oxytocin is a lot of things, but its primary function is to influence social relationships between individuals of a population
    "The neuropeptides oxytocin (OT) and vasopressin (VP) are hormones that are known to mediate social behavior and cognition, but their influence may be sex-dependent. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive review of the sex-related influence of OT and VP on social cognition, focusing on partner preference and sexual orientation, trust and relevant behaviors, memory modulation, and emotion regulation." [4]
    The relevance here should be much more easily explained: the primary angle that I presented my evidence from the first round was establishing a concrete correlation between sexual dimorphism in the brain and gender identity which isn't cis-gender. Therefore, the fact that Oxytocin's key role is dictating sexual dimorphism in mammals makes the relation extremely clear. Individual's who are assigned a gender that conflicts with their gender identity's brain still develop as someone of their gender identity would develop, it subtly differs from the other gender, thus - oxytocin must be one of the key hormones in establishing gender identity, and especially in allowing it to develop over time - as the evidence provided before clearly demonstrates that gender identity and neurology correlate explicitly based on sexual dimorphism. 

    Given this evidence, it is quite clear that the hypothalamus does indeed have key roles in establishing and maintaining gender identity, this evidence also clearly contradicts my opponent's claim made in the previous round - yes - the hypothalamus is involved in gender identity - very much indeed.


    IC (FUNCTION & EVIDENCE)
    However, even if my opponent were to disprove every point of the previous section, even if the Hypathalmus did indeed have no relation or function in regard to gender identity, his point would still be flawed. Recall: Con's position is that because the hypothalamus has no function of forming gender identity (false), it is therefore true that my citations aren't evidence of any correlation in gender identity and dimorphism of the hypothalamus. This claim is fundamentally and logically flawed - the fact that something does not create or cause something as a function does not mean that the thing created cannot affect that something.

    In other words, the fact that the hypothalamus doesn't make gender identity doesn't mean that you can't get evidence for gender identity from the hypothalamus. That's... absurd, it would be like claiming that the only way you could prove anything about stars is from the nebula that created them - or learn anything about water would be consulting oxygen and hydrogen molecules, all of these claims are absurd. You can derive evidence of x from y without y creating x. For example; Tom made a chair, and Alexa bought that chair. Alexa doesn't need to take the chair back to Tom to identify the broken chair leg. 


    • To sum up rebuttal one - the hypothalamus does indeed excrete several chemicals/hormones that are likely responsible for the formation of gender identity, and even if it weren't, the fact that something didn't create x, doesn't mean that you can't derive evidence about x from that thing. 



    GENDER IDENTITY (REBUTTAL II)
    • Inner Guide
      • 2a - Reviewing Con's Case
      • 2b - Regarding Gender
      • 2c - Gatekeeping Gender

    2A (REVIEWING CON'S CASE)
    "Because what has escaped my opponent is that the subject of identity is essentially abstract. Even my opponent cites a source (APA) which describes identity as characteristics subject to one's "sense" of self that isn't "wholly shared" with another. The notion that a person is an individual who has values, emotions, perspectives that are not just subject to but also dictate said individual's experiences is self-evident (literally!)"

    "....Note that my opponent's neurological citations coincide with his submitted definitions and distinction of "sex," not "gender...." [1]
    Prior to this, my opponent attempted to establish several questions that would, presumably, poke holes in the idea of gender identity. Primarily he wants to establish that gender identity is a vague concept and that there is no actual way to distinguish a cis individual from a trans-individual. Further, he attempts to discredit my argument for the neurological evidence of gender identity via the definition of gender and sex. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 

    Before continuing, I will briefly cite my opponent's question and answer it - note that this is merely to clear up some concepts before 2b and 2c.

    [Q]: "what is it? For example, what is a male's identity? And how is it distinguishable from a female's identity? What are the distinct "body sensations, body images, and feelings that one's memories, goals, values, expectations, and beliefs [belonging] to the self that are DISTINCTLY MALE OR FEMALE?:" [1]
    A: They are distinguishable via self-identification - they are different experientially. 


    2B (REGARDING GENDER)
    My opponent notes that the evidence I provide is more relevant to the description of sex than it is to gender; before we delve into exactly why this is incorrect, please recall the definition (and by proxy definition of sex) of gender:
    • Gender - "n. the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female"
    First notice some essential terms in the above definition:
    • usually
    • implies
    • Psychological
    Next - please draw your attention to the third term specifically - psychological - I submit a defintiion for the term now:
    "relating to the study of the mind:" [5]
    Further recall the framework established in round 1:
    "Psychological traits or properties are inherently emergent properties of neurological properties of one's self - therefore neurological properties apply to gender"
    "“Personality is an abstraction used to explain consistency and coherency in an individual’s pattern of affects, cognitions, desires and behaviors [ABCDs]” (Revelle, 2007, p. 37). But personality research currently provides more a taxonomy of patterns than theories of fundamental causes. Psychiatric disorders can be viewed as involving extremes of personality but are diagnosed via symptom patterns not biological causes. Such surface-level taxonomic description is necessary for science, but consistent predictive explanation requires causal theory. Personality constructs, and especially their clinical extremes, should predict variation in ABCD patterns, with parsimony requiring the lowest effective causal level of explanation. But, even biologically inspired personality theories currently use an intuitive language-based approach for scale development that lacks biological anchors. I argue that teleonomic “purpose” explains the organisation and outputs of conserved brain emotion systems, where high activation is adaptive in specific situations but is otherwise maladaptive" [6]
    What I'm arguing is that while gender usually does refer to purely social and cultural aspects of the gender/sex divide, the fact that their is a psychological aspect means that gender is defacto neurological, and therefore by proxy biological. Note that the definition specifically clarifies that the distinguishment of these terms are via the usuage of them, what does this mean? That the reason why we don't think of the neuroscience of gender is because we primarily talk about gender in a social or cultural context. The mere fact that my argument "seems" to follow one more than the other is irrelevent, as here we are discussing gender in both a social and a neurologic framework. 


