Lately I've been listening to my arguments in a text to speech reader before posting. It helps a lot. Might help with your "always spell check before posting" rule
Feel free to concede the debate. I don't really want to have a long long debate about this topic in the forums though, mainly because the resolve is a semantic issue.
Conscious v unconscious is a false dichotomy. Consciousness is a state of awareness, and as we enjoy it, it is the state of being aware of being aware. How aware one is is directly tied to their neural complexity, And we wouldn't call a dog as conscious as a person but we would call a dog more conscious than a goldfish because they're operating on different levels of awareness and therefore different levels of consciousness.
Again, you're attempting to qualify good will that's good in itself with ends. But good will as a means and good will that's good in itself are different. Any moral principle cannot be qualified by the satisfaction of perceived ends, because then it would be a hypothetical imperative of morality rather than a categorical one. A categorical imperative is a principle of morality that tells you what's right without qualification. Please give an example of a good intention that brings about bad things and how that intention is no longer good. I wager you're going to give another example of an ends based motivation.
How is having sex for reproduction a moral action? Also, you didn't answer my question about the scientist. Would you say that the scientist acted morally?
And I'm not saying hypothetical imperatives dont exist, but that their "goodness" is always qualified by the context of the particular case, and can never lead to universal principles for this reason. The particular case is the lowest level of ethical discussion, and ends-based ethics can never have a discussion at the level of principle. Hypothetical imperatives of moral action are always predicated on the satisfaction of an end or inclination. Suppose a shopkeeper has the idea to shortchange his customers. But then he says to himself "if I do that, then I'll lose business." And decides not to. While he made a good decision, as I'm sure we agree, his motivation was selfish. This selfish motivation devoids the action of moral value. It's an amoral decision at best.
People can do bad things with good intentions, but their intentions still have moral value. Their good will doesn't need to satisfy some end to be qualified as good, unless their good will is good as a means. The only other good will is a will that's good in itself, or without qualifications.
In my example of the scientist, would you say that the scientist was acting morally?
What are you talking about when you say "if this super specific thing works universally, then it's moral"? The whole idea is to take a maxim like, "lie to get what you want" and imagine that it was a universal moral law. If it undermines itself, then it cannot possibly be a universal moral principle. It doesn't discriminate against minorites to say "stealing is wrong," unless those minorities are stealing. But the concept of "wrongness" is an a priori principle that is applied to the empirical input of the act of stealing when making the ethical judgement.
I did, the good will should be considered good in itself because it doesn't need qualifications to be good.
The moral value of an action comes from the maxim. Imagine if there was a scientist that created a weather machine to control the weather and intended to hold the world hostage, but when he turns it on, the machine malfunctions and creates perfect weather everywhere. It is one of the best things to happen to humanity. Would you consider the scientist to be acting morally? The moral value of his action, while producing good results, is found in his motivation.
Why must all goods be qualified? What qualifies a good will as being good, if it's not seeking the satisfaction of some preference? I say its good without the need of qualification because it is good no matter what ends it brings about.
There is a distinction between a will that's good in itself and a will that's good as a means. It's good in itself because it's goodness isn't qualified by the satisfaction of inclinations.
And if you have to qualify the good, then how can you even determine what is good outside of your perception of how it will satisfy some end? You need some thing that is good without qualification, which is the good will.
Universal principles of morality are how you attribute goodness or wrongness to empirical inputs in the first place. So if you have to qualify what is good by the context of the particular situation, then you are stuck with hypothetical imperatives of morality, rather than categorical ones. And in this way, what's good will shift and change and can never ascertain moral principle
Moral principles are necessarily universal. They have to be unqualifiedly good, or else they aren't principles of morality. You can't possibly know if your reason for moral action is in line with universal principles of morality unless you universalize the maxim.
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I didn't plan to vote on this
Wtf
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Vote bump, in case anyone else is feels like voting too
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Lately I've been listening to my arguments in a text to speech reader before posting. It helps a lot. Might help with your "always spell check before posting" rule
Right on
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Yes, yes I can.
I'd rather drag this out until I lose than mar my record with a no vote tie in a rated debate
The only way I will stop is if you formally concede. Otherwise, I'm always gunning for the win.
Well I'm gonna post my round 2 and then it's up to you if you want to keep going or concede.
Feel free to concede the debate. I don't really want to have a long long debate about this topic in the forums though, mainly because the resolve is a semantic issue.
source for my faith definitions, sorry
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/faith
Now thats a debate!
Lol "late"... Waiting until the last second is my specialty
Conscious v unconscious is a false dichotomy. Consciousness is a state of awareness, and as we enjoy it, it is the state of being aware of being aware. How aware one is is directly tied to their neural complexity, And we wouldn't call a dog as conscious as a person but we would call a dog more conscious than a goldfish because they're operating on different levels of awareness and therefore different levels of consciousness.
So the resolution is really more like "atheism and theism both use faith equally" or atheism and theism are both faiths."?
Are you saying that you'll be arguing all of these? That seems quite a large burden of proof. Especially with the tight character limit
Equal in what way? Education? Doctrinal length? Practices?
I guess to try to get an easy win for his first debate?
Yeah I think I agree. All it really attacks is an omnibenevolent god. Zeus doesn't care about evil.
ah, slow to the draw. Oh well, this will be fun to read.
Make this unrated and I'll accept
Well it's just wrong to not consider chess a sport lol
Pro probably has this one. I mean we're talking like a 200 kg weight difference
I forgot to edit a part in the examples, the third one is to demonstrate an amoral action, not a bad one, that produces good consequences.
Apologies.
Vote bump
Very tempting, too bad my hands are full
I'm excited to see just how bad of a mistake I've made
I look forward to getting this over with with you lol
Lol, saw that coming
Another one bites the dust?
Again, you're attempting to qualify good will that's good in itself with ends. But good will as a means and good will that's good in itself are different. Any moral principle cannot be qualified by the satisfaction of perceived ends, because then it would be a hypothetical imperative of morality rather than a categorical one. A categorical imperative is a principle of morality that tells you what's right without qualification. Please give an example of a good intention that brings about bad things and how that intention is no longer good. I wager you're going to give another example of an ends based motivation.
How is having sex for reproduction a moral action? Also, you didn't answer my question about the scientist. Would you say that the scientist acted morally?
And I'm not saying hypothetical imperatives dont exist, but that their "goodness" is always qualified by the context of the particular case, and can never lead to universal principles for this reason. The particular case is the lowest level of ethical discussion, and ends-based ethics can never have a discussion at the level of principle. Hypothetical imperatives of moral action are always predicated on the satisfaction of an end or inclination. Suppose a shopkeeper has the idea to shortchange his customers. But then he says to himself "if I do that, then I'll lose business." And decides not to. While he made a good decision, as I'm sure we agree, his motivation was selfish. This selfish motivation devoids the action of moral value. It's an amoral decision at best.
People can do bad things with good intentions, but their intentions still have moral value. Their good will doesn't need to satisfy some end to be qualified as good, unless their good will is good as a means. The only other good will is a will that's good in itself, or without qualifications.
In my example of the scientist, would you say that the scientist was acting morally?
What are you talking about when you say "if this super specific thing works universally, then it's moral"? The whole idea is to take a maxim like, "lie to get what you want" and imagine that it was a universal moral law. If it undermines itself, then it cannot possibly be a universal moral principle. It doesn't discriminate against minorites to say "stealing is wrong," unless those minorities are stealing. But the concept of "wrongness" is an a priori principle that is applied to the empirical input of the act of stealing when making the ethical judgement.
I did, the good will should be considered good in itself because it doesn't need qualifications to be good.
The moral value of an action comes from the maxim. Imagine if there was a scientist that created a weather machine to control the weather and intended to hold the world hostage, but when he turns it on, the machine malfunctions and creates perfect weather everywhere. It is one of the best things to happen to humanity. Would you consider the scientist to be acting morally? The moral value of his action, while producing good results, is found in his motivation.
You're good
Why must all goods be qualified? What qualifies a good will as being good, if it's not seeking the satisfaction of some preference? I say its good without the need of qualification because it is good no matter what ends it brings about.
So no, I'm not assuming the conclusion, it's just a reasonable inference.
There is a distinction between a will that's good in itself and a will that's good as a means. It's good in itself because it's goodness isn't qualified by the satisfaction of inclinations.
The good will is good without qualification, because it is good in itself. All other good things are qualifiedly good and therefore not categorical.
And if you have to qualify the good, then how can you even determine what is good outside of your perception of how it will satisfy some end? You need some thing that is good without qualification, which is the good will.
Universal principles of morality are how you attribute goodness or wrongness to empirical inputs in the first place. So if you have to qualify what is good by the context of the particular situation, then you are stuck with hypothetical imperatives of morality, rather than categorical ones. And in this way, what's good will shift and change and can never ascertain moral principle
Moral principles are necessarily universal. They have to be unqualifiedly good, or else they aren't principles of morality. You can't possibly know if your reason for moral action is in line with universal principles of morality unless you universalize the maxim.