    2C (GATEKEEPING GENDER)
    Please note the following characteristics of gender identity, as they are the primary qualities that my opponent attacks:
    • Abstract
    • Self-Identifying
    • Superficially Undistinguishable 
    My opponent appeals to these characteristics in some sort of informal reductio ad absurdum (presenting parts or facts regarding something as absurd in order to discredit it logically [7]). The problem is that an ad absurdum by itself does nothing to actually substantiate something absurd, it appeals to what is presumed to be absurd. Reading between the lines, it is clear that my opponent finds something which cannot be specifically distinguished as something invalid - or at the very least inconsistent insofar as treating them as such a thing goes. There is a huge problem there though, the fact that something is abstract or not fully explored does not make the existence of that thing any less certain, nor does it somehow make that principle less valid. 

    For example - the concept of language:
    "The idea that language mediates our thoughts and enables abstract cognition has been a key idea in socio-cultural psychology. However, it is not clear what mechanisms support this process of abstraction. Peirce argued that one mechanism by which language enables abstract thought is hypostatic abstraction, the process through which a predicate (e.g., dark) turns into an object (e.g., darkness)." [8] 
    To further explain myself, language is incredibly abstract, words do not have inherent meaning - they have a meaning that we, as a consensus, give them. The only way that we distinguish between words and their meanings are the language that we constrain them to, but that is entirely based on how you as an individual interpret and identify that. Yet... by merely asking each other for their defintions we can use words as concrete arbiters of meaning. Simiarly, gender is something that can only be seperated by one's internal and experiential identification of their gender - what distinguishes them is inherently individual, it would be like asking what seperates red from green - I suppose you could argue that they are seperate by different wavelengths of light, but how would you verify that that wavelength is that shade of color? You can't - because that is experiential. 

    Therefore, my opponent's argument regarding how "abstract" gender is - well -its irrelevant, how exactly does that put any doubt on gender identity as a concept? The abstractness of color or language doesn't prompt Con to discard them as principles, so we see that this argument regarding Gender Identity is nothing more than biased.

    • To conclude rebuttal two, my opponent's claim that the neurological evidence presented in round 1 applies to sex and not gender is false based on the implicit neccessity of neurology causing psychology, furthermore the reflection of said terms are to be used in occurdence of its meaning, furthermore, the fact that it is difficult to distinguish gender, or that it is abstract is not any indication that gender identity is somehow "invalid". 



    MORAL THEORY & OBLIGATION (REBUTTAL III)
    • Inner Guide
      • 3a - Reviewing Con's case 
      • 3b - Transgender Harm
      • 3c - Multiracial Ethics

    3A (REVIEWING CON'S CASE)
    "Last, my opponent attempts to conscript essentially everyone in assuming responsibility for the well-being of gender dysphoric trans individuals using "emotional blackmail," i.e. if we don't perceive these gender-dysphoric individuals as part of the yet to be defined and distinguishable group to which they identify, then we are essentially complicit and serve as the catalyst for their suicidal thoughts, substance abuse, childhood abuse, physical/sexual abuse, neglect, bullying, harm, depression, maltreatment, and the like. He employs an ill-constructed syllogism to conflate one's "desire" to live to that of others (that is, the two premises do not logically and necessarily extend to his proposed conclusion.)" [1] 
    Following this argument is an equivocation of race and gender, arguing that the citation I use regarding native american identity being denied causes empirical harm means that I should accept said equovication of gender and race, and based off of that, that any any self-identification would be at conflict with another identification. The above is essentially arguging that my syllogism regarding how we treat others is wrong and the citation of the empirical harms of misgendering is "emotionally blackmailing" the "us" of the syllogism. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 

    Before continuing, I will briefly cite my opponent's questions and answer them - note that this is merely to clear up some concepts before 3b and 3c.
    Q: "If my opponent is going to suggest that trans-people ought to be treated as the gender to which they identify, then how does he prescribe "cisgenders," and others who aren't trans, "treat" trans-people in accordance to their identified gender?" [1]
    A: Generally, by treating them as you would treat somebody of the gender they identify with and not the gender you percieve, primarily through correct pronouns. 

    Q: "How does one treat another as a "male" or a "female," or a "non-cis male," or "non-cis female," or "non-binary"?" [1]
    A: For example, you see your male friend named Tom, Tom leaves the room immediately after, and someone asks you where Tom went: You would respond, "He left the room,", essentially just treating them without the bias of what you assume their gender to be, and using the correct pronoun. 

    Q: " If one trans-individual informs a cis-gendered individual on his/her/zhim/zer sense of gendered identity, does one then apply that to every other trans-individual?" [1]
    A: The question itself is nonsense, a gender identity necccessarily applies to each indiviudal seperately, hence the word, "identity", this would be like asking, "If one person informs you that they're gay, does that mean every person who isn't straight is gay?" All you do is ask people their gender... it's not that difficult. 

    Q: "And if this identification is subject to an individual's "sense" of it, then can one truly treat another, trans or not, in accordance to one's gender?"
    A: Yes - you treat that indiviudal as they tell you they sense it - the answer is in the question itself. 


    3B (TRANSGENDER HARM)
    There is one, big problem with my opponent's "argument" here, its merely an assertion - recall:
    "He employs an ill-constructed syllogism to conflate one's "desire" to live to that of others (that is, the two premises do not logically and necessarily extend to his proposed conclusion.)" [1]
    My opponent regards the syllogism as "ill-constructed", but doesn't actually explain how my syllogism is invalid, recall the noted syllogism:
    In order for that desire to recpricated, you must respect that others have a desire to live, and allow them to live. To put it syllogistically:
    P1: You desire to live
    P2: Others desire to live
    Con: Allowing one another to live fulfills both desires
    I would like Con to please specifically explain the invalidity of the above syllogism, it is neccessarily true that if you desire to live, and others desire to live, then allowing one another to live does neccessarily fulfill both desires. My opponent's claiming otherwise would perhaps warrant more rebuttal, but the most my opponent provides is an assertion. Moving on, my opponent claims that being cognizant of harm that can be caused is equivelent to "conscripting" and "assigning blame". My opponent has misinterpreted my argument, the argument was that you ought to treat trans-indiviudals as the gender they idneitfy because doing otherwise is empirically harmful. This is not saying that you have to do as much, but that you should do that to arrive at the best outcome, i.e, the less harm. 

    The problem my opponent faces is the presence of moral obligations, If my opponent desires to avoid harm (as all humans do unless threatened, its an evolutionarily hardwired phenomena [9]), then it would follow that he neccessarily wants others to not harm him, and then the following conclusion is that, if you want to avoid harm, and the other indiviudal wants to avoid harm, you both have an obligation to not harm the other - if you harmed that indiviudal, you are giving them implicit permission to harm you, and vica verca - the only pragmatic way to avoid this negative feedback loop is to not harm one another. As such, the fact that misgendering and treating trans-indiviudals as the gender that they don't identify with causes them harm, you have a moral obligation to not misgender them.


    3C (MULTIRACIAL ETHICS)
    My opponent claimed, leaving out a core part of the citation I might add, that:
    "He also cites an example of multiracial individuals who reported experiencing low self esteem after filling out a demographic form which lacked options for multiple races"
    Please recall the actual citation:
    "One study looked at Native Americans and found that those who outsiders perceived as belonging to a different racial group experienced higher rates of depression and suicidality than those who were recognized for who they really were. Another study focused on multiracial individuals and found that those who were forced to report a single racial identity on a demographic form experienced lower self-esteem than those who were allowed to select multiple racial identities. And a study of transgender people found that the more frequently their gender identity was denied, the more stress and depression they experienced." 
    Essentially, its arguing that whenever one has a psychological identity, and that identity is denied repeatedly, it has negative effects on the individual. My opponent attempts to argue that I am equivocating the two... and no - I am solidfying the idea that denying one's identity will have negative effects on the identity, they claim that - this can cause inhibition on another idinvidual's identity.. and this is another, frankly, ridiclous. Like arguing that identifying as homosexual somehow inhibits someone from being straight. My opponent attempts to muddy the point by using his "only wanting to pursue relationships with people who can reproduce" identity to claim that gender identity inhibits on that identity, and it doesn't.

    Let's break this down, my opponent is claiming that "wanting to pursue relationships with only people who can reproduce" is inhibited by having to treat transwomen as women, but that isn't the case at all - not all women can reproduce either, claiming arbitrarily that the ability to reproduce is what defines a female is to literally strip humanity from people who cannot reproduce, and that's an actual absurditity. My opponent's attempts to equivocate this situation with race fails similarly, but what I want to emphasize is that sexuality is dictated by being attracted to gender, attracted to how somoen experiences x, y, or z, and that attraction is built on assumptions of what gender experience - what my opponent is talking about is a stereotype, not an actual example of attraction. 

    • In summary, my opponent doesn't actually have an argument, he asserts that my syllogism is invalid, but does not substantiate this, he attempts to equiovcate race and gender and being attracted to people who can reproduce and transwomen, but both fail to actually be valid in the way that Con interprets them. 




    SOURCES:
    Con
    Prior to this, my opponent cites the precise functions of the hypothalamus, essentially he is arguing that: because it is not the function of the hypothalamus to establish gender identity, it is, therefore, true that the constructive I provided regarding the hypothalamus is not evidence for the validity of gender identity. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 
    Yes, this is a misinterpretation. I'm not arguing nor have I argued that your construction regarding the hypothalamus is not evidence for the validity of gender identity. I am arguing that the functions of the hypothalamus as listed do not or has yet to inform on an identifiable and distinguishable gendered identity.

    Why is that at all relevant to our discussion regarding gender identity? Very simply put - we are discussing the reasons why the functions of the hypothalamus are related to gender identity. From there the connection is quite simple; gender dysphoria, an affiliation that is derived from external and internal stress regarding a conflict of an individual's physiological shape and gender identity [3], is quite clearly related and regulated by CHR - one of the Hypathalmus's primary functions. Given that fact, CRH has to be one of the key hormones in gender identity - as the only way that gender dysphoria can even form is a conflict between gender identity and another characteristic of an individual. Thus, any key formation of gender identity is reliant on CRH regulating stress, which determines if a transgender individual develops gender identity. 
    No, we are not discussing how the functions of the hypothalamus are "related" to gender identity. I'm questioning how the functions of the hypothalamus allegedly inform gender identity. And as you can see, my opponent is clearly employing sophistry. He's rendering conclusions based on loose connections, i.e. the CRH is a stress regulating hormone, gender-dysphoria involves stress induced by a conflict between one's physiological shape and one's gender identity, therefore gender identity is informed by CRH secretion. Secretion levels of CRH are suspected to inform a plethora of conditions such as anxiety, Depression, and anorexia nervosa. It could also worsen rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, ulcerative colitis, and Crohn's disease. It's a stress regulating hormone. And experiencing stress isn't gender-specific.

    But my opponent is welcomed to demonstrate how this hormone specifies, identifies, and distinguishes a gendered identity.

    Oxytocin is a lot of things, but its primary function is to influence social relationships between individuals of a population
    "The neuropeptides oxytocin (OT) and vasopressin (VP) are hormones that are known to mediate social behavior and cognition, but their influence may be sex-dependent. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive review of the sex-related influence of OT and VP on social cognition, focusing on partner preference and sexual orientation, trust and relevant behaviors, memory modulation, and emotion regulation." [4]
    The relevance here should be much more easily explained: the primary angle that I presented my evidence from the first round was establishing a concrete correlation between sexual dimorphism in the brain and gender identity which isn't cis-gender. Therefore, the fact that Oxytocin's key role is dictating sexual dimorphism in mammals makes the relation extremely clear. Individual's who are assigned a gender that conflicts with their gender identity's brain still develop as someone of their gender identity would develop, it subtly differs from the other gender, thus - oxytocin must be one of the key hormones in establishing gender identity, and especially in allowing it to develop over time - as the evidence provided before clearly demonstrates that gender identity and neurology correlate explicitly based on sexual dimorphism. 

    Given this evidence, it is quite clear that the hypothalamus does indeed have key roles in establishing and maintaining gender identity, this evidence also clearly contradicts my opponent's claim made in the previous round - yes - the hypothalamus is involved in gender identity - very much indeed.
    Oxytocin doesn't have a primary function given it's importance in gestation and giving birth as well. But once again, my opponent is employing sophistry--using loose connections to render conclusion he has not explicitly demonstrated. He argues "it must be" without explicitly delineating the information these hormones provide to gender identity. Only assumed correlations.

    My opponent's entire argument rests on a yet to be substantiated equivalence, i.e. the physiology of the brain = mind = identity. Until he substantiates this equivalence, he CANNOT satisfy his burden.

    However, even if my opponent were to disprove every point of the previous section, even if the Hypathalmus did indeed have no relation or function in regard to gender identity,
    Once again, I did not make this argument. I don't have to. It is your argument that the hypothalamus informs gender-identity. It is therefore your burden to substantiate that information.

    Recall: Con's position is that because the hypothalamus has no function of forming gender identity (false), it is therefore true that my citations aren't evidence of any correlation in gender identity and dimorphism of the hypothalamus. 
    That is not my position. This argument is not about "correlations." My opponent's proposition is "Trans-people are, and ought to be treated, as the gender they identify as." Your angle is to somehow explain that the physiological differences in a particular region of the brain, especially those in opponent's 42 person sample, correlated with those of a specified sex in spite of their "physiological shape." It has been and it is my opponent's intention to argue that these sexually dimorphic physiological differences in the brain manifest as a property of the mind, because as my opponent would allege, the mind is an emergent property of the brain. And if identity is formed in the mind, then these sex-based differences will also manifest in one's identity.

    So my demand to my opponent is this: identify how these sexual dimporphic physiological differences in the brain (specifically the hypothalamus) manifest in one's identity. Identify how they are distinguishable.


    This claim is fundamentally and logically flawed - the fact that something does not create or cause something as a function does not mean that the thing created cannot affect that something.
    You are arguing against straw men.

    In other words, the fact that the hypothalamus doesn't make gender identity doesn't mean that you can't get evidence for gender identity from the hypothalamus. That's... absurd, it would be like claiming that the only way you could prove anything about stars is from the nebula that created them - or learn anything about water would be consulting oxygen and hydrogen molecules, all of these claims are absurd. You can derive evidence of x from y without y creating x. For example; Tom made a chair, and Alexa bought that chair. Alexa doesn't need to take the chair back to Tom to identify the broken chair leg. 
    "Just because I can't make my argument, doesn't mean that my argument can't be made." That line of reasoning is irrelevant fluff. You are charged with the responsibility of substantiating your argument.

    Prior to this, my opponent attempted to establish several questions that would, presumably, poke holes in the idea of gender identity. Primarily he wants to establish that gender identity is a vague concept and that there is no actual way to distinguish a cis individual from a trans-individual.
    Not vague. And i don't have to establish that gender identity is vague. I have to established that identity is individual.

    A: They are distinguishable via self-identification - they are different experientially. 
    EXACTLY! Then what relevance do your neurological studies have in demonstrating a "correlation" if self-identification--in this case with one's "gender"--is subject to EXPERIENCE? Is experience informed by sexual dimorphism? Is the self subject to sex-based differences in the brain, and if so, how?

    (Note: Caps weren't applied to indicate "yelling." They are put there for extra emphasis.)

    What I'm arguing is that while gender usually does refer to purely social and cultural aspects of the gender/sex divide, the fact that their is a psychological aspect means that gender is defacto neurological, and therefore by proxy biological. Note that the definition specifically clarifies that the distinguishment of these terms are via the usuage of them, what does this mean? That the reason why we don't think of the neuroscience of gender is because we primarily talk about gender in a social or cultural context. The mere fact that my argument "seems" to follow one more than the other is irrelevent, as here we are discussing gender in both a social and a neurologic framework. 
    Yet again, my opponent is employing sophistry. This time, it's the employ of an erroneous biconditional, i.e. pyshcology = neuroscience. He has not substantiated this equivalence. He would have you accept this transitively, i.e. psychology studies the mind, the mind is a property of the brain, the brain is neurobiological, therefore psychology, like neuroscience, studies the neurobiological. And while my opponent seeks to create no distinction between psychology and the biological, his definition clearly does.

    My opponent appeals to these characteristics in some sort of informal reductio ad absurdum (presenting parts or facts regarding something as absurd in order to discredit it logically [7]). The problem is that an ad absurdum by itself does nothing to actually substantiate something absurd, it appeals to what is presumed to be absurd.

    My opponent appeals to these characteristics in some sort of informal reductio ad absurdum (presenting parts or facts regarding something as absurd in order to discredit it logically [7]). The problem is that an ad absurdum by itself does nothing to actually substantiate something absurd, it appeals to what is presumed to be absurd.
    A reductio ad absurdum is a mode of argument where one demonstrates that a premise when extended to its logical conclusion renders an absurdity, i.e. logical contradiction. I am asking you questions based on your proposition and the descriptions supplied. They are not rhetorical. I do expect you to answer them.

    Reading between the lines, it is clear that my opponent finds something which cannot be specifically distinguished as something invalid - or at the very least inconsistent insofar as treating them as such a thing goes. There is a huge problem there though, the fact that something is abstract or not fully explored does not make the existence of that thing any less certain, nor does it somehow make that principle less valid. 
    You're once again arguing against strawmen.

    Simiarly, gender is something that can only be seperated by one's internal and experiential identification of their gender - what distinguishes them is inherently individual, it would be like asking what seperates red from green - I suppose you could argue that they are seperate by different wavelengths of light, but how would you verify that that wavelength is that shade of color? You can't - because that is experiential. 
    Thank you very much for making my argument. You see, your neurological studies employ fixed standards of sex, i.e. the manifestation of sexual dimorphism in the hypothalamic region of the brain. And you've been using correlations to argue these manifestation are emergent in one's mind, and therefore one's identity. If one's self-identification with one's gender is primarily, or as you stated ONLY, subject to an individual's experience, then the correlations which you argued are ENTIRELY USELESS because they are informed by a sex-based standard that is undermined by individuality. That is, it doesn't matter that when analyzing the brains of trans individuals the INAH volumes were comparable to a specified sex, because the the manner in which they identified with their gender is still subject to their individual experiences. And since our discussion is not focused correlations of sexual physiology, then your studies have yet to provide any information that trans individuals are the gender with which they identify.

    Following this argument is an equivocation of race and gender, arguing that the citation I use regarding native american identity being denied causes empirical harm means that I should accept said equovication of gender and race, and based off of that, that any any self-identification would be at conflict with another identification. The above is essentially arguging that my syllogism regarding how we treat others is wrong and the citation of the empirical harms of misgendering is "emotionally blackmailing" the "us" of the syllogism. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 
    I'm dropping this tangent since race has nothing to do with the subject.

    Generally, by treating them as you would treat somebody of the gender they identify with and not the gender you percieve,
    And how I treat someone of the gender with which they identify?

    primarily through correct pronouns. 
    So is it your argument that in one's dereliction to use a "correct" pronoun, one is morally responsible for the harm (self-inflicted or otherwise) of a trans individual experiences, which includes a bevy of harms like suicidal thoughts, substance abuse, childhood abuse, physical/sexual abuse, neglect, bullying, harm, depression, maltreatment, and the like?

    For example, you see your male friend named Tom, Tom leaves the room immediately after, and someone asks you where Tom went: You would respond, "He left the room,", essentially just treating them without the bias of what you assume their gender to be, and using the correct pronoun. 
    How is one responsible for whatever harm may come their way if one does exhibit this bias?

    The question itself is nonsense, a gender identity necccessarily applies to each indiviudal seperately, hence the word, "identity", this would be like asking, "If one person informs you that they're gay, does that mean every person who isn't straight is gay?" All you do is ask people their gender... it's not that difficult. 
    It's not about difficulty; it's about why one ought to?

    A: Yes - you treat that indiviudal as they tell you they sense it - the answer is in the question itself. 
    Then why qualify it as "gendered"?

    I would like Con to please specifically explain the invalidity of the above syllogism
    Sure.

    Syllogisms necessarily extend the veracity of their premises. For example:

    P1: Animals are not plants (True)
    P2: Humans are animals (True)
    C: Therefore, Humans are not plants. (True)

    Your syllogism:

    P1: You desire to live
    P2: Others desire to live
    Con: Allowing one another to live fulfills both desires

    This does not extend the veracity of both premises. That is my desire to live is discrete from another's desire to live. I can kill you, for example, and that wouldn't affect either of our desires to live. Up until the point I kill you, you desire to live. They are not necessarily connected, unlike my previous example.

    But this is just more sophistry and emotional blackmail, since as of yet, you have not substantiated how refusing one's pronouns causes another's suicide.


    Round 3
    Pro
    Forfeited
    Con
    Seeing as my opponent has forfeited the previous round, there are no particularly new arguments to which I can respond. I will instead explore the concept of individual identity. In order to explore individual identity, we must first elaborate on the meaning of "self," which coincides with the definition I referenced in Round One.

    What is self?

    The self is a constellation of posited abstract notions, i.e. consciousness informed by sentient characteristics of which one is reflexively aware. Now I know what you're thinking: "let me google search this in order to confirm this overly verbose description." This doesn't take necessarily from one particular description and actually reflects a magpie effort to create a composite of numerous psychological and philosophical conclusions. Since the self can only describe its experiences reflexively, characteristics, experiences, sensations, values about the self by the self are necessarily subjective--i.e. contingent on gnosis (personal/individually experienced knowledge.) 

    Why is the self individual?

    First we must define, individual. For my purposes, I going to define the adjectival and nominal forms:

    adj. single; separate.
    n. a single human being as distinct from a group, class, or family. (Both from Oxford Languages.)

    Now I'd be remiss if I did not harken back to the description of the self and provide an A.P.A. definition as both my opponent and I have done since the first round.

    self
    n. the totality of the individual, consisting of all characteristic attributes, conscious and unconscious, mental and physical. Apart from its basic reference to personal identity, being, and experience, the term’s use in psychology is wide-ranging. According to William James, self can refer either to the person as the target of appraisal (i.e., one introspectively evaluates how one is doing) or to the person as the source of agency (i.e., one attributes the source of regulation of perception, thought, and behavior to one’s body or mind). Carl Jung maintained that the self gradually develops by a process of individuation, which is not complete until late maturity is reached...
    Now the operative term in that description is individuation, which is described as:

    individuation
    n.
    1. generally, the physiological, psychological, and sociocultural processes by which a person attains status as an individual human being and exerts himself or herself as such in the world.
    Because the self is chiefly experienced by the self, the self must therefore be distinct especially in comparison to how other selves experience themselves.

    Why can't (individual) identity be gendered?

    The definition my opponent provided suffices for the purposes of this contention. But let's remind ourselves how my opponent defined the term, gender:

    Gender - " the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female" [B]
    Let also define whereas, since opponent has either rejected or elided the fact that his definition contradicts the biological aspects of psychology and its descriptive, psychological (taken from Merriam Webster):

    Definition of whereas
     (Entry 1 of 2)
    1a : while on the contrary
    Not only is my opponents references on neurobiology irrelevant, but his definition also contradicts its information with respect to gender.

    When we suggest something or someone is "gendered" we are suggesting a standard. That is, a metric used to detect or index reproducibility. So if I were to index a group of individuals as "male" or "female," I'm suggesting that, in accordance with my opponent's description, there is a "link" or "correlation" psychologically, behaviorally, socially and culturally. So it would then follow that a gendered identity would be described as a sense of self which follows a psychological, behavioral, social and cultural standard which is informed by the terms "male" "female", or "neuter". But note what my opponent states here:

    A: They are distinguishable via self-identification - they are different experientially. 
    If this self-identification is different experientially, then it is impossible for it to meet a psychological, behavioral, social, cultural standard. Because the individual's identification is naturally reflexive--as I mentioned above. And therefore there is no way to identify or treat someone according to any standard that isn't subject to the individual's whims and preferences.

    If my opponent intends to concede. I ask that he does me the courtesy of let it be known here soon, so we can expedite this process.

    Round 4
    Pro
    Foreword:
    This is the last debate round I will post for a long time most likely. Purely because of how close this subject is to me as well as the....  rather loose way my opponent has defended his claimed. Were this anyone else, perhaps this would be a straight up - I forfeited to many rounds to come back in this one without a rebuttal from my opponent. However, given how loosely my opponent has defended his claims I will use nothing aside from the content in my earlier rounds to rebut, merely pointing out that my opponent either didn't respond to my point or didn't respond with anything substantial - nothing that my opponent would really need a rebuttal for. 

    Thank you everyone who reads my debates and votes on them, let's get started I suppose. 


    Why is that at all relevant to our discussion regarding gender identity? Very simply put - we are discussing the reasons why the functions of the hypothalamus are related to gender identity. From there the connection is quite simple; gender dysphoria, an affiliation that is derived from external and internal stress regarding a conflict of an individual's physiological shape and gender identity [3], is quite clearly related and regulated by CHR - one of the Hypathalmus's primary functions. Given that fact, CRH has to be one of the key hormones in gender identity - as the only way that gender dysphoria can even form is a conflict between gender identity and another characteristic of an individual. Thus, any key formation of gender identity is reliant on CRH regulating stress, which determines if a transgender individual develops gender identity. 
    No, we are not discussing how the functions of the hypothalamus are "related" to gender identity. I'm questioning how the functions of the hypothalamus allegedly inform gender identity. And as you can see, my opponent is clearly employing sophistry. He's rendering conclusions based on loose connections, i.e. the CRH is a stress regulating hormone, gender-dysphoria involves stress induced by a conflict between one's physiological shape and one's gender identity, therefore gender identity is informed by CRH secretion. Secretion levels of CRH are suspected to inform a plethora of conditions such as anxiety, Depression, and anorexia nervosa. It could also worsen rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, ulcerative colitis, and Crohn's disease. It's a stress regulating hormone. And experiencing stress isn't gender-specific.
    To simply put, my opponent's objection is bullshit. Bullshitery of the highest caliber. We are talking about what the hyperthalmus has to do with gender-identity forming, why the hell would a part of the brain have to ONLY relate to one function? Of course its not gender-specific, stress isn't, but it is one of the things. And I point that out in the paragraph he cites - read:
    "Given that fact, CRH has to be one of the key hormones in gender identity - as the only way that gender dysphoria can even form is a conflict between gender identity and another characteristic of an individual. Thus, any key formation of gender identity is reliant on CRH regulating stress, which determines if a transgender individual develops gender identity"
    Moving onward
    Oxytocin doesn't have a primary function given it's importance in gestation and giving birth as well. But once again, my opponent is employing sophistry--using loose connections to render conclusion he has not explicitly demonstrated. He argues "it must be" without explicitly delineating the information these hormones provide to gender identity. Only assumed correlations.
    My opponent stated: "Oxytocin also does x, therefore it can't do y", its more bullshitery, doesn't point out why its sophistry or how it doesn't inform gender identity, just that it does other stuff too... which, duh. 

    Forward,
    My opponent's entire argument rests on a yet to be substantiated equivalence, i.e. the physiology of the brain = mind = identity. Until he substantiates this equivalence, he CANNOT satisfy his burden.
    Nope - just that it informs identity, not that they are equal. Pointed that out too. 

    And even swifter on:
    identify how these sexual dimporphic physiological differences in the brain (specifically the hypothalamus) manifest in one's identityIdentify how they are distinguishable.
    This is after saying that his position wasn't what he said it was in the first round-  nope - that's bullshit - this is NOW your demand, not the one before - so yeah - he's doing this thing called "LYING". And... why? This would be like asking why atoms want full valence shells, its an observation borne from experimentation, you could question it, but that wouldn't really accomplish much. Here let me answer it anyway though - the people whose brain matches what we have for one gender typically, typically assign their gender as the one we have the research on. Pretty obvious. 

    He completely hand-waved this argument away as "fluff", leaving it a dropped point:
    In other words, the fact that the hypothalamus doesn't make gender identity doesn't mean that you can't get evidence for gender identity from the hypothalamus. That's... absurd, it would be like claiming that the only way you could prove anything about stars is from the nebula that created them - or learn anything about water would be consulting oxygen and hydrogen molecules, all of these claims are absurd. You can derive evidence of x from y without y creating x. For example; Tom made a chair, and Alexa bought that chair. Alexa doesn't need to take the chair back to Tom to identify the broken chair leg. 


    A: 
    They are distinguishable via self-identification - they are different experientially. 
    EXACTLY! Then what relevance do your neurological studies have in demonstrating a "correlation" if self-identification--in this case with one's "gender"--is subject to EXPERIENCE? Is experience informed by sexual dimorphism? Is the self subject to sex-based differences in the brain, and if so, how?
    *Le sigh*, my opponent doesn't seem to understand wording very well, you see - I said that gender identity (as far as distinction from an outside observer) is different self-identification - they are not "subject to experience", the way the indvidual distinguishes their gender identity is based on their experience, not changed by experience, classified by it. It would be like claiming that my perception of the color was "subject by experience" whenever I said that they are distinguished experientially. It's more like sophistry on my oppoenent's part really. 


    And this bit is interesting and first-hand shows how dishonest my opponent's framing is:


    What I'm arguing is that while gender usually does refer to purely social and cultural aspects of the gender/sex divide, the fact that their is a psychological aspect means that gender is defacto neurological, and therefore by proxy biological. Note that the definition specifically clarifies that the distinguishment of these terms are via the usuage of them, what does this mean? That the reason why we don't think of the neuroscience of gender is because we primarily talk about gender in a social or cultural context. The mere fact that my argument "seems" to follow one more than the other is irrelevent, as here we are discussing gender in both a social and a neurologic framework. 
    Yet again, my opponent is employing sophistry. This time, it's the employ of an erroneous biconditional, i.e. pyshcology = neuroscience. He has not substantiated this equivalence. He would have you accept this transitively, i.e. psychology studies the mind, the mind is a property of the brain, the brain is neurobiological, therefore psychology, like neuroscience, studies the neurobiological. And while my opponent seeks to create no distinction between psychology and the biological, his definition clearly does.

    My opponent appeals to these characteristics in some sort of informal reductio ad absurdum (presenting parts or facts regarding something as absurd in order to discredit it logically [7]). The problem is that an ad absurdum by itself does nothing to actually substantiate something absurd, it appeals to what is presumed to be absurd.
    What did he skip over completely in that quoting?
    Next - please draw your attention to the third term specifically - psychological - I submit a defintiion for the term now:
    "relating to the study of the mind:" [5]
    Further recall the framework established in round 1:
    "Psychological traits or properties are inherently emergent properties of neurological properties of one's self - therefore neurological properties apply to gender"
    "“Personality is an abstraction used to explain consistency and coherency in an individual’s pattern of affects, cognitions, desires and behaviors [ABCDs]” (Revelle, 2007, p. 37). But personality research currently provides more a taxonomy of patterns than theories of fundamental causes. Psychiatric disorders can be viewed as involving extremes of personality but are diagnosed via symptom patterns not biological causes. Such surface-level taxonomic description is necessary for science, but consistent predictive explanation requires causal theory. Personality constructs, and especially their clinical extremes, should predict variation in ABCD patterns, with parsimony requiring the lowest effective causal level of explanation. But, even biologically inspired personality theories currently use an intuitive language-based approach for scale development that lacks biological anchors. I argue that teleonomic “purpose” explains the organisation and outputs of conserved brain emotion systems, where high activation is adaptive in specific situations but is otherwise maladaptive" [6]
    I am not, nor have ever said, that psychology is neurology, I've said psychology is inherently emergent properties of neurology, and used the above to prop it up, even though my opponent never mentioned it. There needs no more explanation, my opponent is being dishonest with his claims or never read fully.

    You see, your neurological studies employ fixed standards of sex, i.e. the manifestation of sexual dimorphism in the hypothalamic region of the brain. And you've been using correlations to argue these manifestation are emergent in one's mind, and therefore one's identity. If one's self-identification with one's gender is primarily, or as you stated ONLY, subject to an individual's experience, then the correlations which you argued are ENTIRELY USELESS because they are informed by a sex-based standard that is undermined by individuality. That is, it doesn't matter that when analyzing the brains of trans individuals the INAH volumes were comparable to a specified sex, because the the manner in which they identified with their gender is still subject to their individual experiences. And since our discussion is not focused correlations of sexual physiology, then your studies have yet to provide any information that trans individuals are the gender with which they identify.
    Say it with me people, "Wooooooooord Saaaaaaaalaaaaaad". Excuse the ad hominem, but my opponent is about as bright as a grade schooler trying to argue with a grad student that pluto is still a full planet. Nope, my study finds correlations between what we typically see of brains of those that we agree are female versus brains of people that you disagree are female and saying, "Hey, they have the same stuff here." Nothing fixed about it, its about showing relative comparisons. Furthermore, if you have to accept my argument to try to undermine my argument, then you've conceded... because you agreed to my argument - there is no need to show that gender is informed by individuality if you already agree to that fact-  so if that is the only way you can come to the conclusion is flawed, then you've still lost....

    Further-furthermore, even that was still flawed, because you don't understand what comparisons are - in other words - this experiment was about determining (or how I used it anyways) was about measuring how good measuring gender self-identification is - the people who the trans people were tested against also identified themselves as female... you just don't really think about it, because you don't really think about this very hard. 

    Following this argument is an equivocation of race and gender, arguing that the citation I use regarding native american identity being denied causes empirical harm means that I should accept said equovication of gender and race, and based off of that, that any any self-identification would be at conflict with another identification. The above is essentially arguging that my syllogism regarding how we treat others is wrong and the citation of the empirical harms of misgendering is "emotionally blackmailing" the "us" of the syllogism. If this is somehow a misrepresentation of my opponent's argument I ask that they establish such in the second round, until then I will proceed with this interpretation. 
    I'm dropping this tangent since race has nothing to do with the subject.
    It does actually - it talks about your own harping. And like my opponent I shall drop some of his points, since he does exactly nothing to actually rebuke them

    P1: You desire to live
    P2: Others desire to live
    Con: Allowing one another to live fulfills both desires

    This does not extend the veracity of both premises. That is my desire to live is discrete from another's desire to live. I can kill you, for example, and that wouldn't affect either of our desires to live. Up until the point I kill you, you desire to live. They are not necessarily connected, unlike my previous example.
    Premises don't have to connect to one another, the conclusion has to be logically true given each premise, which is what mine does. My opponent doesn't understand how syllogisms work. Premises can both talk about the perspective of something on the same thing. 
    For example:

    P: P thinks x
    P: Q thinks x
    CON: C

    Given context:
    P: You don't like birds
    P: He doesn't like birds
    Con: Therefore neither likes birds

    The conclusion is an observation given both premises, simple as that. 

    And I can completely rebuke my opponent's premise given this one thing:
    If this self-identification is different experientially, then it is impossible for it to meet a psychological, behavioral, social, cultural standard. Because the individual's identification is naturally reflexive--as I mentioned above. And therefore there is no way to identify or treat someone according to any standard that isn't subject to the individual's whims and preferences.
    Wrong - experiential distinguish-ation isn't neccersarily decided by "whims", that's how sexuality works, yet one can still identify as gay or straight, based on how THEY EXPERIENCE REALITY - it is not a "whim", and while it could be considered a "preference", it is a preference in the same way that color is a "preference of which reflections of photons reach your eye socket." 

    For those confused, yes, Sexuality is a talking about which gender you "prefer", however the context of the definition my opponent and I are using is opposite, like "Toby preferred if she was male" like, experience, and gender identity is based on a preference, and how my opponent is framing it, like the thing they prefer isn't true.... however, you can prefer something and it be true- for example - I would prefer to be a male, and I am male - the mere fact that you prefer something does not mean that it is not true.

    Furthermore, experience is something which is based on every living things ability to interpret their environment, it is the ONLY way you can treat people. It is the only way people do treat people. My opponent is completely avoiding any research specifically because he knows psychology disagrees with him (and also he's a quack who thinks psychology is fake don't @ me, he does). 

    Anywho, thanks, this was really more of a rant than anything else, maybe if I had more time I would put in more effort, but really this is all I can afford to spend here. I don't think Athias makes any good points, this is the the last round I'll post that isn't an "Extend" or "My opponent basically conceded". 
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